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Abstract

This thesis advances the study of the legal literature from the madhhab-law tradition by way of
studying the Shāfiʿī literary tradition and its two most authoritative classics. These two works are
al-Nawawī’s (d. 676/1278) digest Minhāj al-ṭālibīn and Ibn Ḥajar al-Haytamī’s (d. 974/1567)
commentary on it, Tuḥfat al-minhāj. This study will provide a typology of the development of
the Shāfiʿī juristic texts. The typology is based on an indigenous and coherent periodization
centered around an analysis of the intellectual and social developments within the Shāfiʿī legal
tradition, not the classical Eurocentric periodization scheme. The main objective of this typology
is to present a coherent theory of texts that can serve our understanding in two main ways. First,
it will help situate these texts within overarching discursive developments in the Shāfiʿī legal
tradition. Second, it will contribute to a coherent understanding of how discursive arguments
emerged, interacted, and transpired across time and space. More specifically, it will help us
understand how and why these works emerged at the time, what social and scholarly functions
they served, what role language and nomenclature played in serving these functions, how they
acquired their authoritative status, and what overarching conversations they engaged with.
The Shāfiʿī madhhab is a discursive tradition that can be understood from multiple
perspectives. I analyze the particularities of its intellectual history through a historiographical
lens to trace how agreements and disagreements, both internal and external, were managed by
jurists and through texts. Starting with the eponymous founder, Muḥammad b. Idrīs al-Shāfiʿī
(150-204/767-820), I present a coherent narrative of the interpretive developments of the Shāfiʿī

9

literary tradition as a ‘story of books.’ This narrative will elucidate how and why literary genres,
juristic operations, and particular texts emerged, with a special focus on how to situate Minhāj
and Tuḥfa in Shāfiʿī literary history.
Both al-Nawawī’s digest Minhāj and Ibn Ḥajar’s commentary on it, Tuḥfa, will be
analyzed textually. I will analyze each text, its genealogy, the reasons it was authored, its
particular linguistic and terminological makeup, juristic objectives and achievements, and
examples from its juristic trajectory that demonstrate its different functions. A central interest of
this thesis is how each of the texts represent and contribute to the development of the genres of
digests (mukhtaṣarāt) and expansums (muṭawwalāt). The authors’ innovations in the realm of
juristic terms (al-muṣṭalaḥāt al-fiqhiyya) will be investigated to prove the centrality of these
terms to their juristic projects.

10

Introduction

Every day at the strike of 9 am, as soon as the security guards of the Egyptian House of Fatwa
unlock the gates of their public service office which is located across from a bustling highway,
al-Darasa district, Cairo, a flow of individuals rushes into the small yard outside the office
building. Eager for a religious legal opinion to settle personal matters, they form a short queue.
They come with different questions, varying between marriage, inheritance, or commercial
conflicts. By midday, the place is crammed and loud, without a space to sit. The crowd includes
women carrying and dragging toddlers, elderly men in wheelchairs, and young men in shorts and
ponytails. Seeing the demand for fatwas, and the fact that fatwa issuing has become “a
worldwide media phenomenon,” the same Egyptian House of Fatwa also provides its services via
email, text message, and by phone.1 It also mediates its services through popular primetime TV
and radio programs. The Shāfiʿī legal school, which is the main focus of this thesis, was
historically predominant in Egypt. However, in an attempt to fight “a multifarious production of
‘religious knowledge’ that has consistently lacked any axis of authority,” the website of the
Egyptian House of Fatwa explains that its current juristic methodology consists instead of
following the four Sunni schools of laws (madhhabs).2 The webpage adds that, “it acknowledges

1

Muḥammad Khalid Masud, Brinkley Morris Messick, and David Stephan Powers, Islamic Legal Interpretation:
Muftis and their Fatwas (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996), 29. In comparison to the currently highly
institutionalized and corporatized approach of the current Egyptian House of Fatwa, this book also claims that
issuing fatwas in the premodern world was carried out in a more un-institutionalized fashion, and “in diverse social
and historical setting [that] served to stimulate the development of sharīʿa from below and in response to the specific
needs of particular Muslim communities.” See: Ibid., 4.
2 Wael

ī

469.

Hallaq, Shar ʿa: Theory, Practice, Transformations (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009),
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and is familiar with others [i.e. madhhabs], and even grants them preponderance (tarjīḥ) for the
sake of attending people’s needs or for the sake of realizing the overarching objectives of
Shariʾa… which are Jaʿfarism, Zaydism, Ibāḍism, and even Ẓāhirism.”3 In contrast, however, the
houses of fatwa in other states favor a less pluralistic approach for the sake of consistency,
relying on the juristic tradition of a sole madhhab. For example, the Jordanian House of Fatwa
relies on Shāfiʿism4, while its Moroccan5 and UAE6 counterparts follow Mālikism.
A kilometer away from the Egyptian House of Fatwa, in a packed section of al-Azhar
Mosque, a Shaykh sits at the center of an informal circle to teach and comment on the section on
contracts (al-ʿuqūd) from al-Nawawī’s (d. 676/1278) classic digest, Minhāj al-ṭālibīn. Minhāj is
one of the two books that form the textual study of this thesis and is considered the most
authoritative legal text in the Shāfiʿī legal school. The Shaykh’s lesson is populated by students
from around the world, the majority of whom are South East Asian. In the same way scripture
and poetry are memorized, to this day, scores of Somali students continue a local tradition of
memorizing the entire text of Minhāj, which amounts to 370 pages in one of the latest editions,
3

For the complete detailed explanation of the methodology of iftāʾ of the Egyptian House of Fatwa, see: “Muʿtamad
al-fatwā fī Dar al-Iftāʾ”, website of Dār al-Iftāʾ al-Miṣriyya, accessed on 18 November 2019: http://dar-alifta.org/
AR/ViewFatawaConcept.aspx?Sec=fatwa&ID=64
4 The

webpage, which details the methodology of the Jordanian House of Fatwa in extracting fatwas, provides a
number of reasons why they choose to follow the Shāfiʿī madhhab. The reasons include piety, affirming moderation,
avoiding unreliable opinions, assuring consistency, and helping muftīs in their complicated mission; see: Manhaj alfatwā al-muʿtamad, Dāʾirat al-Iftāʾ al-Urdiniyya, accessed on 18 November 2019: https://www.aliftaa.jo/
ShowContent.aspx?Id=47#.XcOrO0UzYWo
5

Morocco constitutionally follows the Mālikī madhhab. For more on the activities of the Moroccan House of Iftāʾ
see: Hayʾat al-Iftāʾ al-Maghribiyya, al-Shuʾūn al-Dīnniyya, accessed on 18 November 2019:http://
www.habous.gov.ma/%D9%85%D9%86%D8%B4%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%88%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A9.html?task=showCategory&catid=83
6 The

website of the UAE House of Fatwa states that it adopts the Mālikī madhhab in matters of worship and favors
it in all other issues. See: al-Markaz al-Rasmī lil-Iftāʾ, accessed on 18 November 2019: https://www.awqaf.gov.ae/ar/
%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B1%D9%83%D8%B2%20%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B1%D8%B3%D9%85%
D9%8A%20%D9%84%D9%84%D8%A5%D9%81%D8%AA%D9%80%D9%80%D9%80%D9%80%D9%80%D8
%A7%D8%A1
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as part of their juristic education.7 This tradition exists in Yemen, Egypt, Kazakhstan and other
places where Shāfiʿism is taught and practiced. Outside the Mosque of al-Azhar, a book seller
takes a picture to post on social media of a new client posing and smiling while carrying a box of
a newly purchased new 10-volume edition of Ibn Ḥajar’s (d. 974/1567) Tuḥfat al-Muḥtāj. Tuḥfa
is the second of the two books that this thesis will study and is considered by post-classical
scholars one of the most authoritative Shāfiʿī legal commentaries.
Whether in religious life, family and laws, or education, Islamic law and the madhhablaw tradition continue to play a central role in the social life and daily practice of Muslims. Yet,
despite their significance, “We know very little about how, exactly, Islamic law came to acquire
its classical form, and even less about why.”8 Recent contributions have focused on Islamic law’s
relationships with the wider sociopolitical and cultural contexts and institutions, including
studying the process of law-formulation and law-determinacy in the Ḥanafī school, unveiling the
‘grammar’ of Islamic law and its works in context,9 the interplay between Shariʿa, politics and
materiality,10 among others. In specific, Al-Azem’s recent work on the Ḥanafī school and its
most authoritative texts is particularly important to this thesis, especially since it also studies the
of the most authoritative legal manual and commentary within that tradition. In addition, it
7

For more on this, see how open competitions are held with prizes are successful memorizers: “Ikhtitām musābaqat
fī ḥifẓ Minhāj al-ṭālib.lil-Imām al-Nawawī fī Maqadīshū”, al-Ṣūmāl al-Jadīd, accessed on November 2019: http://
alsomal.net/%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B5%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AE%D8%AA%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%85%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%A8%D9%82%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%AD%D9%81%D8%B8%D9%85%D9%86%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%AC-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B7%D8%A7/
8 Ahmed

El Shamsy, The Canonization of Early Islamic Law: A Social and Intellectual History (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2013), 3.
9

Brinkley Messick, Shar ʿa Scripts: A Historical Anthropology (New York: Columbia University Press, 2018).

10

ī

Iza R. Hussin, The Politics of Islamic Law: Local Elites, Colonial Authority, and the Making of the Muslim State
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2016).
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examines the legal process surrounding the creation and adoption of these two works and the
social contexts that produced them.11 In contrast, the Shāfiʿi madhhab continues to be
understudied, especially with regard to the totality of its literary tradition, its legal mechanisms,
late process of determining why certain texts are authoritative, and, more importantly, the wider
cultural and social institutions that produce and affect them. This thesis alone cannot resolve all
of these issues. Still, I hope that my work on the Shāfiʿī madhhab and its two most authoritative
texts will complement Al-Azem’s valuable contribution, especially since there is no study on the
history of the Shāfiʿī school and its literary tradition.
This thesis examines how juristic theory and processes interact within the Shāfiʿī literary
tradition, how the school’s doctrine and authority were achieved, and how they interacted with
socio-political, cultural, and intellectual conditions in Mamluk Egypt and the Levant between the
seventh/thirteenth and tenth/sixteenth centuries. In specific, I will address how these interactions
played out within two periods in the Shāfiʿī madhhab: a period known as the ‘era of verification’
(taḥqīq), in which the functionaries of the school filtered and verified the previously
unmanageably expansive legal corpus; and the ‘era of glosses’ (ʿaṣr al-ḥawāshī), in which
numerous multi-volume commentaries on authoritative texts were penned and became the new
main genre for jurisprudential innovation. As a case study, this research project will textually
examine the two most authoritative works in the Shāfiʿī literary tradition: (a) al-Nawawī’s (d.
676/1278) digest Minhāj al-ṭālib.and (b) Ibn Ḥajar al-Haytamī’s (d. 974/1567) commentary on it,
Tuḥfat al-minhāj. As such, the thesis will examine Shāfiʿism in the middle period (between the
seventh/thirteenth and the tenth/sixteenth centuries) through unpacking its two seminal texts in

11 Talal Al-Azem,

Rule-Formulation and Binding Precedent in the Madhhab-Law Tradition (Leiden: Brill, 2017).
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ways that will shed light on the legal tradition’s intellectual and literary history and the influence
of political and socio-cultural institutions on iftāʾ.
In so doing, the objective of this research project is to answer the following questions:
How was the legal doctrines of the Shāfiʿī school formulated and formalized? What literary,
linguistic, terminological, and juristic activities went into this process? What kind of intellectual
history did this process produce? And since, according to both Schacht and Calder, Islamic law is
a jurists’--as opposed to judges’--law, how did jurists (fuqahāʾ, sing. faqīh), especially late ones
like Ibn Ḥajar, canonize their legal corpus?12 Did the professionalization of jurists under the
Mamluks and Ottomans affect such processes? More importantly, were there certain social needs
and judicial, educational, and political changes that resulted in a shift in the function and scope
of legal ijthād within the confines of Shāfiʿī madhhab?
In specific, I will attempt to: (1) study the history of the Shāfiʿī literary tradition, with a
focus on the juristic processes that led arriving at its doctrines and authoritative texts; (2) provide
a textual study of the aforementioned pair of texts, with a focus on their genealogy, linguistic and
terminological content, and juristic contribution, and; (3) build on recent scholarship to discover
the relationship between such juristic developments and their wider epistemic, socio-political,
and cultural environment.
I hope that this thesis will contribute to a better understanding of the Shāfiʿī literary
tradition, its dynamics, the role of language and terminology within it, the different roles
different texts and genres played, and the social cultural elements that affected this tradition

12

Joseph Schacht, An Introduction to Islamic Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964), 5 and 209; Norman Calder,
“Law,” in Seyyed Hossein Nasr and Oliver Leaman (eds.), History of Islamic Philosophy, (London-New York:
Routledge, 1996), 986.
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between between the seventh/thirteenth and the tenth/sixteenth centuries. By this, I hope to
contribute to bridging the gap of understanding how post-classical Islamic law functioned, in
both the eras of verification (ʿaṣr al-taḥqīq) and commentaries (ʿaṣr al-ḥawāshī).

Theoretical and Methodological Notes
This thesis posits that studying the Shāfiʿī madhhab as a tradition, based on the postulations of
Alasdair MacIntyre and Talal Asad, reaps several benefits.13 Together, their contributions have
helped develop the notion of an Islamic tradition. Among these benefits is recognizing and
emphasizing the discursive nature of such religious legal structures. Hence, this leads to
acknowledging the importance of identifying the roles of debates and disagreements in
madhhab-law structures, from their foundation onward. As it is not the scope of this thesis to
engage with the external arguments, this thesis will not engage with the external discourses of

13

Although MacIntyre defined the term in several of his writings, the most comprehensive and relevant definition
he provides of a tradition is arguably the following, “a tradition is an argument extended through time in which
certain fundamental agreements are defined and redefined in terms of two kinds of conflict: those with critics and
enemies external to the tradition who reject all or at least key parts of those fundamental agreements, and those
internal, interpretative debates through which the meaning and rationale of the fundamental agreements come to be
expressed and whose progress a tradition is constituted”; Alasdair MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality?
(Ducksworth: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988), p. 12.
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the madhhab-law tradition in relation to Shāfiʿism.14 As for the internal discourses within the
Shāfiʿī madhhab, the Shāfiʿī juristic tradition emerged out of a special historical moment that
was characterized by inter-denominational Sunni tensions. These tensions were mainly between
the rationalist school of Abū Ḥanīfa; the scripturalist approach of the school of Imām Mālik, with
its emphasis on the role of oral communal culture of the ‘practice of the people of
Madīna’ (ʿamal ahl al-Madīna); and the primacy of consensus, which was championed by Ibn
ʿUlayya, who is one of al-Shāfiʿī’s main interlocutors, among other forces.15 It is the purpose of
Chapter One to trace other tensions and to investigate how the founding rationale was revisited
through time.
A second benefit of MacIntyre’s postulation is to recognize that, as is the case in other
intellectual traditions, madhhabs integrate rational and moral elements. The moral elements were
adequately substantiated by Hallaq.16 One pertinent example of the rationality of these traditions
is their inherit relation to Legal Theory (uṣūl al-fiqh); a discipline that is concerned with
systematizing the interpretation of scriptural sources of Islamic law as well as creating an
14

It suffices here to mention that external inter-madhhab debates constitute the well-known genres of apologia and
the explanation of inter-madhhab disagreements, or ikhtilāf. Both of these genres include ‘offensive’ and ‘defensive’
literature in all madhabs, and the Shāfiʿī madhhab is no exception.To give a general overview of inter-Madhhab
apologia, for an example of works attacking Shāfiʿī jurisprudence from the Mālikī perspective, see: Muḥammad alLabbād al-Qayrawānī, Kitāb al-radd ʿalā al-Shāfiʿī, edited by ʿAbd al-Maguid b.Ḥamda (Tunisia: Dār al-ʿArab lilṬibāʿa, 1986). For a work on the superiority of the Shāfiʿī madhhab and its jurisprudential methodology, see:
Muṣṭafā al-ʿArūsī, al-Anwār bahiyya fī bayān aḥaqiyyat madhhab al-shāfiʿiyya (Cairo: Dār al-Iḥsān, 2019).
Arguably the most extensive intra-madhhab defense of the scriptural proofs of the Shāfiʿī school and those of alShāfiʿī’s opinions is al-Nawawī’s al-Majmūʿ, which will be discussed in Chapter Two; Yaḥyā b.Sharaf al-Dīn AlNawawī, Al-Majmūʿ, edited by Shaykh Najīb al-Muṭiʿī (Jaddah: Maktabat al-Irshād, n.d.). In defense of the ‘new’
and ‘old’ opinions of the founder of the Shāfiʿī school, see the important treatise of Ibn al-Qāṣṣ, which will be
discussed later on in this chapter: Aḥmad Ibn al-Qāṣṣ, Nuṣrat al-qawlayn lil Imām al-Shāfiʿī, edited by Māzin Saʿd
al-Zabībī (Damascus: Dār al-Bayrūtī, 2009).
15

El Shamsy, Canonization, 224.

16

ī

ī

This idea that morality has always been an essential part to Islamic law is at the heart of Hallaq’s Shar ʿa: Theory,
Practice, Transformations, where he criticizes many academic theses’ perception of Islamic law as being void of any
moral dimension. See: Wael Hallaq, Shar ʿa: Theory, Practice, Transformations (Cambridge, UK; New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2009), 10.
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interpretive canon that focuses on producing formal legal reasoning.17 Uṣūl al-fiqh is an
essential part of all madhhabs aiming to provide an objective and critical process that governs
legal deduction.18 Uṣūl al-fiqh is especially central to how the Shāfiʿī madhhab started and
evolved, since its own founder has authored what some claim is the first work of Legal Theory in
Islam in his famous al-Risāla. In addition to uṣūl al-fiqh, other forms of rationalizing the legal
operations within the madhhab-law tradition include the ‘meta’-madhhab principles of
overarching objectives of Shariʿa (maqāṣid al-sharīʿa)19 and operational legal maxims that
govern legal deduction within the madhhabs.20
The third benefit is acknowledging that sharing a linguistic, in specific terminological,
patrimony is essential to the founding and progress of a legal tradition. As El Shamsy points out,
creating common terms was important to the Shāfīʿī madhhab since its very beginning.21 The
genre and the role juristic terminologies (muṣṭalaḥāt fiqhiyya) is a central focus of this thesis
and will be examined in Chapters Two and Three.

17

Intisar Rabb, “Islamic Law Through Legal Canons” in Routledge Handbook of Islamic Law, edited by Khaled
About El Fadl, Ahmad Atif Ahmad, Said Fares Hassan (New York: Routledge , 2019), 2017.
18

For an overview of uṣūl al-fiqh, see B. Hallaq, A History of Islamic Legal Theories: An Introduction to Sunni uṣūl
al-fiqh (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
19 These

hierarchical objectives are five and concern the protection of faith, property, life, progeny, and intellect, in
that order.
20 These

legal maxims are: (1) certainty will not be overturned by doubt, (2) hardship must be elevated, (3) matters
will be judged by their purposes, (4) harm must be removed, and (5) custom has the weight of the law. For an
explanation of these maxims and how these function in the the Shāfiʿī madhhab, see; ʿAbd Allah b.Alī al-Damlijī
Suwaydān, Sharḥ al-qawāʿid al-khams al-latī yanbanī ʿalayha al-fiqhʿalā madhhab al-imām al-Shāfiʿī (Cairo, Dār
al-Iḥsān, 2018); also seeJalāl al-Din al-Suyūṭī, al-Ashbāh wa al-naẓāʾir fi qawāʿid wa furūʿ al-Shāfiʿiyya, edited by
(Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1983), 7-8.
21

“The Shāfiʿī school that grew around al-Shafiʿī’s paradigm of law in the third/ninth century was thus primarily a
discursive institution, rooted in a central corpus of texts and shared techniques for its analysis. These were
transmitted and developed in a burgeoning secondary literature and spread rapidly to other legal schools,
inaugurating a process of convergence that would eventually culminate in the creation of a common terminological
and methodological basis in Sunni thought”; El Shamsy, Canonization, 224-226.
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Fourth, I am encouraged by several recent works that bring together insights from
religious anthropology and textual studies of legal texts to reveal new insights about legal
religious traditions and their actors. One example is Messick’s Shar ʿa Scripts that studies the
performative dimension of a textual tradition within Zaydism, combining an ethnography of textbased writing and reading activities with a philological study.22 Also drawing on Nakissa’s recent
monograph, I am interested in benefiting from his insights into combining practice theory and
hermeneutics theory in order to arrive at a better understanding of religious legal traditions on
their own terms.23 Since traditions consist of signs (of mental attributes, e.g. piety) and effects
(action and structures onto the material world, e.g. the structure of studying a juristic manual),
hermeneutic theory offers insights into grasping a holistic picture of how religious juristic
traditions operate. In specific, it can offer insights into understanding why representatives of
these traditions have an important religious and spiritual standing. As Nakissa asserts, “In the
Islamic tradition, it is expected that religious scholars obey God by acting in accordance with His
rules/intentions. Since religious scholars act in accordance with God’s rules/intentions, their
actions are effects of God’s rules/intentions… Given this situation, God’s mental attributes can
be inferred from the obedient action (including statements) of religious scholars.”24
22

Brinkley Messick, Shar ʿa Scripts: A Historical Anthropology (New York: Columbia University Press, 2018). Of
particular interest to this paper, the book pays attention to the social context of lf legal texts, whether library or
archival, the transition from oral to written in the legal spheres, and how the legal rankings and authorities were
constituted. Of interest here is how Messick builds on Geertz’s conception of Shariʿa as a form of “local knowledge”
and is connected to an intellectual tradition: Messick, Shariʿa, p. 26. Through exploring the interaction between the
doctrinal juristic writing (“library”) and how these rules were encountered in action in the local judicial system
(“archive”), Messick provides an important portrayal of a lived legal tradition. Also, a major intersection between
his work and this thesis is his exploration of the independent juristic preferences of Zaydī jurists that fall outside the
established position of their school (ikhtiyārat), which is similar to preferences of Imam al-Nawawī which I examine
in Chapter Two.
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ī

Nakissa, The Anthropology, 44.

ī
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Muslim scholars from the madhhab-law tradition offer guidance to their followers
through both articulating rules (i.e. madhhab-specific doctrines, guidelines, dispensations, etc.)
and instilling and embodying mental attributes (piety, scrupulousness in implementation of
actions, and intentions). It is the attempt to enrich one’s religious life of the adherents by way of
arriving at, instilling, and acting on God’s mental attributes, as embodied in the actions and
statements of religious jurists and scholars, that represent the religious dimension of the
madhhab-tradition. Whether these attributes are encountered by direct encounters with jurists in
educational or judicial settings or through texts, this dimension is what gives importance to their
social and religious life. This understanding is in line with how jurists see their work and social/
religious role. They are seen as representatives of the God; whether on the level of ijtihād or
below that, as individuals attempting to reach God’s rule on any given legal question for the sake
of their stakeholders.25 It is also because of the importance of this dimension that all biographies
of author-jurists and jurists include a section on their piety and religiosity. The three biographies
of the central figures of this thesis, al-Shāfiʿī, al-Nawawī, and Ibn Ḥajar, provide a vivid picture
of the interconnection between their personal piety and impersonal juristic reasoning.
Below is a Literature Review followed by an overview of the Framework of the Thesis.
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For example, al-Shāṭibī asserts, “On the whole, a muftī is a teller on Allah’s behalf (mukhbir ʿan Allah) just like a
prophet. He is a deputy of Shariʿa (muwaqqiʿ lil-al-sharīʿa) in relation to the action of the religiously responsible
individuals (mukallafīn) based on his own judgment in the same way a prophet does. His ruling is upon the Umma is
enforceable, based on the authorization of being a vicegerent (khalīfa), just like a prophet.” See: al-Shāṭibī, alMuwāfaqāt fī uṣūl al-sharīʿa, edited by Aḥmad Muṣṭafā Qāsim al-Ṭahṭāwī and Sayyid Zakariyyā al-Ṣabbāgh (Cairo:
Dār al-Faḍīla, n.d.), 3:270.
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Literature Review
Despite a number of well-received scholarly works in the field of Islamic law, the longestablished preoccupation with the formative period continues. Comprehensive treatments of the
dynamics and discourses of Islamic law in the late classical pre-modern era are scarce. Legal
studies of the late period, inter-disciplinary or otherwise, suffer a noticeable gap, which this work
hopes to bridge with regard to certain aspects of the Shāfiʿī school. Due to its wide application
and official adaptation by the Ottomans and (some) Mamluks, the Ḥanafī school may have
attracted more scholarly attention than all others. This thesis will highlight the process of
discursive canonization in the Shāfiʿī literary tradition, weaving insights from intellectual history
with textual analysis.
Hallaq’s central argument in Shar ʿa: Theory, Practice, Transformations, a critique of the
post-classical decline paradigm that permeates Islamic legal studies, is that Islamic law is
constructed on moral grounds, not those of the power of the state. The scope of this book
intersects with the study of post-classical Shāfiʿism, since it engages with the concept of the
emergence and the development of legal schools (in all their successive iterations, whether study
circles, personal schools or discursive doctrinal institutions) is based on social morality and
concern for the metaphysical. And due to their financial or semi-independence, the jurists were
able to attend to their duty of deriving legal rulings based on religious sources and functioning as
mediators between the government and the people. Since both al-Nawawī and Ibn Ḥajar are
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after the Seljuqs, especially under the Mamluks and Ottomans. His assessment of the era is
important, as he affirms the existence of an equilibrium during that period between men of the
pen and those of the sword. “The ruling elite received cooperation of the scholars and their
promotion of their legitimacy, while the scholars received a salary, protection, and the full right
to apply the law as they saw fit… the judges applied the fiqh as the Sharīʿa and its author-jurists
and muftis required.”26 This is especially the case with the Shāfiʿī school since it continued to
develop outside state-sponsorship, for different reasons. This investigation will engage Hallaq’s
arguments, which claims that Islamic legal scholarship, including the Shāfiʿī school, enjoyed
independence from the power of the state under both the Mamluks and early Ottomans.
However, the exclusion of the Shāfiʿī madhhab from being the main madhhab in Egypt and the
Levant weakened the development of jurisprudence of interpersonal transactions (muʿāmalāt),
vis-a-vis matters of worship (ʿibādāt).
A work that focuses on the formative period, offering an insightful analysis on the
emergence and continuation of the discursive Shāfiʿī community, is El Shamsy’s The
Canonization of Islamic Law. This monograph provides a valuable study of the canonization
project of Imam al-Shāfiʿī, meaning how he gave scripture, especially ḥadīth, hermeneutic
authority in the jurisprudential process. The term ‘canonization’ is multivalent, and it emerged in
a particular Western context. Its use in other religious and legal traditions is problematic. I use

26 Wael
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the term ‘canonization’ cautiously.27 The early process of canonization did not make certain legal
texts by al-Shāfiʿī standard authoritative texts. Rather, it positioned prophetic traditions as a
whole as primary textual sources for legal interpretation. Here, El Shamsy agrees with Shacht
and Brown that this adaptation of prophetic traditions constitutes canonization.28 El Shamsy’s
book champions ‘radical individualism’ of the jurists over the legal tradition of Medina which is
based on communal culture. Distraught with the sacralization of communal tradition (ʿamal) of
early Mālikism, the book depicts Imam al-Shāfiʿī’s solid theorization, creativity and radical
individualism as expressed in a confident authorial voice; a subject that directly connect with
later attempts of rule formulation and the introduction and role of the commentarial genre.
Another important relevance of this work to this research project is how later generations of
Shafiʿīs follow the methodology of their eponymous founder, albeit critically, through what he
terms ‘secondary canonization.’29 This secondary process of canonization was later performed by
successive Shāfiʿī jurists who inferred authoritative rulings and selected authoritative texts by
scholarly process that followed a methodology, was inspired by the science of ḥadīth, and was
influenced by historical, cultural and juristic developments. As we shall see below the process of
juristic verification that performed by al-Nawawī and al-Rāfʿī in the seventh/thirteenth century is
akin to a canonization of juristic opinions; not books or a category of scriptural source.
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For an examination of the term canonization and its introduction to Islamic Studies, especially ḥadīth studies, see:
Jonathan Brown, The Canonization of Al-Bukhari and Muslim: The Formation and Function of the Sunni Ḥadīth
Canon (Boston; Leiden: Brill, 2007), 21-46. In it he examines the emergence of the term in the Biblical tradition and
its introduction into literary and legal studies. He also shows how it is used historically in two different ways: as a
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between using term in the Western context and other cultural and civilizational contexts and traces the use of the
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Fachrizal’s study of Imam al-Nawawī, one of the two central figures of this research
project, represents an important contribution to Islamic legal studies. With its focus on a single
jurist and on analyizing why his influence was so important to his juristic school, it provides a
valuable understanding of how al-Nawawi achieved his eminent status within the Shāfiʿī school.
It closely examines his efforts in reviewing, reevaluating, rearranging, refining, and reconciling
the school’s entire legal corpus of the Shāfiʿī school that was produced up until his time. In
specific, its main contribution lies in its examination of the story of how al-Nawawī reconciled
the legal opinions the understudies Iraqian and Khurasanian hermeneutical sub-schools (ṭarīqas);
a long overdue research project in understanding the legal and intellectual history within the
Shāfiʿī legal tradition. In specific, the book studies the influence of al-Nawawī’s teacher, Ibn alṢalāḥ (d. 643/1245) on him. The crux of the book, which directly relates to my work on poststabilization canonization, affirms that the same personal and doctrinal authority that was at the
heart of establishing the madhhabs, especially the Shāfiʿī one, was “extended to later jurists who
lived during the post-formative period, such as al-Nawawī, and for the same reasons, that is, in
order to structure and stabilize legal dispositions in the Muslim community.”30 Al-Nawawī’s
authority, based on which Ibn Ḥajar and other later mujtahids rely, is due to his superb
achievement of filtering and drastically minimizing the expansive legal pluralism that existed
before him through the above mentioned sub-schools. Al-Nawawī embarked on such a
momentous project, first, for the practical purpose of enabling his fellow jurists to arrive at legal
opinions that are endorsed by the madhhab’s hermeneutical principles easily and, second, by
way of elaborating on his legal methodology in his longer works.
30

Fachrizal A. Halim. Legal Authority in Premodern Islam: Yaḥyā b. Sharaf al-Nawawī in the Shāfi’ī school of Law
(London; New York: Routledge, 2015), 5.

25

One of the main findings of Fachrizal’s book that is relevant to this thesis is the influence
of Shāfiʿī fiqh master--who is more famed for his erudition in Ḥadīth--Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ (d. 643/1245)
on al-Nawawī. Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ was the teacher of al-Nawawī’s teacher. Ibn al-Ṣalaḥ had many
influences on al-Nawawī’s hierarchy of ijtihad, an influence that was not traced by either Hallaq
or Calder in their magisterial examination of the hierarchy of ijtihādic juristic authority.31 Ibn alṢalāḥ’s lasting influence on al-Nawawī is not only in his ḥadīth-guided approach to law, but,
more importantly, his own outlook and trajectory with regard to reconciling the two Shāfiʿī subschools and typologies of iftāʾ and ijtihād. In the same way, Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ’s influence on alNawawī’s most celebrated ḥadīth works is well established, especially on al-Nawawi’s
commentary on Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim, one can easily trace a parallel and obvious impact from Ibn alṢalāḥ’s al-Nawawī fiqh. In specific, we can easily trace the influence of Ibn al-Ṣalah’s discourse
on the etiquettes of seeking and issuing fatwas from his book on Adab al-muftī wa al-mustaftī on
the main structure of the typology of mujtahids in al-Nawawī’s introduction to Majmūʿ. This
legal influence has not been traced or studied before.
In addition, al-Nawawī’s lasting contribution to the Shāfiʿī school consists in him, first,
becoming an authorial axis, whose work on ḥadīth authentication was dedicated to
authoritatively providing textual proofs to his legal positions. It is for this reason that he later
became called ‘the authenticator (muḥaqqiq) of the madhhab’. Second, He also reconciled the
legal differences between the two Shāfīʿī sub-schools, the Iraqian and Khurasanian. This project
was one of the concerns of Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ. Al-Nawawī also used his chain of transmission of the
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juristic works both sub-schools which connects to Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ to authenticate and verify the
their legal opinions. Through a process of preponderance that examines both the text (matn) and
transmission (isnād) of legal opinions of previous scholars (in yet another resemblance to
verification of ḥadīth reports), al-Nawawī was able to deliver his lasting juristic ocntribution.
Another resemblance to the science of Ḥadīth that Fachrizal highlights is the centrality of
biographical studies to the rule-formulation efforts of al-Nawawī. This included a process of
rewriting “the life history and achievements of other high-caliber jurists who, despite their close
affinity with al-Shāfiʿī, found their membership in the Shāfiʿī madhhab called into question.”32
In this thesis, I shall provide a clear differentiation of the terms of tarjīḥ within the
Shāfiʿī school which seem to have escaped previous scholars working on Shāfiʿism in the Middle
Period, including Halim. For example, the term aẓhar (lit. more manifest) does not only mean
the most distinctive legal view, but is also specific to the process of only weighing between the
opinions of the eponymous founder alone. There are few other variations that are covered in
Chapter Two.
Al-Azem’s textual analysis of the process of rule-formulation and legal precedence in the
madhhab-tradition represents an important and relevant contribution. It focuses on closely
studying a pair of the most authoritative texts in the Ḥanafī school, Qudūrī’s Compendium and
Ibn Quṭlūbughā’s commentary on it. Both in its structure and focus, this book is an inspiration
for this thesis. Al-Azem’s central argument is that the most salient feature of the madhhab-law
structure is the binding authority it furnishes on the genre of legal commentaries; especially
through the processes of rule-formulation (tarjīḥ) and law-determinacy (taṣhīḥ). Al-Azem goes
32
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beyond Hallaq and Calder in their study of juristic hierarchy, situating this conceptual legal
institution within the broader (internal) periodization of Ḥanafī madhhab, its commentarial
tradition, and the process of jurisprudential reasoning. He provides an expansive and careful
reading of the textual developments of Islamic law. It also provides valuable terminological
investigations and engagements with the commentarial tradition, to which Ibn Ḥajar’s Tuḥfa
belongs. Al-Azem asserts that “writings in this genre may contain much originality and legal
value, and should not be dismissed due to an assumed lack of ‘independence.’”33 Other relevant
aspects from this monograph include the meaning and function of a madhhab, main
characteristics of the madhhab-law system, the typology of juristic authority, periodization of
sources, and survey of legal arguments. Its investigation of the problems arising from the
quadruple four-tier judicial systems that were introduced by the Mamluks, a development that
urged jurist-authors to formulate and determine preponderant juristic rules for both jurists and
judges, is of central relevance.
As for the Arabic secondary sources, ʿUkāsha’s study of the fatwas and their impact on
the Mamluk society in Egypt and the Levant, Al-fatāwa al-dīniyyia wa atharuhā fī mujtamaʿ
Miṣr wa al-Shām: ʿaṣr ṣalāṭīn al-Mamālīk, is an extensive and comprehensive study. Its
coverage of form and contents of fatwas from the period is very helpful, including the sample
fatwas. He also provides an exposition of the official and unofficial fatwa-issuing bodies
(mosques, madrasas, etc), an exhaustive survey and list of the names, brief biographies, fatwa
collections, madhhab, and tenure of muftīs (including women muftīs, the most famous among
them is ʿĀisha al-Bāʿuniyya (d. 922/1517), and an examination of the creation of an official and
33 Al-Azem, Talal.
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specialized house for iftāʾ, i.e. Dār al-ʿAdl. There is a survey of subjects and impacts of different
fatwas; varying between political (e.g. high profile appointments, sacking, legitimizing war
waging), religious (related to managing endowments, Christians, new cultural innovations,
prohibiting extravagant women clothing that mimics the wives of the Mamluk princes),
economic (protesting increase in taxes or allowing them, endorsing change of currency used,
etc.), and even environmental. The book’s direct relevance is that it examines Imam al-Nawawī’s
fatwas and his encounter with the Mamluk Sultan, al-Ẓāhir Baybars (d. 676/1277), to endorse a
fatwa to force the population to contribute to fight the Moghul armies. The book culminates in
several important findings, including the conclusion that the Shāfiʿīs constituted more than fifty
percent of all muftīs, that two families of Shāfiʿī judges dominated the official muftī seats, and
that at times fatwas enjoyed influence that surpass those of the Mamluk sultans themselves.34
With its special technical focus and comprehensiveness, al-Khaṭīb’s Ikhtiyārāt al-imām
al-Nawawī allatī tafarrad bihā min al-madhhab al-Shāfiʿī examines the special juristic
preferences (ikhtiyārat, sing. ikhtiyār) of al-Nawawī. Ikhtiyārāt is a special term. It indicates
differing with both Imām al-Shāfiʿī and the established opinion within the madhhab, and coming
up with a new evidence-based opinion. At the heart of this work is a subtle but important
distinction between preponderance (tarjīḥ) and ikhtiyār. As the author emphasizes, there is an
important but subtle difference between the two, one that caused Ibn Ḥajar to scorn jurists who
heedlessly equate the two.35 This book’s significance lies in several areas. First, it surveys and
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studies all the ikhtiyārāt of al-Nawawī from all his books, including Minhāj. The book proves
and examines the idea of the fragmentation of independent legal reasoning (tajzuʾ al-ijtihād) by a
qualified scholar, in this case it is al-Nawawī is this relevant to revisit the hierarchy of juristic
ijtihād. This practice transforms ijtihād into a compartmentalized process that is applied
vertically; which is still radical and involves differing with the established opinions of the
madhhab. The preponderant opinion among the majority of scholars is that this topic-specific
ijtihād is permissible. In his authoritative gloss Jamʿ al-jawāmiʿ on Shāfiʿī jurisprudence (uṣūl),
Shaykh Ḥasan al-ʿAttār (d. 1250/1835), asserts,
(The permissibility of the fragmentation of ijtihād is the preponderant opinion) Means that it so
happened that for some individuals, the ability of performing ijtihād concerns certain chapters,
like ordained inheritance quotes (al-farāʾiḍ). This is acquired by way of knowing its evidence
through one’s own inference (istiqrāʾ) or from a ‘complete mujtahid’ and then to examine the
evidence. With regard to the opinion of those who prohibit it, it is probable that there might be
contradicting evidence among the evidence which he [i.e. the fragmentary mujtahid], unlike in the
case of someone who is aware of all evidence and has examined them.36

This is central to the theme of the transformation of ijtihād in later eras, especially during and
after the commentarial period. I will further engage with this concept, along with the emergence
of ‘narrational ijtihād’ in Chapter Three. Equally importantly, as this book shows that the
commentator who traces (yatatabaʿ) al-Nawawī’s khityārat the most is Ibn Ḥajar, the author of
commentary on Nawawī’s Minhāj that this thesis will be studying.
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Framework of the Thesis
The introduction of this thesis demonstrates the continuous relevance of Islamic law and the
madhhab-law tradition in contemporary Muslim life. It also highlights the need to study the later
period of this history and the existing gaps in Islamic legal and intellectual history. It identifies
the gaps in studying the post-classical period in the Shāfiʿī school and its juristic, authorial,
literary, and socio-cultural developments. In addition to the thesis statement, and the specific
questions that this research project will interrogate, the Introduction also includes a Literature
Review and this Framework of the Thesis.
Chapter One, titled The Legal and Literary Tradition, examines the main methodological
and epistemic components of the Shāfiʿī madhhab. The aim here is to provide a typology of the
Shāfiʿī juristic literature that expresses a coherent theory of Shāfiʿī texts. My objective is to
answer the following set of questions: what debates and discourses did the central texts in the
Shāfiʿī literary tradition come out of, how the course of the development of the madhhab
influenced them, why certain texts gained a high status, and how and why they were composed.
This typology will be based on a periodization that is based on the internal logic and timeline of
this literary tradition itself, not the standard European periodization format. This typology is a
concise yet overarching description of juridical methodologies of this legal school, their
development, and how this was translated into specific textual projects. I will attempt to unpack
the historical development of the madhhab as a ‘story of books’ that is undergirded by eight
internally characterized interconnected periods that respond to different scholarly and juristic

31

needs (not the standard periodization scheme adopted in the Western academia). I will also
examine why the Shāfiʿī school came to agree to not to integrate the legal works that preceded
al-Nawawī in its process of rule-formulation and law-determination.
Chapter Two studies the most authoritative legal digest in the Shāfiʿī madhhab, alNawawī’s Minhāj al-ṭālibīn. This chapter focuses on studying the two main aspects that this
thesis argues allowed Minhāj to enjoy such a status: first, its linguistic character and the effective
and innovative terminological system and; second, its juristic methodology and
accomplishments. Firstly, the chapter will include a short biography of the author, an exposition
of Minhāj’s contents, the author’s intention behind composing it, and its intended uses. Secondly,
this chapter will move its focus into analyzing the linguistic and terminological systems of alNawawī, which is at the heart of the authorial objectives of Minhāj. This chapter will attempt to
trace the genealogy of such terms especially from al-Nawawī’s other books. In addition, it will
study and offer the findings of a handful of books that studied this terminological system, in
order to provide both analytical and statistical insights on the use of these terms. Thirdly, this
chapter will move to investigate Minhāj’s legal methodology and provide examples of its juristic
verification, al-Nawawī’s engagement with the two Shāfiʿī hermeneutic sub-schools of the
Khursanians and the Iraqians, and the reception of Minhāj. The chapter concludes with
examining al-Nawawī’s lasting contribution on the Shāfīʿī madhhab.
Chapter Three is a textual study of the most celebrated Shāfiʿī commentary on Minhāj,
Tuḥfat al-muḥtāj of Ibn Ḥajar al-Haytamī, the most authoritative late work in the school. First,
the chapter will provide a brief contextual biography of Ibn Ḥajar, in addition to a description of
his positionality within the ‘commentarial circle’, a circle of late Shāfiʿī jurists and
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commentators who came to represent the most authoritative circle in the post-classical era of the
Shāfiʿī school under the Ottomans. I will also engage with debates regarding the status of the
Tuḥfa, its competition with al-Ramlī’s Nihāyat al-muḥtāj, as well as the other works from that
period. Second, this chapter will analyze the linguistic and terminological makeup of this
commentary, in an attempt to demonstrate the specific functions and innovations of this
commentaries from that era. This will include a study of two works that are dedicated to studying
the terms of Tuḥfa. Third, this chapter will study the juristic contributions of Ibn Ḥajar, including
his inferences, verifications, and evidentiary defense of Shāfiʿī doctrines. This will include
multiple examples representing different juristic functions. I will also compare Ibn Ḥajar’s and
al-Nawawī’s approaches to ijtihād.
The thesis will end with a conclusion summarizing and weaving together the different
findings from its three chapters.
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CHAPTER ONE
The Shāfiʿī Legal and Literary Tradition:
Towards a Theory of Texts

The aim of this chapter is to provide a typology of the Shafiʿī literary tradition. This typology
will help articulate a coherent theory of texts of the Shāfiʿī juristic tradition. Such a typology is
crucial to understanding the positionality of al-Nawawī’s digest, Minhāj al-ṭālibīn, and Ibn
Ḥajar’s commentary on it, Tuḥfat al-minhāj, the two main focuses of this thesis, within the
Shāfiʿī textual tradition. The suggested is based on an ‘indigenous’ periodization scheme that is,
first, representative of the major juristic concerns and operations of each period and, second, is
identifiable among Shāfiʿī scholars. This periodization stems from the internal juristic,
educational, and judicial needs of the Shāfiʿī school. Hence it is believed to be effective in
understanding the intellectual arguments and discourses that books from every period speak to.
As such, the main purpose of this typology will be two-fold. First, to identify the overarching
juristic and literary process of this literary and intellectual tradition across time and space.
Second, to understand how and why the two books that are at the heart of the textual study of this
thesis came to enjoy their authoritative positions. This typology of the Shāfiʿī literary timelines is
divided into two main parts: first, early Shāfiʿī textual production prior to al-Nawawī and,
second, from al-Nawawī’s time onward.
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The Shāfiʿī Literary Traditions: A Story of Books
The Shāfiʿī school is one of the four juristic schools of Sunni Islam, alongside its Ḥanafī, Mālikī,
and Ḥanbalī counterparts. As is the case with the three others, it is named after its eponymous
founder, Muḥammad b. Idrīs al-Shāfiʿī (150/767-204/820). Each of these legal schools is called
in Arabic madhhab, literally an established pathway. Madhhab is a technical term that came to
acquire multiple meanings. Its three most common meanings are (1) the totality of a school of
law, (2) a doctrine of such a school, and (3) an interpretive opinion or adopted by a qualified
jurist.37 Within Islamic studies, several Islamicists have offered different perspectives on how
madhhabs developed historically. These perspectives vary between being regional, personal, or
individual-then-doctrinal schools, to a guilds, or corporate entities.38 Despite having the Qur’an
and ḥadīth as the center of their interpretive operations, each of these schools represent a unique
jurisprudential and literary tradition. Each of the madhhabs also enjoys a different genealogy,
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are other variations of the technical meaning of the term. For example, within the Shāfiʿī school, Imām alNawawī uses this term in Minhāj in a specific sense, meaning the adopted positions of both subschools, the
Khurasanian and the Iraqian, based on either (a) an opinion (qawl) of al-Shāfiʿī, (b) the opinions (or awjuh) of alShāfiʿī’s Companions (aṣḥāb), or a combination of the two. See: ʿArafāt ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Maqdī, Tabṣirat almuḥtāj bi mā khafiya min muṣṭalaḥ al-Minhāj (Kuwait: Dār al-Ḍiyāʾ, 2014), 96.
38 The

first scholar to address the gradual development of madhhabs is Melchert. See the introduction in:
Christopher Melchert, The Formation of the Sunni Schools of Law, 9th–10th Centuries C.E. (Leiden; New York:
Brill, 1997). Hallaq’s work on the subject objected to Schacht’s postulation that madhhabs are geographical entitties.
See: Wael B. Hallaq, “From Regional to Personal School of Law? A Reevaluation,” Islamic Law and Society 8:1
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Inns of Court,” in Zeitschrift Für Geschichte Der Arabisch-Islamischen Wissenschaften, (ed.) Fuat Sezgin (Frankfurt
am Main: Institut für Geschichte der Arabisch-Islamischen Wissenschaften an der Johann Wolfgang GoetheUniversität, 1984); Sherman A. Jackson, Islamic Law and the State: The Constitutional Jurisprudence of Shihāb alDīn al-Qarāfī (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1996).
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history, geographical influence, juristic and doctrinal authorities, and shared terminology.
Whether a collective school of law, an individual jurist, a teacher or a judge, the functionaries of
these Islamic juristic schools saw themselves as vehicles for divinely inspired law. They also saw
education as an essential aspect of their mission. To serve their scholarly, pedagogical and
juristic objectives, these schools created elaborate and complex educational and scholarly
structures to transmit and authorize their doctrines and curricula. These structures came to
systematically derive, disseminate, and verify their evidence and precedence-based doctrines that
are derived from the Islamic scripture via their jurisprudential methodology.
These complex structures of the madhhabs represent time-honored processes and
doctrines. Based on Horner's assertion, all traditions share the following: matters of ideas that are
passed on from generation to another, the process through which they are passed on, and a
reservoir of “specialness”, or expertly-produced intellectual products or artifacts. This assertion
is consistent with the above-cited understandings of the different meanings of a madhhab: first,
as a doctrine, second, as a methodological process of juristic verification followed to arrive at
these doctrines and, third, as a preserved collection of expert’s opinions, respectively. Some of
these aspects of the madhhab-law traditions are neither clear-cut nor adequately studied. In
specific, this research project is interested in how these three elements intersect within the Shāfiʿī
literary tradition. That is, what is the process through which the Shafiʿī madhhab arrived at its
doctrines and where are they contained? How did the Shafiʿī literary and juristic tradition arrive
at those doctrines? And how did this madhhab deal with its reservoir of legal opinions? In
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specific, the second half of this chapter will provide a survey of the Shāfiʿī literal with a focus on
exploring it as a story of books. Consequently, it will examine how and why certain periods in
this intellectual history were characterized by a central juristic operation culminating in a certain
book.

The Shāfiʿī Literary Tradition: Stories, Cycles, and Texts
The first step towards exploring the typology of the Shāfiʿī literary tradition is to examine the
relation between its main juristic genres. Norman Calder’s assertion that Islamic law is a
jurists’—as opposed to a judges’— law is an important starting point for this examination of the
library of the Shāfiʿī madhhab. He argues that the two main types of legal writings in Islamic law
are legal digests (mukhtaṣarāt) and expansums (mabsūṭāt, or muṭawwalāt).39 There are other
views that emphasize the role of judges (qādīs), like Coulson’s.40 Some scholars, like Hallaq,
suggest that tension between the two professions was a creative force that played a role in the
development of legal writings within the madhhab-tradition since its beginnings.41 This
continuous tension eventually, and creatively, led to the later hierarchy of relied-upon
(muʿtamad) doctrines, which was achieved through the process of preponderance or ruleformulation (tarjīḥ) of juristic opinions. Despite there being many important types of juristic
writing, from collections of fatwas, legal distinction (furūq), cognate and similar issues (alashbāh wa al-naẓāʾir), the ‘legal verses’ (āyāt al-aḥkām), topical treatises, poetic renditions of
39
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legal manuals (nuẓum, sing. naẓm), and legal prophetic traditions (aḥādīth al-aḥkām), the Shāfiʿī
legal history advanced as a spiral-like interplay between digests and expansums. This interplay
culminates in the two most authoritative works within this literary tradition, al-Nawawī’s digest,
Minhāj al-ṭālibīn, and Ibn Ḥajar’s expansum, his commentary on that digest, Tuḥfat al-muḥtāj.
This following section of this chapter will examine the literary history of the Shāfiʿī madhhab as
a continuous and dialectical narrative leading to both works.

On Traditions and Their Founding Rationales
I will move now to engage with the founding rationale of the Shāfiʿī madhhab and the role of
language within this tradition. The radical founding moment of the Shāfiʿī school of law that
claimed to treat interpretive demands of that moment and consisted in two aspects: first, an
articulation of a hierarchy of the sources of legal operations and, second, a reconceptualization of
the revelation (waḥy) as a direct and continuous divine communication anchored in the Arabic
language and its rules, as well as prophetic Sunna.42 As for the first aspect, the hierarchy of the
foundational sources (uṣūl, sing. aṣl), according to al-Risāla, the sources of this hierarchy are:
(1) The Qur’an; (2) Prophetic actions and tradition, or Sunna; (3), Scholarly consensus (ijmāʿ),
especially for matters that are directly addressed in either of the first two; (4) the recorded
opinion of a Companion (qawl al-ṣaḥābī), especially when there is no known disagreements with
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it; and (5) scripture-based analogical deduction (qiyās).43 Describing the way the Shāfiʿī school
came together to form a tradition around this source-based interpretive method, El Shamsy
portrays this founding moment, which resulted in the emergence of a scholarly legal tradition
that shares a terminological and methodological bases, as follows,
The Shāfiʿī school that grew around al-Shafiʿī’s paradigm of law in the third/ninth century was
thus primarily a discursive institution, rooted in a central corpus of texts and shared techniques
for its analysis. These were transmitted and developed in a burgeoning secondary literature and
spread rapidly to other legal schools, inaugurating a process of convergence that would eventually
culminate in the creation of a common terminological and methodological basis in Sunni thought.
Al-Shāfiʿī’s paradigm found its niche within this wider movement. The solution that it offered to
the crisis of normative tradition consisted of an elitist scripturalism… As a result, Islamic law was
transformed from a communal venture, based on an organic link to revelation through shared
tradition, to a science of interpretation that soon became embedded in a discursive community of
scholars.44

This passage is relevant for two reasons. First, it emphasizes how terminological and
methodological cohesion is key to solidifying a tradition, especially at its birth. As Chapters Two
and Three will demonstrate, the invention and sharing of terminological conventions and
methodological norms are essential aspects to the advancement and the stabilization of the
Shāfiʿī school from the seventh/thirteenth to the tenth/seventeenth centuries. Both aspects,
terminological and methodological cohesion, are essential to carrying on and advancing

43 Al-Shāfiʿī

explains this hierarchy by stating: “Knowledge is of two types, adherence or deduction. Adherence of
the Book. If not, it is of the Sunna. If not, it is the opinion of the majority of our early generation (salaf), for which
we know of no contestation. If not, then a qiyās that is based on the Book of Allah, Mighty Majestic. If not, based on
the Sunna of the Messenger of Allah, Allah’s blessings and peace be upon him. If not of the majority of the early
generation, for which we know of no contestation”; Muḥammad b.Idrīs al-Shāfiʿī, al-Umm, (Beirut: Dār al-Fikr,
1990) 1:170.
44
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interpretative conversations between jurists and restoring the doctrinal and authoritative
structures of a given tradition. Second, since the founding rationale of the Shāfiʿī school was
embodied in a discursive community, this then highlights the importance of understanding the
dynamics of such a community. In other words, studying how this discursive community was
formed and their relations is an important aspect of studying a juristic tradition.

Intra-Communal Relations
There are two aspects of the Shāfiʿī school that demonstrate the previously mentioned relational
dimension of a tradition. First, there is an established hierarchy of authority (marātib al-fuqahāʾ)
to perform different juristic innovations and issues based on the qualification of a given jurist,
including forms of ijtihād. This hierarchy is classified into five categories, and in later periods
into six.45 Calder studied this hierarchy and concluded that it was important to the continuation
of the madhhab-tradition, especially since higher rank scholar-jurists used to train lower-ranking
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ones and thus, “became constitutive of the next generations’ task”.46 Below is a table
representing this typology.

1

Classification

Description

Examples

Absolute
mujtahidis

They acquired knowledge of scriptural
rulings via different sources,
conditions for solid evidence, mastery
of Qur’an, ḥadīth, language, and
produced a legal theory on which their
legal inferences and substantive
rulings are based.

The four eponymous founders of
the four Sunni madhhab-law
traditions.

They follow a madhhab but still
through their own unique legal
reasoning.

Al-Buwayṭī (d. 232/847), alMuzanī (d. 264/878), Ibn alMundhir (d. 318/930), and Ibn
Jarīr al-Ṭabarī (d. 310/923).

(also called
independent muftī)

2

The restricted
mujtahids or the
dependent muftīs

3

The mujtahids of
the madhhab a.k.a
‘possessors of
perspectives’ (aṣhā
b al-wujūh)

They are independent in their
establishing (taqrīr) of legal
foundations and theory through proofs,
without contradicting the eponym.

Shaykh Abū Ḥāmid al-Isfārīnī (d.
406/1016), al-Qaffāl (d.
365/976), and al-Mawazī (d.
340/951).

4

The mujtahids in
fatwa and ruleformulation
(tarjīḥ)

They mastered the methodology and
knowledge of the madhhab.

Al-Nawawī (d. 676/1278) and alRāfiʿī (d. 633/1236).

5

The transmitters
(naqalat) of the
madhhab

The are qualified to transmit the legal
tradition, and understand both
ambiguous and unambiguous issues

Ibn Ḥajar (d. 974/1567) and alRamlī (d. 1004/1596).

Table 1: A hierarchy of the mujtahids and muftīs of the Shāfiʿī madhhab.

Second, throughout its development, the Shāfiʿī madhhab kept an unbroken chain of narration
(silsila) that established the connection of its teachings back to the Prophet Muḥammad via the
eponymous founder.
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Based on the previously mentioned relational elements of a madhhab, this thesis suggests
that a comprehensive understanding of a juristic tradition should couple an examination of its
doctrines with an understanding of the situatedness of the interpretive authorities that produced
them. For example, as Chapter Two will show, one of the main achievements of al-Nawawī, for
example, in his project to review all the previous legal opinions of his school to arrive at its
doctrines. Therefore, al-Nawawī had to reconcile and verify the doctrines of the two interpretive
sub-schools of the Shāfiʿī school that existed up to his time: i.e. Khorasians and Iraqians. These
sub schools weighed heavily on the progress of the Shāfiʿī madhhab from the fifth/tenth century
forward. Without understanding the relative differences in the hierarchy of authority, doctrines,
and juristic approaches of these sub-school vis-a-vis al-Nawawī, one cannot fully grasp the
significance and scope of al-Nawawī’s lasting achievement. In contrast, based on the findings
from Chapter Three, one of Ibn Ḥajar’s main contributions to post-classical Shāfiʿism is his
defense and consolidation of the juristic authority of the ‘Two Masters’ (al-shaykhān), one of
whom is al-Nawawī, who came before him in the seventh/tenth century and enjoys a higher rank
in the hierarchy of juristic authority.

The Genres of Digests and Expansums
Didactic legal digests (mukhtaṣarāt) represent the most common genre in the Shāfīʿī library. The
most famous example of these digests is the short and widely memorized treatise of Abū Shujāʿ
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al-Aṣfahānī (d. 593/1197), which is known by two titles, al-Ghāya wa al-taqrīb and al-Ghāya wa
al-ikhtiṣār. Digests are characterized by their inescapably succinct and pedagogical tone,
representing a ‘backward-looking’ summation of the precedent-based system of the madhhab.
They seek to offer clear-cut, uniform and formulated rules for pedagogical purposes, without a
need to engage in debates, justification or citing differences. Historically, the origin and spread of
digests was seen as part of the dialectic between progression and regression. For example, the
Ḥanafī jurist al-ʿAtābī (d. 586/1190), sees the spread of digests, in specific the activity of
summarization, as a sign the downfall or “briefness” of the intellectual capabilities of the time
(“wa likhtiṣār himamihim ikhtārū al-mukhtaṣar fī kull shayʾ”).47 In contrast, an example of
reading the spread of digests in a different light is offered by Ḥājī Khālifa, a.k.a. Kâtip Çelebī,
the famous author of the bibliographical encyclopedia Kashf al-ẓunūn ʿan asāmī al-kutub wa alfunūn. According to him, digests are, “made as reminders of the headlines of issues (ruʾūs almasāʾil). An advanced individual benefits from them by way of recollection. They may benefit
some intelligent beginners due to their quick advancement to meanings from precise phrasing.”48
Also the famous historiographer Ibn Khaldūn describes the activity of writing digests as “the
recording of a brief program in every science is presented through a survey of its issues
(masāʾiluhu) and their proofs succinctly, with fewness in letters and while packing them with
numerous meanings from the respective of the wider discipline.”49 In relation to the juristic
functions of digests in the realm of Islam law, according to Fadel, the main objective of these
47
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digests is to provide uniform rulings which severed a pre-modern form of serving a project of
legal codification.50 Digests are the most valued and refined products of taqlīd (conformity to
legal precedent), functioning as both textbooks for students and a shorthand for judges for
ensuring the uniformity of substantive law.
As for the genre of expansums (mabsūṭāt or muṭawwalāt, meaning the expansive or
lengthy books, respectively), within juristic writing, it mainly consists of commentaries (shurūḥ),
and glosses/supra-commentaries (hawāshī). Some historians argue that this commentarial genre
was important to Islamic juristic writing from the works of Arabic grammarians.51 One can
describe these works as a ‘forward-looking’ mode of writing, interested in exploring new
horizons of meaning by way of applying a critical, expansive and detailed engagement with the
previous discourses and debates. This engagement takes place by a focused linear interaction
with one book, from beginning to end. Expansums were used both as references for advanced
educational purposes and references to issue fatwas. In addition to amending mistakes and
shortcoming in the original text (matn), Ḥājjī Khalīfa argues that there are three central reasons
for composing commentaries: (1) fulfilling a need for further expanding, so that hidden meanings
that are otherwise not easily are grasped by non-experts; (2) providing some needed
introductions, analogies, rearrangement, and rationales, and; (3) limiting the unintended
hermeneutical possibilities of the text and giving preferences to the meanings that the author of
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the original work intended.52 Calder also provides several functions for expansums: (1) analysis,
(2) a means of expressing loyalty to one’s school of thoughts and its achievements, (3) ‘Truth’
formation and, (4) an aristocratic activity for the scholarly elite.53 Expansums are home to the
juristic precedent-based reviews and commentaries of the madhhab-system. As al-Azem asserts,
“The primary forum in which post-classical Muslim jurists determined precedent was not the
courtroom, the academy, or the halls of a government legislative agency, but rather the book,
and, most prominently, in the genre of legal commentary.”54

The Literary Tradition: A Juristic Story
As part of attempting to provide a survey of the Shāfiʿī literary tradition, I would like to start by
expressing a methodological note that pertains to periodization. The periodization of the
development of the Shāfiʿī literary tradition that is suggested below will not be based on the
classical European conceptualization of pre-modern history. Rather, it is based on critiques of the
standard European periodization scheme (i.e. classical, medieval, modern, etc.), which imposes a
European historical particularity on other non-European histories. This argument was raised by
Chakrabarty’s marxist subaltern’s historical perspective and Koselleck’s theory of historical
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times.55 Instead, I will adopt a more temporally and spatially relevant periodization of the Shāfiʿī
textual history. The periodization scheme I follow below is based on an indigenous timeline, one
that is marked by the internally recognized salient feature of each period. These features are,
first, relevant to Shāfiʿī legal and literary tradition and, second, recognized by its practitioners
and scholars.56 One important advantage of this periodization system is the ability to read the
Shāfiʿī literary tradition on its own terms, without implicating it with the dialectical arguments of
‘rise’ and ‘decline’. This is especially important since, as we shall see, there was much
understudied intellectual, terminological and juristic innovation taking place within the
commentarial tradition in the tenth/sixteenth century, a period that was supposedly seen by some
commentators as a ‘period of decline and stagnation’, for example.
It can be argued that, throughout its history, the Shāfiʿī tradition was generally speaking
subjected to two types of forces. First, there is what one may call ‘vertical’ forces--like the need
for systematization (which the process rule-formulation and review are part of), standardization,
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codification, rankings of legal experts and their scope, verification, and authentication. These
forces function as an engine for a literary tradition to advance, as a juristic-precedent based legal
school. Second, there are ‘horizontal’ forces, like the need to attend to newly emerging legal
questions, geographical variations in terms of the practice and preferences among local school
bases, and individual differences between author-jurists. The creative tensions between these
intersecting forces surely results in crystallization and accumulation of doctrines, legal
authorities, and literary responses. As we shall see below, in terms of legal writing, there is a set
of processes that were necessitated by emerging scholarly and social needs. These processes
include synthesizing legal statements and opinions (jamʿ), editing (ḍabṭ), filtering (taḥrīr),
interpreting (sharḥ), transmitting (naql), consolidating legal positions (tanqīḥ), authenticating
(takhrīj or taḥqīq, especially of ḥadīth evidence), extracting substantive rulings (tafrīʿ), among
others. The periodization below will give an overview of how each of these processes emerged
and how they took place.
This chapter posits that the most influential books in the story of the Shāfiʿī madhhab are
the ones that textually succeeded in addressing the social and educational needs of their time.
Also, although the history of the books will be the main focus of this survey, this story cannot be
told by merely narrating the bibliographical history of book titles and author names and
biographical information. Rather, it will include the progression of the juristic processes of the
Shāfiʿī madhhab and the development of its traditional genres of juristic writing, with a special
focus on the genres of digests and expansums. Reform through filtering weak opinions and the
law-formulation is important to this process. According to contemporary Mālikī jurist-author alḤajawī in his survey of the history of Islamic fiqh, “Not exercising the filtering of weak and non-
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preponderant opinions (tanqīḥ) of books of fiqh is one of the necessary causes for its
decrepitude.”57 The continuation Islamic juristic traditions depends on their ability to filter their
opinions and to arrive at its doctrines through an always re-energized and continuously
developing process of tarjīḥ. The above quotation also stresses the link between the work of
author-jurists in legal manuals and how their findings should then be transferred and transformed
into educational textbooks.
Before starting with the survey of the Shāfiʿī literary tradition, another terminological
point remains. Unlike the Ḥanafī madhhab, as discussed in al-Azem’s work, the Shāfiʿī tradition
prefers the term ‘relied upon’ or muʿtamad more over ṣaḥīḥ to identify its doctrine; despite the
two being virtually synonymous in some instances.58 The term muʿtamad does not appear in
early Shāfiʿī books, however. The first scholar to use the term with its special terminological
objective is Shaykh Zakariyyā al-Anṣārī (d. 926/1520).59 Even though the term was in use for a
while, the first author to define it in full is Ibn Ḥajar in Tuḥfat al-muḥtāj, the book which the
textual study of Chapter three focuses on. Ibn Ḥajar defines muʿtamad as:

57 Al-Hajawī

by asserting, “Not exercising the filtering of weak and non-preponderant opinions (tanqīḥ) of books of
fiqh is one of the necessary causes for its decrepitude; especially in the Ḥanafi and Mālikī madhhabs. If they [the
madhhabs] have many mujtahids of varying degrees, their legal questions would still be found scattered in the books
of fatāwa. A muftī needs to review numerous tomes and perform profound examinations. He may find his answer in
a place different from where he thought they should be. If he does not acquire a substantial ability in memorization,
expertise, and reading, and he revises a fatwa, then the outcome is certainly blunder and chaos… reforming fiqh
certainly needs educational books, as I previously mentioned”; Muḥammad b.al-Ḥasan al-Ḥajawī, al-Fikr al-Sāmī fī
tārīkh al-fiqh al-Islāmī (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1995), 2:405.
58

ʿAbd al-Baṣīr b.Sulaymān al-Malyabārī, Dirāsa shahiyya li muṣṭalaḥāt al-madhāhib al-arbaʿa al-fiqhiyya
(Kuwait: Dār al-Ḍiyāʾ, 2018), 81.
59

Muḥammad b. ʿUmar al-Kāf, al-Muʿtamad ʿinda al-Shāfiʿiyya: dirāsa naẓariyya taṭbīqiyya, an MA thesis, selfpublished, p. 16, accessed on April 2019: (https://ia800700.us.archive.org/21/items/
gawish2040_yahoo_201810/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B9%D8%AA%D9%85%D8%AF%20%D9%81%
D9%8A%20%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81%D9%82%D9%87%20%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%A7%D9%81
%D8%B9%D9%8A.pdf)
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That which the verifiers from among the late scholars are in consensus on, and that which our
shaykhs are still recommending and transmitting from their own shaykhs--and they, in return, [are
also in consensus on like] those before them-- is that the muʿtamad [positions] are those that the
Two Masters (al-Shaykhān) [i.e. al-Nawawī and al-Rāfiʿī] are in agreement on. Meaning, unless
those who reexamined their positions are in concordance that it a certain opinion of either of them
is nothing but an inadvertent absent-mindedness (sahw)... otherwise if they are in disagreement
then the author’s [i.e. al-Nawawī’s] position is superior… and if there is a preference for al-Rāfiʿī
that this secondary to it, then that’s it.60

After providing the above introduction on the Shāfiʿī tradition, I will move now move to
providing an eight-period survey of its literary history, one that shows will also show why and
how al-Nawawī’s Minhāj and Ibn Ḥajar’s Tuḥfa came to enjoy their positions within the Shāfiʿī
tradition. Below is a table presenting the main periods, developments, and books in the Shāfiʿī
literary tradition, followed by a brief survey.

ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd al-Sharwānī and Aḥmad b.Qāsim al-ʿAbādī, Ḥawāshī al-shaykh ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd al-Sharwānī wa
al-shaykh Aḥmad b.Qāsim al-ʿAbādī ʿala tuḥfat al-muḥtāj, (Beirut: Dar al-Fikr, 2014), 1:39.
60
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The main periods, developments, and books in the Shāfiʿī literary tradition
Part One: the typology of early Shāfiʿī book prior to al-Nawawī
1. The founding the
madhhab
(186-204/802-820)

2. The transmission of
the jadīd books of the
founder
(204-270/820-884)

3, The emergence and
spread of the madhhab
(270-404/884-1014)

4. Stabilization and
emergence of the subschools
(404-505/1014-1112)

The emergence of the
founding rationale and a
discursive institution, and
a preliminary but common
terminological and
methodological basis.

The transmission,
teaching, and explaining
of the opinions and
methods; and influencing
on the formative history
of other Sunni schools

The spreading of a fully
realized madhhab; the
emergence of the first
work of biographical
dictionaries and
dissertations (taʿlīqa)

The emergence of the
(transmission-focused)
Iraqian and ( extractingcorollary- rulings-savvy)
Khurasnian sub-schools.
The introduction of
encyclopedias.

Al-Shāfiʿī’s (d. 204/820)
qadīm books, like alḤujja, and jadīd ones, like
al-Umm.

The mukhtaṣars of alMuzanī (d. 264/878), alBuwayṭī (d. 232/847), and
Ḥarmala al-Tujībī (d.
243/857).

Ibn Surayj’s (d. 306/919)
digest and the books of
Abū Zurʿa (d. 302/915)
and al-Qaffāl (d.
365/976).

Al-Māwardī’s works (d.
450/1058), al-Shirāzī’s (d.
476/1084) al-Muhadhhab,
al-Ghazālī’s (d. 505/1111)
al-Wasīṭ, and al-Wajīz.

Part Two: Shāfiʿī books after al-Nawawī
5. The period of
verification
(505-676/1112-1278)

6. The period of
commentaries
(676-926/1278-1520)

7. The period of the
glosses
(926-1335/1520-1917)

8. The contemporary
period (1335-/1917-)

The filtering out of weak
opinions and the
consolidation of Shāfiʿī
doctrines; being those that
al-Rāfiʿī (d. 633/1236)
and al-Nawawī (d.
676/1278) share.

A critical engagement
with al-Rāfiʿī and alNawawī’s books; the
introduction of poetic
renditions of legal texts
for educational purposes.

The emergence of the
circle of commentators
(shurrāḥ), headed by alAnṣārī (d. 926/1520) and
his students, all of whose
views are considered
valid.

A decline in teaching and
integration of the
madhhab in fatwa and
courts.

Al-Nawawī’s Minhāj alṭālibīn, al-Majmūʿ, and
al-Rawḍa; al-Rāfiʿī’s alMuḥarrar and al-Sharḥ
al-kabīr; and Abū Shujāʿ
al-Iṣfahānī’s (d. 593/1197)
al-Ghāya wa al-taqrīb.

The commentaries of alIsnawī (d. 772/1372), alAdhraʿī (d. 783/1278), alBulqīnī (d. 805/1403), alAqfahsī (d. 808/1405),
Ibn Raslān’s (d.
844/1441) al-Zubad and
al-ʿAmrīṭī’s (d. 890/1485)
Nihāya.

The commentaries of Ibn
Ḥajar (d. 974/1567),
Tuḥfa, and al-Ramlī’s (d.
1004/1596), Nihāya,
among others, and
glosses, like al-Bayjūrī’s
(d. 1277/1861).

The encyclopedic works
of al-Zuḥīlī (d.
1436/2015) and Hītū, alFiqh al-manhjī of al-Khun
and et al, and others.

Table 2: The main periods of the development of the Shāfiʿī literary and juristic tradition, including the main scholarly and
juristic developments, and the main books from each period.
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Part One: Early Shāfiʿī textual production prior to al-Nawawī
First: The Period of the Founding the Madhhab by Imam al-Shāfiʿī (186-204/802-820)

The story of books of the Shāfiʿī school starts with the impressive and prolific efforts of the
eponymous founder of the madhhab, Imam Muḥammad b. Idrīs al-Shāfiʿī (150-204/767-820).61
His legal writings during his scholarly career in Egypt (199-204/815-820), which constitutes
what is known as the ‘new’ (jadīd) madhhab, vis-a-vis his legal contribution during his
interspersed time in and out of Iraq (184-199/800-815), which is called ‘old’ (qadīm), is the real
seed of the Shāfiʿī bibliographical corpus. This issue of revisiting al-Shāfiʿī’s qadīm positions
continued for centuries after him. Some scholars, including al-Nawawī, believe that unless alShāfiʿī states that his jadīd opinion abrogates a qadīm one, it can still be adopted.62 While in
Egypt, al-Shāfiʿī engaged with a number of students, including students of Imam Mālik
(179/795), another eponymous founder of Sunni legal tradition, to whom he dictated his legal

61

For a biography of al-Shāfiʿī see: Fakhr al-Dīn Muḥammad al-R z , Man qib Al-Im m Al-Sh fiʻ (Cairo:
Maktabat al-Kulliyy t al-Azhar ya, 1986); Kecia Ali, Imam Shafiʿi: Scholar and Saint (Oxford: Oneworld, 2011);
Na r mid Ab Zayd, al-Im m Al-Sh fiʻ wa taʾsīs al-aydulūjiyya al-wasatiiyyaa (Cairo: Sayn ʾ lil-Nashr, 1992).
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ā

ū
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One of the most informative accounts on the qadīm and jadīd debates and answering the question of why and
what happens when a scholar revisits his juristic positions is Ibn al-Qāṣṣ’ (d. 335/947) Nuṣrat al-qawlayn. The book
is not only a defense of resorting to both the jadīd and qadīm opinions of al-Shāfiʿī in operations of juristic
inferences. It provides ten benefits for the existence of qadīm and jadīd opinions. These ten reasons are: (1) as a
measure of differentiation between the invalidity of certain opinion and the validity of another; (2) that some qadīm
are a mere narration of opinions of jurists that came before al-Shāfiʿī; (3) that al-Shāfiʿī intentionally put forward
two different opinions as way of testing students while providing the doctrine in different place in his books; (4) that
one of them is a narration of previous opinion while the other is the outcome of allegorical deduction (qiyās); (5) a
as a demonstration certain issues for which both positions are valid; (6) certain issues where the two opinions are
consecutive (ʿalā al-tartīb) in relation to a certain juristic scenario; (7) when al-Shāfiʿī intentionally does not
publicly state which of the two position is more evidently solid, for fear of social disturbance; (8) when one of the
two positions is positively valid while the other is valid for the sake of juristic safety (ʿalā al-iḥṭiyāṭ); (9) when one
of them is a clear way of explaining a matter, while the other is left unexplained or ambiguous, and (10) cases when
he explained a position for the sake of making a juristic question easier for students, in order for them not to follow
al-Shāfiʿī himself in what he adopts in his personal life, since it is more difficult to implement: Abī al-ʿAbbās
Aḥmad b. Abī Aḥmad Ibn al-Qāṣṣ, Nuṣrat al-qawlayn lil Imām al-Shāfiʿī, edited by Māzen Saʿd al-Zabībī
(Damascus: Dār al-Bayrūtī, 2009), 107-130.
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works. During this period, the story of the books of the madhhab revolved around two pivots:
performing preponderance between the explicit legal opinions (aqwāl, sing. qawl) of al-Shāfiʿī
and, second, the operations of editing and narrating his books. Shāfiʿī jurists engaged for
centuries in creating rules for formulating the qawls of their Imam, including Imam al-Juwaynī
(d. 468), al-Shirāzī (d. 476) in his al-Tabsira, al-Ghazālī (d. 505/1111), who wrote a treatise on
the subject, titled al-Qawl fī ḥaqīqat al-qawlayn, al-Munāwī (d. 803) in Farāʾid al-fawāʾid.
Arguably the most extensive treatment of the subject is in al-Razī’s (d. 606/1210) al-Maḥsūl.63
The founding rationale of the Shāfiʿī school was effective because it successfully
addressed and resolved serious interpretive problems. Mainly, it manage to tackle the tension
between the different hermeneutic and jurisprudential approaches at the time of al-Shāfiʿī;
especially between the rationalist schools (aḥl al-raʾy), who are mainly the Ḥanafīs and the
traditionists (ahl al-hādīṭḥ), chiefly made up of Mālikīs, among others. One of the main
problems at the time of al-Shāfiʿī is that the rationalists changed their views continuously. The
traditionalists, on the other hand, were not able to effectively respond to new issues and also
were not able to respond to the arguments of the rationalist, or to articulate an overarching
jurisprudential methodology that supports their view.64 Thanks to his training with both schools,
al-Shāfiʿī was able to find a middle path mainly between these two forces. His perspective stirred
away from the Mālikīs’ emphasis on local custom as well as from the rational speculation of the
Ḥanafīs. Instead, as El Shamsy observes, “Al-Shāfiʿī’s radical reconceptualization of revelation
63 The

upshot here is that generally the new opinion (qawl jadīd) abrogates the old one (qawl qadīm). There are
cases where the Imam states two opinions, but then only one of them is championed by either: (a) explicitly using
the terms of tarjīḥ, or (b) an indicating the problem with one of them, or (c) branching out ruling based on one of
them. For more on this see: al-Kāf’s thesis, 110-114; al-Munāwī, Farāʿid al-fawāʾid fī ikhtilāf qawlayn li mujthid
wāḥid, edited by Muḥammad Ismāʿīl (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIllmiyya, 1992).
64

El Shamsy, Canonization, 197-198.
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as an act of direct divine communication, grounded in the Arabic language and explicable
through the prophetic Sunna, spawned new genres of writing, creating new literatures.”65
However, as Melchert convincingly demonstrates, the tension existing at the time was not only
between these two camps. Rather, it included other forces like the Ẓāhirīs, with their emphasis on
consensus or common Muslims.66
As for the iconic books from this era, the prolific career of Imām al-Shāfīʾī is now well
established. The list of those books include his pioneering works on jurisprudence or legal
methodology (uṣūl al-fiqh) in al-Risāla. Thanks to recent contributions from Lowry and El
Shamsy67, a revisionist hypothesis by Calder68 that argues that Risāla does not--at least not
fully--belong to al-Shāfiʿī has been rebutted. The fiqh works from the qadīm era include alHujja, which is lost, and a volume of collected legal opinions by al-Karābīsī titled al-Qadīm.
From the jadīd era, al-Umm is considered to be the most important work here. It is a collection of
opinions written and dictated by al-Buwayṭī and was narrated by al-Murādī, two of al-Shāfiʿī’s
most dedicated students.
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Ibid., 223.
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Interestingly, Melchert also demonstrates that, contrary to widespread perceptions, there existed jurisprudential
methods within the traditionist camp at the time of al-Shāfiʿī. This included some Mālikī jurisprudential efforts:
Christopher Melchert, "Traditionist-Jurisprudents and the Framing of Islamic Law." Islamic Law and Society 8, no. 3
(2001): 387, 406.
67 Academic

debate over the authenticity of some of al-Shāfiʿī’s works in uṣūl al-fiqh and whether the ideas in alRisāla are his has seen several notable contributions. Norman Calder offered a revisionist perspective in this regard,
arguing that we cannot trust that the work was authored by students of who recorded the legal contribution of their
major imams, including al-Shāfiʿī in the second/eighth century, in Studies in Early Muslim Jurisprudence (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1999). Based on the convincing refutations from Joseph Lowry, Early Islamic Legal
Theory: The Risāla of Muḥammad b. Idrīs al-Shāfiʿī, Studies in Islamic Law and Society, vol. 30. (Leiden: Brill,
2007), and Ahmed El Shamsy, The Canonization of Islamic Law: A Social and Intellectual History (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2013), this view is now no longer accepted.
68

Norman Calder, Studies in Early Muslim Jurisprudence (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999).
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On the emergence, spread and the significance of digests from beginning stages in the
Shāfiʿī literary tradition, and how these works effectively substituting al-Shāfiʿī’s own expansive
work, Ali writes,
Although the Umm contains Shafi'i's doctrines and was transmitted, apparently quite accurately,
to a number of early Shafi'i scholars it did not long remain a primary legal manual for Shafi'i
scholars. Epitomes produced by Muzani and Buwayti quickly supplanted the Umm as teaching
resources. The ‘daunting length’ – El Shamsy counts 6500 pages – and scattershot organization of
the Umm were doubtless key factors. Buwayti abridged it to 200 pages in his Digest, which
quickly spread both west to Andalusia and east as far as Bukhara. Muzani's Digest spawned
numerous commentaries, and became a central part of the curriculum of the emerging Shafi'i
school; it was ultimately far more influential than the Umm itself in the establishment of
distinctively Shafi'i doctrines. Authoritative compendia produced in later centuries rendered the
Umm obsolete. It is only since the publication of the Bulaq edition at the outset of the twentieth
century that the Umm has reemerged as a vital text, now for historians rather than jurists…
Despite its antiquarian rather than doctrinal importance, the Umm has become a very important
book in early Islamic legal studies.69

The previous passage shows that digests have played an important role since the beginning of the
Shāfiʿī literary tradition. Their role was to condense, contain, impart and the juristic opinions of
the founder of the school. The emergence of the two digests of al-Muzanī and al-Buwayṭī is
attributed to the educational and social need for a more manageable length than the founder’s
own monumental al-Umm.

Second: The period of transmitting the legal work of the madhhab and narrating the jadīd
books of the founder (204-270/820-884)
The active collection, transmission, and writing down of the legal positions and works of alShāfiʿī is the central literary and juristic mission of this period. The two main authors of this
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Ali, Imam Shafiʿi, 80-81.
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period are the al-Muzanī (d. 264/878) and al-Buwayṭī (d. 232/847), with their influential digests
of the opinions of al-Shāfiʿī. It is noteworthy to mention that before meeting with al-Shāfiʿī alMuzanī (d. 264/878) and al-Buwatṭī were part of the rationalist and traditionist camps,
respectively. It is not a coincidence that, despite their unshakable commitment to al-Shāfiʿī and
his methodology, their approaches to Shāfiʿī jurisprudence mirror their backgrounds. Later on as
we shall see, their respective views were transmitted and resulted in two internal approaches that
reiterate the rationalist and traditionist perspectives, still within the folds of an overarching
Shāfiʿī paradigm.
One of the main books of this period is the digest by al-Muzanī, or Mukhtaṣar al-Muzanī,
as it is widely known. This work is considered to be one of the five most influential works in the
early part of Shāfiʿī legal tradition, according to Ḥajjī Khalīfa’s Kashf al-Ẓunūn. Al-Muzanī was
known for his piety and commitment to al-Shāfiʿī. Before meeting al-Shāfiʿī, al-Muzanī followed
the Ḥanafī madhhab. Later Shāfiʿī scholars, like Ibn al-Ṣalāh, point out that many of his
independent views were rejected for their rationalist leanings.70 Nevertheless, this digest seems
to have had an influence on how all later Shāfiʿī legal manuals were arranged. 71 In its opening
statement, al-Muzanī asserts, “I summarized this book from the knowledge of Muḥammad b.
Idrīs al-Shāfiʿī, may Allah have mercy upon him, and also based on the meaning of his [i.e. alShāfiʿī’s] statement: ‘in order to bring it closer to whoever seeks it, while informing them to not

70 According

to Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ, al-Shirāzī in his al-Muhazzab refutes many of al-Muzanī’s juristic opinions. See:
Taqyy al-Dīn ʿUthmān b.Abd al-Raḥmān al-Shahrazūrī Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ, Ṭabaqāt al-fuqahāʾ al-shāfiʿīyya, edited by
Muḥyī al-Dīn ʿAlī Najīb (Beirut, Dār al-Bashāʾir al-Islāmiyya, 1992), 202-203.
71

Çelebī, Kashf, 1635-1636.
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emulate it (taqlīduh) or emulate other works; so that everyone can examine it for the sake of their
religion and to caution themselves. And success is only through God’.”72
The second notable author-jurist from this period is Abū Yaʿqūb al-Buwayṭī, who took
over the teaching responsibility after al-Shāfiʿī passed away for more than twenty years. Before
meeting al-Shāfiʿī in Cairo, al-Buwayṭī was a follower of Imam Mālik and his traditionist
approach. In fact, according Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ’s Ṭabaqāt al-shāfiʿīyya, al-Buwayṭī is the (unnamed)
person debating al-Shāfiʿī in his famous treatise on the difference between Mālik and al-Shāfiʿī,
Ikhtilāf Malik wa al-Shāfiʿī, in which he advocates Malikī traditionist positions.73
Another important student of al-Shāfiʿī is al-Rabīʿ al-Murādī (d. 270/884), who verified
and narrated several of his teacher’s works, including al-Risāla and al-Umm. Other noteworthy
compendiums from this period include the works of Ḥarmala al-Tujībī (d. 243/857). Through
their contribution to transmitting, explaining and critically expanding on the founder’s ideas and
methods, al-Shāfiʿī’s students are credited with the wide reaching and lasting influence that the
madhhab achieved at this period. These efforts were so momentous that, as El Shamsy observes,
they exercised an important influence on the formative history of other Sunni schools as well.74

Third: The emergence and spreading of the madhhab (270-404/884-1014)

72

Ismāʿīl al-Muzanī, Mukhtaṣar al-Muzanī fī furū’ al-Shāfiʿiyya, commented on and edited by Muḥammad Abd alQādir Shāhīn (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1998), 7.
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Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ, Tabaqāt al-fuqhahāʾ al-shāfiʿīyya, 683.

Commenting the model that al-Shāfiʿī students created and their influence on other madhhabs, El Shamsy notes,
“This model eventually matured into the classical school of law, while the students’ reinterpretations of al-Shāfiʿī’s
thought formed the bridges over which al-Shāfiʿī’s canonization project spread to other schools and fields of
scholarship at a remarkable speed. It is thus not an exaggeration to say that the formative history of the al-Shāfiʿī
school is also the formative history of classical Sunni Islamic law”; El Shamsy, Canonization, 6-7.
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If the founding and transmission of the teachings of the madhhab were the main functions of the
first two periods in the history of the Shāfiʿī literary traditions, the popularization of these
teachings is the salient mark of the third one. After transmitting the foundational legal books and
doctrines of the founder, the school entered a new period that witnessed its spreading and
emergence as a fully realized madhhab. These efforts came about especially at the hands of
dedicated teachers and judges. Chief among them were ʿUthmān al-Anmāṭī (d. 288/901), and his
student-cum-judge Abū al-ʿAbbās Ibn Surayj (d. 306/919), who is credited with spreading the
Shāfiʿī maddhab in Khurasan and Persia. Ibn Surayj attracted many students and wrote an
important commentary on Mukhtaṣar al-Muzanī. According to Melchert, Ibn Surayj’s influence
on the future of Shāfiʿī school was far-reaching. His influences included establishing the
madhhab as a guild in the third/ninth century, writing his own influential digest, and founding
the genre of taʿlīqa, or a dissertation. It was an assignment by Ibn Surayj to his students
consisting of writing a commentary on al-Muzanī’s Mukhtaṣar. According to Melchert,
It is clear that a continuous school--in the later sense--did not flourish neither in Iraq nor in Egypt
during the ninth century, The classical Shāfiʿī guild school dates back, in most of its essentials,
not all the way to al-Shāfiʿī but to Abū al-ʿAbbās Ibn Surayj (d. Baghdad, 306/918). From his
time onwards, Shāfiʿī jurisprudents have normally had an identifiable teacher and identifiable
students. Before his time, the learning of Shāfiʿī jurisprudence was less like the learning of
Ḥanafī jurisprudence, organized as a regular course of study under one teacher, than like the
gathering of ḥadīth reports from a number of teachers, the more the better. From this time
forward, there was a normal course of advanced study leading to production of a taʿlīqa, virtually
a doctoral dissertation, describing the judicial opinions chosen by the Shāfiʿī school. No such
literary production regularly characterized the study of law before Ibn Surayj. It was a mark of
the classical school of law that had a local chief, and Ibn Surayj seems to be the first
jurisprudence described as having the chieftaincy of the Shāfiʿīyah. From his time onward,
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someone was usually identified as having inherited that title, but no one before is said to have had
it.75

As the above shows, as a literary form, the taʿlīqas served two purposes. First, a juristic one,
through which Shāfiʿī views on a given issue (masʾala) are deduced. Second, these works were
an important element of an educational process early on the Shāfiʿī, marking the mastery of
students with Shāfiʿī jurisprudence. However, taʿlīqas had some unintended and far-reaching
consequences. With this, as Halim asserts, Ibn Surayj, “basically provided a cradle of
development for the ṭarīqa. Hence, through the proliferation of the taʿlīqa, the ṭarīqa also grew.
Its climax apparently was reached during the period of the aṣḥāb al-wujūh, that is, the period of
those jurists who were capable of deriving legal solutions employing the methodology of the
eponym of the madhhab, as was promoted by Ibn Surayj.”76
The spreading of the madhhab at this stage was carried out by other scholars as well like
Abū Zurʿa the Damascan (d. 302/915) and al-Qaffāl (d. 365/976). With regard to diversification
of the genres of the Shāfiʿī books, this period also, “Witnessed the emergence of the first work of
biographical dictionaries of the Shāfiʿīs, Al-madhhab fī dhikr shuyūkh al-madhhab, by Abī
ʿUmar al-Muṭṭawiʿī (d. 440/1049).”77

Fourth: The stabilization of the madhhab and emergence of the Iraqian and Khurasanian
sub-schools (404-505/1014-1112)
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The main characteristics of this critical period are three-fold. First, there was a spike in the
number of ulema who adhered to the Shāfiʿī school, contributing to it with diverse works.
Second, the Shāfiʿī madhhab was adopted by political power, especially the Seljuk dynasty
(428-590/1037-1194) which stretched between Anatolia, south east Asia and Persia, and the
Ayyubids (566-658/1171–1260), whose kingdom covered Egypt and the Levant. This adoption
influenced courts and schools. Third, two interpretive sub-schools (ṭarīqas) emerged within the
madhhab; the Iraqians and Khurasanians. Even though the difference between the two subschools was a difference in the paths of narrations of legal opinions from the founder and their
respective preferences between them, according to al-Nawawī, the Iraqians were more accurate
in their transmission while the Khurasanians were better in applying and organizing legal
opinions.78
An important point here is that, as Halim demonstrates, al-Nawawī verification ultimately
favored the Iraqian school, with its distinctive traditionist inclination.79 Chapter Two will deal
with this point.
There are important authors and books from this period. First, there is Abū Isḥāq alShirāzī (d. 476/1084), who wrote a lasting influential work, al-Muhadhhab. Al-Muhadhhab is an
abridgment of judge Ṭāhir al-Ṭabarī’s (d. 450/1058) influential work/dissertation al-Taʿlīqa. AlShirāzī also wrote al-Lumaʿ, an influential commentary on Ibn al-Ḥājib’s (d. 646/1249) digest in
the discipline of uṣūl al-fiqh. Second, there is the eminent Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī (d. 505/1111),
who wrote a series of surveys and his own abridgments that the entire corpus of the later
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madhhab relied upon. This series of books is based on a multi-volume compendium by his
teacher and towering scholar al-Juwaynī’s (d. 478/1086), Nihāyat al-maṭlab. Nihāyat al-maṭlab
is an expansive commentary on Mukhtaṣar al-Muzanī. Al-Ghazālī’s series of abridgments are
titled al-Basīṭ, al-Wasīṭ, and al-Wajīz, in the order of their length, from the biggest to the
smallest. As a sign of the stabilization of the madhhab, according to Ḥājjī Khalīfa, four of the
five most influential classical books of Shāfiʿism that were produced prior to verification period,
which is marked by the achievements of al-Nawawī and al-Rāfiʿī in this regard, came from this
period of stabilization.80 This is a testimony not only to the stabilization of the madhhab, but to
its maturity and prolific abilities. Other than the aforementioned digest of al-Muzanī that was
produced in the third/ninth century, the rest of the five books from this period are al-Ghazālī’s
al-Wasīṭ, and al-Wajīz, al-Shirāzī’s al-Muhadhdhab and al-Tanbīh.
Another important development in this period is the introduction of the voluminous genre
of juristic encyclopedias (mawsūʿāt fiqhiyya). The most significant works from this era are Chief
Judge al-Māwardī’s (d. 450/1058) al-Ḥāwī al-kabīr and Nihāyat al-maṭlab fī dirāyat al-madhhab
by Imam al-Juwaynī (d. 478/1085), both of which are running commentaries on al-Muẓanī’s
Mukhtaṣar.
Below is a diagram of the genealogy of the main books in the Shāfiʿī school.

80 According

to Ḥajji Khalīfa, “Mukhtaṣar al-Muzanī fī furūʿ al-Shāfiʿiyya is one of the five famed five books
among the Shāfiʿīs that they widely circulated among them. It is widely cited in all regions, as mentioned by alNawawī in al-Tahdhīb. It is authored by the Shaykh and Imam Ismāʿīl b.Yaḥyā al-Muzanī al-Shāfiʿī, who died in
264 [/878]. He is the first to author a book in the Shāfiʿī madhhab. Ibn Surayj said that the book Mukhtaṣar alMuzanī will leave the world untouched [i.e. by criticism]. Based on its model, they [i.e. the Shāfiʿīs] arranged their
works. They explained and commented on its discourse. The Shāfʿīs are actively engaging with it, studying it and
reading it for a long time. They vary between an expatiating commentator (shāriḥ muṭawwil) and an explaining
abridger (mukhtaṣir muʿalil). The majority among them admit that only a few comprehend its secrets, like Ibn
Surayj”; Khalīfa, Kashf, 1635-1636.
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Figure 1: The genealogy of the main books in the Shāfiʿī literary tradition, showing the main texts, their types
(whether a digest, commentary, or a gloss). Source: Muḥmmad b.Umar al-Kāf, al-Muʿtamad ʿind al-Shāfiʿiyya:
dirāsa naẓariyya taṭbīqiyya, an MA thesis, self-published, p. 369.

Part Two: The typology of Shāfiʿī books from after al-Nawawī
Fifth: The stage of verification at the hands of the ‘Two Masters’, al-Nawawī and al-Rāfiʿī
(505-676/1112-1278)
The period of the seventh/thirteenth century is one of unprecedented blooming of the Shāfiʿī
tradition. This was partially fueled by the support of the Ayyubids and Seljuks and partially
because of scholarly efforts to filter and verify an unmanageably expansive legal corpus of the
Shāfiʿī legal school. The juristic books from this period are known to have performed two
essential functions: first, isolating weak (ḍaʿīf) and non-preponderant (marjūḥ) juristic opinions,
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a process which came to be know as verification (tarjīḥ or alternatively tanqīḥ) and; second, the
consolidation of opinions that are inline with opinions and foundations of Imām al-Shāfiʿī by
way of attaching to them their respective scriptural evidence (taḥrīr).81 With a massive library
that has acquired more than three centuries’ worth of legal works by scores of Shāfiʿī authorjurists, some of these works by the seventh/thirteenth century have started to contradict the
established foundations of the Shāfiʿī madhhab. Also, due to the expansion of the madhhab east
and west, its books became geographically scattered and unconnected in terms of their shared
doctrines and juristic authority figures. Thus, a dual need emerged, first, to limit absolute
independent legal reasoning (ijtihād muṭlaq) and, second, to verify and regulate the
jurisprudential rules of the madhhab.
These momentous tasks were achieved by The Two Masters (al-Shaykhayn), al-Rāfiʿī (d.
633/1236) and al-Nawawī (d. 676/1278). Al-Rāfiʿī mainly worked on al-Ghazālī’s legal works
and produced al-Muḥarrar. Al-Nawawī, on the other hand, who is more prolific and came to be
more preferred right after his death. He authored the decisive book on which all the later
referential literature relies, Minhāj al-ṭālibīn, which is the subject of Chapter Two. It must be
noted here that within the standard Shāfiʿī curriculum, Minhāj al-ṭālibīn, is the most advanced
textbook for Shāfiʿī fiqh students and the ultimate reference for muftīs.82
There are other important bibliographical developments from this period. These include
the production of lasting educational digests that are still in use and circulation to this day as
standard textbooks. The most iconic one is Abū Shujāʿ al-Iṣfahānī’s (d. 593/1197) Ghāyat al81

See the editor’s preamble to Nihāyat al-maṭlab: Al-Juwaynī, Nihāyat al-maṭlab, edited by ʿAbd al-ʿAzīm al-Dīb
(Jeddah: Dār al-Minhāj, 2007) 1:153.
82 Al-Kurdī,

al-Fawāʾid, 34-36.
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ikhtiṣār (a.k.a. al-Ghāya wa al-taqrīb). Many later commentaries and super-commentaries on
this digest, like Ibn al-Qāsim al-Ghazzī (d. 918/1512) commentary and al-Bayjūrī’s (d.
1277/1861) supera-commentary, became the standard references.
The books of the Two Masters have had a lasting effect on Shāfiʿī scholarship like no
other. Even though El-Shamsy sees their work as “part of an encyclopedic drive in the Mamluk
era to gather and sift all existing Islamic knowledge; a movement that animated all legal schools
and Islamic disciplines,” there are few reasons that can explain this drive.83 As stated above, one
of the main objectives of the literary production of this period was to verify and engage with the
expansive juristic corpus that was produced before. This is partly the reason for the encyclopedic
orientation in the Mamluk era. This encyclopedic orientation which mainly took place in the
genre of commentaries will come to be the main site of juristic ijtihād, not digests. But another
reason for the need for encyclopedia works is an educational one. These commentaries served as
references for advanced Shāfiʿī students in madrasa academies, covering past debates, critical
engagements with the original works, and serving as reservoirs of legal opinions of past
authorities.
The scope of verification of the entire Shāfiʿī juristic corpus and the depth of ruleformulation that Two Masters underwent was so monumental to the extent that later Shāfiʿīs
deemed going to sources prior to their work as unnecessary. This was carried out especially in alRāfiʿī al-Muḥarrar and al-Sharḥ al-kabīr and al-Nawawī’s Rawḍat al-ṭālib.and al-Majmūʿ. This
new reality of believing there is no need to engage with books that were produced prior to the the
Two Masters, because of the assumption that the majority of these were not verified, have had
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other outcomes: first, that legal works predating the works of the Two Masters became
practically irrelevant. Second, that the funneling of the legal authority within the Shāfiʿī school
through its two most authoritative commentators, al-R fi' and al-Nawawī, has “also constrained
the future scope of Shāfiʿī scholarship.”84

Sixth: The period of the commentaries (676-926/1278-1520)
The juristic and literary efforts in this period revolved around critically engaging and verifying
the doctrines that were deduced by the Two Masters in their books. In the first half of this period,
a group of jurist-authors produced important commentaries that critically engaged with alRāfiʿī's and al-Nawawī’s works. This is because the books of this period “contained the ruleformulations (tarjīhs) of their authors from among the opinions of the Two Masters. They
became the referential reliance in identifying the doctrines of the madhhab.”85 There was also a
parallel track of books branching out from other books, especially the following four: (1) Rawḍat
al-ṭālib.and Minhāj al-ṭālib.of al-Nawawī, and al-Rāfiʿī’s al-Sharḥ al-kabīr and al-Muḥarrar.
Chief among the scholars who worked on these books are al-Isnawī (d. 772/1372), al-Adhraʿī (d.
783/1278), al-Bulqīnī (d. 805/1403) and his student Ibn al-ʿImād al-Aqfahsī (d. 808/1405). AlIsnawī is known to be the most critical of al-Nawawī’s juristic verifications. His views are
contained in both his commentary on Minhāj and his abridgment of Rawḍa. In specific, he
criticizes al-Nawawī’s independent juristic preferences (ikhtiyārat) through which he inferred his
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evidence-based preferences that are different from al-Shāfiʿī.86 Al-Isnawī’s criticisms were not
left unchecked. Rather, they were challenged by the other three previously mentioned, who
critically engaged with his criticisms, accepting some and refuting others. Then came al-Zarkashī
(d. 772/1273), who compiled an important abridgment that benefited from the different glosses
on al-Nawawī’s Rawda up to that point, titled Khādim al-rawḍa.87
Another important development in this history of legal writing is the introduction of
poetic educational texts that are memorized and studied as part of the Shāfiʿī curriculum. Two
famous examples here: Aḥmad al-Ramlī Ibn Raslān’s (d. 844/1441) famed 1000-verse poetic
rendition al-Zubad fī mā ʿalihi al-muʿtamad, titled Safwat al-zubad. Another example is alʿAmrīṭī’s (d. 890/1485) Nihāyat al-tadrīb, which is another exposition of Abu Shujāʿ’s al-Ghaya
wa al-taqrīb. This phenomena of transferring legal and religious writing from prose to poetry for
educational purposes continues to be understudied.

Seventh: The period of the glosses (926-1335/1520-1917)
This is a period to which the subject of Chapter Three, Ibn Ḥajar’s commentary, Tuḥfat almuḥtāj, on the above mentioned Minhāj al-ṭālib.of al-Nawawī belong. This post-stabilization
period was characterized by producing iconic multi-volume interlinear supra-commentaries or
86 After

an examination of the difference between tarjīḥ and ikhtiyār that engaged with many sources, primary and
secondary, al-Khaṭib offers the following definition of a juristic ikhtiyār, which is based on a synthesis of many
references; an ikhtiyār is a case “in which a jurist qualified to perform independent juristic reasoning (mujtahid)
differs with either the established ruling (madhhab) of his followed Imam on some issues or a preponderant (rājiḥ)
juristic opinion based on evidence.”Al-Khaṭīb, Ikhtiyārāt, 93.
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glosses (ḥawāshī., sing. ḥāshiyya) varying in length on previous authoritative works, alongside
some original production. With the establishment of specialized study circles, especially in alAzhar and the Two Sanctuaries, there was an educational need by Shāfiʿī students, as well as
teachers, for such a genre and mode of writing. These glosses served as encyclopedias containing
surveys, opinions and debates on every subject they encountered, in addition to a detailed
sentence-by-sentence engagement with the author's original work. Based on the outcomes from
the period of commentaries, the main books from this period came to revolve around alNawawī’s corpus.
The juristic and literary objective of this period focused on consolidating and expanding
the doctrines of the madhhab. This is mainly attributed to the efforts of Shaykh al-Islam
Zakariyyā al-Anṣārī (d. 926/1520) and a group of his luminary students who became prominent
legal authorities: (1) al-Shihāb al-Ramlī (d. 957/1550), (2) Ibn Ḥajar al-Haytamī (d. 974/1567),
(3) al-Khaṭīb al-Shirbīnī (d. 977/1570), al-Shams al-Ramlī (d. 1004/1596), the son of al-Shihāb
al-Ramlī. Along with Ibn Ḥajar’s Tuḥfat al-muḥtāj, al-Shams al-Ramlī’s Nihāyat al-muḥtāj, both
of which are commentaries on Minhāj, the pair is considered the most important works from the
post-classical, post-stabilization period. These two commentaries became authoritative legal
references containing the later doctrines of the madhhab. Later Shāfiʿīs also are in agreement
that no fatwa can contradict the rulings in these two books. The group of authors of glosses all of
whose opinions are regarded valid for fatwa purposes are: al-Anṣārī, al-Shirbīnī (d. 977/1570),
al-Zayyādī (d. 1024/1615), Ibn al-Qāsim (d. 992/1584), al-Burulusī, a. k. a. ʿUmayra (d.
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957/1550), al-Shubrāmilsī (d. 1087/1676), al-Ḥalabī (d. 1044/1635), and finally al-ʿInānī--and in
this hierarchy of strength.88
Additionally, there are others books that represent the most important products from this
period: al-Anṣārī’s Sharḥ al-Manhaj, which is an commentary on al-Anṣārī’s own abridgment of
al-Nawawī’s Minhāj, al-Anṣārī’s commentary on his own abridgment of Abī Zurʿa al-ʿIrāqī
Tanqīḥ al-lubāb, another work by Ibn Ḥajar which is a commentary on al-Muqaddima alḤadramiyya by Ba-Faḍl, Aḥmad al-Malibārī’s Fatḥ al-Muʿīn which is a commentary on his own
Qurrat al-ʿayn, and finally al-Khaṭīb al-Shirbīnī’s highly regarded commentary al-Iqnāʿ on Abū
Shujāʿ al-Aṣfahānī’s al-Ghāya wa al-taqrīb. These books continue to constitute the standard
works used for the Shāfiʿī educational curriculum. An important and wide referenced gloss is alBayjūrī’s (d. 1276/1859) one on Ibn al-Qāsim’s (d. 918/1512) commentary on al-Ghāya.
Other than their advanced and sophisticated juristic investigations, these works were
characterized by a preoccupation with linguistic and logical examinations. Despite continuing
disagreements and contestations, “it is noticeable that the madhhab completely stabilizes due to
the adoption of relied-upon (muʿtamad) opinions; unlike the previous debates prior to the Two
Masters.”89 Based on the critical engagement of the several scholars, especially the valuable alFawāʾid al-Madaniyya by al-Kurdī (d. 1194/1780), there is a concordance on a hierarchy of the
doctrines of the Shāfiʿī madhhab. It is represented as follows: The highest form of doctrine of the
Shāfiʿī madhhab is represented by that which al-Rāfiʿī and al-Nawawī agree upon. Then, if there
is a disagreement between them on any given issues, the tarjīḥ of al-Nawawī from between the
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two is given precedence. Then this is followed by that which Shaykh al-Islām al-Anṣārī and his
aforementioned students adopted, as long as there is neither different opinions by al-Nawawī nor
the existence of an opinion by the two Shaykhs. Ibn Ḥajar’s Tuḥfa and al-Ramlī’s Nihāya are at
the top of this last category.90

The contemporary period (1335-/1917-)
This period is said to be characterized by a decline in the teaching of the madhhab and its
application in fatwa and judiciary. It marks the last but still ongoing chapter of this story of
books of the Shāfiʿī literary tradition. This period is severely understudied, especially since it
remains unfolding. Despite a general decline in following in madhhab in the contemporary
Muslim world, whether in educational or judicial institutions, some of the noticeable efforts
taking place in this period include the editing of unpublished manuscripts, producing critical
editions, producing new important encyclopedic works, and teaching. The contemporary moment
is complex and a thorough analysis of it falls outside the scope of this work.

Conclusion

The Shāfiʿī school has a complex intellectual and bibliographical history that has not been
adequately studied. In order to situate the two most important works in the Shāfiʿī madhhab,
Minhāj al-ṭālib of al-Nawawī and Tuḥfat al-muḥtāj of Ibn Ḥajar, this chapter provided a typology
90 Al-Kurdī,
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of the Shāfiʿī literary tradition. The aim of this typology was to articulate a coherent and
interconnected theory of Shāfiʿī texts, from the founding onward. Rather than following a classic
model derived from the standard European periodization, this survey adopted an eight-period
scheme shared by Shāfiʿī historians representing the salient features of each historical period.
The first period (186-204/802-820) witnessed the founding of the madhhab through al-Shāfiʿī
scripture-based jurisprudential theory and juristic discourse, which was articulated in his prolific
juristic career. This career was categorized between ‘new’ and ‘old’ doctrines, before and after he
settled in Egypt. In response, the main functions of the second period (204-270/820-884) was the
collection and transmission of opinions of the eponymous founder. The main vehicle for these
functions was the genre of digests (mukhataṣarāt), especially through the works of al-Muzanī (d.
264/878) and al-Buwayṭī (d. 232/847), with their rationalist and traditionist leanings,
respectively. The real spread of the madhhab took place in the third period (270-404/884-1014),
thanks to several efforts, especially al-ʿAbbās Ibn Surayj (d. 306/919). This period witnessed the
emergence of the genre of taʿlīqa, which is similar to modern day academic dissertations, a genre
that was proven effective in serving the educational and juristic specialization of the time. On the
heels of spread came the need for stabilization in the fourth period (404-505/1014-1112). This
period witnessed the emergence of two interpretive sub-schools (tarīqs), as a result of the
widespread of the madhhab and the diverse production of its local centers. These ṭarīqas were
the Iraqian sub-school, with its traditionist emphasis on the accuracy transmission and
authentication of juristic opinions, and its Khurasanians counterpart, with its mastery in
extraction of substantive opinions. The pivotal writings of this period are those of al-Shirāzī (d.
476/1084) and al-Ghazālī (d. 505/1111).
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The spread and diversity of literary and juristic corpus ushered in a need for verification.
Verification activity became the hallmark of the fifth period (505-676/1112-1278), thanks to the
momentous efforts of the ‘Two Masters’ (al-shaykhān) of the madhhab, al-Rāfiʿī (d. 633/1236)
and al-Nawawī (d. 676/1278), who undertook the formidable feat of verifying the entire corpus
of the school. By this, they consolidated the doctrines of the madhhab based on the methodology
and opinions of its founder. The crowned digest of the period is al-Nawawī’s Minhāj, which
came to be regarded as the most authoritative manual in the Shāfiʿī literary tradition. The period
of commentaries (676-926/1278-1520) followed, ushering its prolific and critical engagement
with the production of the Two Masters, which resulted in affirming and consolidating their
achievements and status, as well as identifying areas that other authors needed to further
verification, especially cases of their independent preferences. Even though the following period
is called the period of the glosses (926-1335/1520-1917), it saw the authoring the second most
authoritative book in Shāfiʿism, Ibn Ḥajar’s (d. 974/1567) commentary of al-Nawawī’s Minhāj,
titled Tuḥfat al-muḥtāj. As an expansum, Tuḥfa represents a culmination of both: poststabilization juristic verification efforts and of the literary, linguistic, and logical preoccupations
that are characteristic of the commentarial genre. As for the eighth and contemporary period
(1335/1917-), while editing, publishing and teaching efforts of the Shāfiʿī literature are
noticeable, there is a decline in the juristic production, due to the a drop in integrating the Shāfiʿī
madhhab in fatwa and judiciary.
With Minhāj and Tuḥfa positioned authoritatively at the top of its cannon, the Shāfiʿī
literary tradition can be characterized by a few features. First, that it is the outcome of a series of
juristic and literary operations that aligned themselves in an interconnected timeline. This
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timeline is the product of a interplay of two sets of social needs: ‘conservative’ needs to uphold
doctrinal, methodological, and juristic coherence and authenticity, and ‘progressive’ needs to
respond to new questions, scholarly developments and diversity, and social, judicial and
educational contexts. Second, as a literary tradition composed of different authorial functions, it
enjoys critical and cumulative levels of confirmation and verification. It suffices here to say that,
for example, when Ibn Ḥajar wrote his commentary on Minhāj, which is considered the most
authoritative Shāfiʿī manual, he had to engage with a two-century worth of layers of critical
engagements with it, fierce opposition notwithstanding. Lastly, the site of Shāfiʿī ijtihād has
shifted from the genre of digests to that of expansums. This phenomenon has certain literary
implications in terms of how it will be expressed in this textual genre, a theme that has not been
adequately studied.
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CHAPTER TWO
Enter ‘The Methodology’:
An Examination of the Linguistic and Juristic Elements of Al-Nawawī’s Minhāj

What qualifies a legal manual to become the most authoritative digest in a legal school? What
elements does such a manual need to acquire in order to become a vessel containing and passing
on the doctrines of its literary tradition? As shown in Chapter One, since its inception, the Shāfiʿī
school has been unique in terms of diversity of its opinion; beginning with its founder, who
revisited some of his legal opinions, creating what was known as the ‘old’ (qadīm) and
‘new’ (jadīd) doctrines; the emergence of different narrators of the founder’s opinions, their own
reasoning and opinions, a wide gamut of various genres of legal writing, the emergence of
regional schools, as well as two hermeneutical sub-schools varying in their focus on
authentication and production of secondary rulings, i.e. the Iraqian i and Khurasanian ṭarīqas,
respectively, and the different attempts to verify and reconcile all of that, side-by-side with
consolidating the doctrines of the school. How can a digest encapsulate all of the above? What
intellectual, juristic, and linguistic tools does it require to accomplish such a momentous
mission?
This chapter will study the Minhāj with a focus on examining its status as the most
authoritative and referential legal manual in the Shāfiʿī school of law. It provides an overview of
its content, genealogy, and the reasons behind authoring it. By examining the linguistic nature of
Minhāj and how an original terminological system it adopted became the main tool for serving
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its juristic objectives and the Shāfiʿ madhhab as whole, this chapter attempts to provide an
original contribution in this regard. Thereafter, the chapter moves to examine al-Nawawī’s
juristic verification efforts, especially his success in reconciling the differences between Shāfīʿī
sub-schools that existed up to his time, and how they culminated in the Minhāj becoming the
main vessel for the doctrines of the Shāfiʿī school. It also includes examples from Minhāj that
show the scope of the juristic efforts of al-Nawawī, including some in which he adopts a position
different from that subscribed to by his school. Finally, the chapter concludes by examining how
al-Nawawī influenced Shāfiʿism in an enduring method up to this day.

What Sets The Minhāj Apart?
Minhāj al-ṭālib wa ʿumdat al-muftīn (lit. The methodology of the seekers and reliance of muftīs,
hereafter “Minhāj”) of Muḥyyī al-Dīn b. Yaḥyā b. Sharaf al-Nawawī (d. 676/1278), the most
prominent scholar of the Shāfiʿī school and a ḥadīth master, is the most authoritative and
advanced digest (mukhtaṣar) in the Shāfiʿī school. The volume is said to contain the late
doctrines of the Shāfiʿī school, and has been the main legal reference thereof since it was
authored. It represents a critical abridgment of another juristic text, al-Muḥarrar, by al-Rāfiʿī
(505–676/1112–1278). Together, al-Nawawī and al-Rāfiʿī are considered the two most
authoritative figures from the post-classical era of this legal school onwards, and came to be
known as ‘The Two Masters’ (al-shaykhān) of the Shāfiʿī madhhab. A mid-size edition of alMinhāj solely containing the work without any marginalia or annotation is around 340 pages,
while the most common editions in circulation, all of which either contain footnotes or selections
from running commentaries, are roughly double that in the number of pages. The work is highly
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regarded among jurists, judges, and students of Islamic disciplines, including outside Shāfiʿī
circles. It amounts to a standard advanced text in the Shāfiʿī curriculum to this day everywhere,
and is available in complete audio and video courses online.
The text of al-Minhāj has been commonly memorized by advanced Shāfʿī fiqh students
and specialists. Those who memorized the volume gained the designation ‘al-minhājī’.91 The
work has attracted dozens of commentaries (84 commentaries, in addition to a dozen glosses on
those commentaries), 10 abridgments, several critical editions, and 10 poetic renditions.92 Many
new editions, edited commentaries, and specialized studies of al-Minhāj are published annually.
There is even a regularly updated website monitoring all new publications, study circles, and
student-run study and memorization groups dedicated to this influential book.93 In an attempt to
canonize Islamic law for colonial legal codification by Malaysia, the work was also translated
into English from French by L.W.C. Van den Berg (1845‒1927), a civil servant and linguist, as

91 Al-Sakhāwī,

al-manhal, 29.

92 According

to the Dār al-Minhāj edition of Minhāj, which I will only use outside in this footnote (as otherwise I
use the Dār al-Fayḥāʾ edition), the above-mentioned number of of commentaries is the highest and most reliable
figure I could find on the total number of commentaries on Minhāj. This is part of the publisher’s preface to the
edition which lists a number of partial and incomplete commentaries of Minhāj as well, amounting to 24 in total.
There are another 10 commentaries on the opening speech, or Introduction, alone. There are 10 abridgments of
Minhāj, the most celebrated among them is Shaykh al-Islām Zakariyyā al-Anṣārī’s Manhaj al-ṭullāb, which has
attracted eight commentaries on it, including one by the author, al-Anṣārī, himself, and then another 21 glosses on
these commentaries by al-Aṣārī: Yaḥyā b. Sharaf al-Nawawī, Minhāj al-ṭālib.wa ʿumdat al-muftīn, edited by
Muḥammad Muḥammad Āshūr (Jeddah: Dār al-Minhāj, 2020), 22‒61.
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part of the Dutch colonization of Malaysia.94 This translation is testimony to the central judicial
function of the work and how essential it was to legal operations in the pre-modern and modern
worlds. There is also a French translation from the nineteenth century.95
Any attempt to analyze a work that has become a classic or an authority in any field has
to be, by definition, complex and multilayered. In order to question the situatedness of any such
work is more complex a process than hypothesizing that it happened ‘in the right place at the
right time’, to respond to certain intellectual and social needs. A work such as al-Nawawī’s
Minhāj surely comprises multifaceted and cross-disciplinary influences and focuses. Signally, I
will be focusing on law and language in al-Nawawī’s Minhāj.
There are two central reasons as to why Imām al-Nawawī’s legal digest (mukhtaṣar),
Minhāj, came to be regarded as the most authoritative interpretive legal work in the Shāfiʿī legal
school. Firstly, there is its monumental juristic contribution to the process of verification (taḥrīr)
of the doctrines of the madhhab, especially by (a) synthesizing the Khurasanian and Iraqian subschools, a contribution that is (b) based on two other more expansive works on juristic
verification and authentication of legal proofs that were accomplished, especially in two more
expansive projects; al-Majmūʿ and Rawdat al-ṭālib.(hereafter “Rawḍa”), respectively. Secondly,
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In his preface, the translator iterates the utilitarian purpose behind the translation and notes that his aim is to make
al-Nawawī's work accessible to magistrates and political agents. He also states that the original French translation on
which the English rendition is based, is a non-literal one, or rather a paraphrasing, based partly on al-Muḥarrar, alMaḥallī’s commentary of al-Minhāj, and “the two principal 16th-century commentaries on Minhaj et Talibin--i.e.,
the Tohfat-el-Mohtaj and the Nihayat al Mohtaj. It is hoped, therefore, that the present publication may be of some
practical utility in the direction indicated above [i.e., making it more accessible to magistrates and political agents],
and at the same time not without interest to the student of comparative jurisprudence.” See: Muḥyyī al-Dīn Abū
Zakariyyā Yaḥyā b. Sharaf al-Nawawī, Minhaj et Talibin: A Manual of Muhammadan Law according to the School
of Shafii, Translated by E. C. Howard (Lahore: Law Publishing Company, 1977), p.X.
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For the French translation, see: Minhadj At-Talibin: Le Guide Des Zeles Croyants; Manuel de Jurisprudence
Musulmane Selon Le Rite de Chafi'i, translated by L. W. C. Van Den Berg (Batavia: Imprimerie du Gouvernment,
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a salient feature of al-Minhāj that lacks due attention is its linguistic nature, which combines (a)
unparalleled clarity and precision with (b) the deployment of a comprehensive and effective
terminological system that successfully serves all its methodological objectives. Both alMinhāj’s juristic and linguistic achievements have been adopted by successive generations of
Shāfiʿī jurists to this day, whereby doctrines of the Shāfiʿī school still center around al-Nawawī’s
opinions, and the terminologies he developed in Minhāj continue to constitute a common
practice for Shāfiʿī jurists hitherto. These two juristic and linguistic advantages merited the book
with the very practical purpose it constitutes in the eyes of advanced students seeking to master
their subjects, and in the eyes of judges seeking a shorthand representing the doctrines of the
Shāfiʿī school.
The scope and complexity of the verification process, especially the efforts to reconcile
the two Iraqian and Khurasanian sub-schools, has been studied by several scholars, particularly
the important contribution of Halim, as well as Calder and El-Shamsy. This thesis has benefited
from the work of the former, which focuses on the overall juristic accomplishments of alNawawī, and is only limited to Minhāj.96 I will first examine the merits of the terminological
system at the center of the verification efforts presented in Minhāj. I will try to demonstrate that
one of the central factors that qualified this digest to acquire its paramount position is its precise
language and the consistent use of its original and customized special system of pre-defined
terminologies, the majority of which he first introduced in Rawḍa. Second, as I will demonstrate
in detail below, I will provide diverse examples in which the outcome of al-Nawawī’s juristic
96 Arguably,

the most extensive treatment of the history of the Iraqian and Khorasnian sub-schools can be found in
Halim’s work, Chapter Three. Also, even though he acknowledges the importance of the breadth of the Hallaq’s and
Calder’s contribution to exploring al-Nawawī’s juristic contribution, he believes their work did not provide enough
overview of al-Nawawī’s overarching achievement. See: Halim, Legal, 7.
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verification97 in Minhāj, along with citing the underlying preparatory juristic review from alMajmūʿ and Rawḍa. Third, I will provide a comparison between al-Nawawī’s methodology of
verification and ḥadīth studies, which aims to demonstrate that his legal method in uniting the
two Shāfiʿī sub-schools that preceded him, drew heavily on ḥadīth studies’ methodology. This
special and well-thought-out process, with both its linguistic and juristic elements, allowed this
digest to not only become a hallmark in compacting immense and multi-level legal meanings,
but also to become an optimal work for the choices of the commentarial tradition, as will be
further discussed in Chapter Three.

The Author
Yaḥyā b. Sharaf al-Nawawī (631–676/1233–1277), one of the foremost deferred Islamic Sunni
scholars and one of the supreme authorities, or one of the Two Masters in the Shafiʿī school, who
also specialized in ḥadīth, ḥadīth terminology, ḥadīth commentary, linguistics, jurists’
biographies, and Sufism, are still among the most circulated books to this day. He was famous
for his piety from an early age. Several stories surround al-Nawawī denote saintly miracles, both
as a child and later on in life, which Halim studies and examines how they were used in
hagiographical writing to elevate al-Nawawī’s status.98 It can be said that to this day, al-Nawawī
is one of the very few scholars respected in all Muslim denominations and madhhabs across the
board within Sunnism. He was born in the town of Nawa, in modern-day southwestern Syria,
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In sense, the process of verification or ṭahqīq, which indicates a process of preponderance between juristic
opinions, methdos, or narrations, is process of canonization of juristic doctrines; not of standard books. I could have
used this term, but I prefer to emphasize the distiction between how books and legal opinions are canonized. For
one, there is the fact that legal doctrines change in faster pace throughout history than the book they contain.
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before settling in Damascus at the age of 18 to pursue his education. He lived to witness the
downfall of the Ayyubid dynasty (6th–7th/12th–13th centuries) and the dawn of the Mamluk era
(7th–10th/13th-16th centuries), and was appointed as a lecturer in al-Ashrafiyya madrasa. He is
known for his brave encounter with Mamluk Sultan al-Ẓāhir Baybars (d. 676/1277), in which he
stood up against the Mamluk Sultan’s plan to confiscate the lands that were regained from the
Crusades in 666/1267.99
As for his rank within the hierarchy of ijtihād and fatwa within the Shāfiʿī school, which
Calder translates as the ‘typology of muftīs’, al-Nawawī is placed without any known
contestation in the fourth category. This category is that of the ‘mujtahids in fatwa and ruleformulation (mujtahidī al-fatwā wa al-tarjīḥ)’. Effectively, these are scholars whose
qualifications are established as master-jurists, who are well versed in the madhhab of their
followed eponymous Imams, its proofs, are active in verifying it, and perform preponderance,
along with all its legal and intellectual tools.100
Despite his death at the young age of forty four years old, which some claim is due to his
extremely ascetic lifestyle and impressive authorial productivity, whether by the counts of books
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In this widely cited encounter, Baybars wanted to keep the large swaths of agricultural land that he regained after
his victory against the Crusades. Baybars wanted to keep the lands under his possession based on an opinion of
some Ḥanafī scholars, which is contrary to the opinion of the majority jurists who deem that the lands have to be
transferred back to their original owners. Baybars held a meeting with judges and jurists from across the madhhabs
regarding the issue, citing the Ḥanafī fatwa. The Shāfiʿī judge Shams al-Dīn al-Shahrazūrī (d. 687/1288) and his
Ḥanafī counterpartʿAbd Allah al-Adhraʿī (d. 673/1274) stood firmly and spoke harshly against the Sultan. Baybars
clinged to his position. In response, al-Nawawī first sent him a carefully worded letter advising him against the
confiscation. Baybars was angered by the letter and ordered the sacking of al-Nawawī, only to know that he is not
appointed to a state-sponsored teaching position. Baybars responded to him by writing a letter that showed his lack
of knowledge about the legal issues concerning waging a religiously endowed war (jihād). Al-Nawawī responded to
him with yet another letter which was better received by the Sultan who ended up expressing respect to al-Nawawī
and returned the lands to their owners. See: al-Sakhāwī, al-Manhal, 48-52; al-ʿAttār, Tuḥfat, 99-102; al-Suyūṭī, alMinhāj, 71-74; ʿUkāsha, al-Fatāwa, 211-214.
100 Al-Malybārī,

Dirāsa, 210-213. For more on this see: Norman Calder, "Al-Nawawī's Typology of Muftīs and its
Significance for a General Theory of Islamic Law." Islamic Law and Society 3, no. 2 (1996): 137-164.
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or the impact of his authored works, al-Nawawī has left us an astounding number of books. Our
prolific and influential author also left us with a few unfinished manuscripts, some of which were
completed by others.101 Al-Nawawī’s life and trajectory resemble that of the founder of his
Shāfiʿī school in some aspects; both lived a relatively short life, but managed to be very prolific.
While al-Shāfiʿī lived for fifty four years, al-Nawawī lived for only forty four years. Al-Shāfiʿī’s
prolific career, especially during his stay in Egypt for the last six years of his life, was
“extraordinarily productive,” according to Ali, who quotes al-Marwazī who attributes 113 books
of law, exegesis and belles letters (adab) to al-Shāfiʿī.102 Al-Nawawī was no less prolific. There
are 41 books, several of them multi-volumes, attributed to him. According to the editor of alTaḥqīq, the figure climbs to 65 when we include drafts.103 A more important resemblance,
however, is their shared interests in both the Arabic language and Ḥadīth Studies.
Al-Nawawī’s studies started early on in his life. He started his studies after his father
moved him to Damascus in 649/1251 at the age of 18 to study full-time. There, he studied at the
hands of his first Shaykh Tāj al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Fazārī al-Farkāḥ (d. 690/1291), who
then suggested to him to go study with al-Kamāl Isḥāq al-Maghribī (d. 650/1252), who was
teaching at al-Rawāḥiyya madrasa, located east of the Umayyad Mosque, and was a teaching
101

Other than the abundant mentions and entries on al-Nawawī in biographical dictionaries, there are few
biographies of al-Nawawī, but arguably the most comprehensive is al-Sakhāwī’s. See: Muḥammad Abd al-Raḥmān
al-Sakhāwī, al-Manhal al-ʿadhb al-rawī fi tarjamat quṭb al-aqṭāb al-awliyyāʾ al-Nawawī, edited by Aḥmad Farīd alMazīdī (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 2005). Another important biography is the one written by al-Nawawī’s
own student, al-ʿAttaār (d. 724/1324). See: ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn b.Ibrāhīm al-ʿAṭṭār, Tuḥfat al-ṭālib.fi tarjamat al-imām
Muḥyī al-Dīn, edited by Mashūr b.Ḥasan Āl Salmān, published as a supplement to al-Nawawī, al-Ijāz fī sharḥ sunnī
Abī Dāwūd al-Sājistānī (Amman: al-Dār al-Athariyya, 2007); Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyūṭī, al-Minhāj al-Sawī fī tarjamat
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See: Halim, 2015.
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cites ʿAbduh ʿAlī Kushshak, an editor of an edition Rawḍa, who argues that number of al-Nawawī
authored books reaches 65, counting unfinished works and drafts: al-Nawawī, al-Taḥqīq, edited by Qāsim Aghā AlNurī (Damascus; Beirut: Maktabat Dār al-Fajr, 2016), 13.
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assistant to Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ (d. 643/1245), who had an important influence on al-Nawawī’s scholarly
contribution, as we shall see later on.104 His studying intensifiedafter his return from pilgrimage
to the holy sites in Mecca and Medina with his father. Two years later, he enrolled at alRuwāḥiyya. As a sign of the importance of memorization to legal teachings, al-Nawawī
memorized al-Shirāzī’s Tanbīh, and a quarter of the latter’s Muhadhdhab as well. As a testament
to the wide and interdisciplinary scope of his schooling, his studies in al-Ruwāhiyya are said to
have included 12 lessons a day: two lessons studying al-Ghazālī’s al-Wasīṭ, one on al-Shirāzī’s
al-Muhadhdhab (on which al-Nawawī would later write a commentary on its abridgment by alRāfiʿī), a ḥadīth lesson on the two Ṣaḥīḥ books, one on Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim, another on grammar,
studying Ibn Jannī’s al-Lumaʿ, Arabic lexicography and grammar based on Ibn al-Sikkīt’s Iṣlāḥ
al-mantiq, another in Legal theory, which included al-Lumaʿ of al-Shirāzī and al-Rāzī’s alMuntakhab, theology, and genealogy.105 As al-Sakhāwī mentions, his teachers of both ḥadīth and
fiqh are students or affiliates of Ibn al-Salāḥ. The three other teachers with whom he studied are
Muḥammad b. Nūḥ b.Mūsā al-Maqdīsī (d. 650/1252), the Muftī of Ḥalab, ʿUmar b.Asʿad b.Abī
Ghālib al-Rabʿī al-Arbalī (date of death unknown), and Sallār b. al-Ḥasan al-Arbalī (d.
670/1272).106 They too were affiliated with Ibn al-Salāḥ, whose influence on al-Nawawī we will
come back to later in this chapter.
In another resemblance with al-Shāfiʿī, when it comes to linguistics, a subject which is
related to the linguistic elements of Minhāj;in the same way that al-Shāfiʿī was considered an
104 Al-Sakhāwī,

al-Manhal, 15.
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authority in the Arabic language, so was al-Nawawī. Al-Nawawī authored two important works
on Arabic, Taḥrīr al-tanbīh and Tahdhīb al-asmāʾ wa al-lughāt. It is no exaggeration that a
grammarian and historian of Arabic linguists, Ibn Abī Shuhba, asserts that al-Nawawī was “a
master (imām) in language and grammar. He studied these subjects with Shaykh Jamāl al-Dīn b.
Mālik, and narrated from him in his own writing. He authored Tahdhīb al-asmāʾ wa al-lughāt,
leaving it in draft form. This work is testament to his erudition in the science of language. The
same applies to his book al-Taḥrīr ʿala kitāb al-tanbīh.”107 There is no doubt that al-Nawawī’s
mastery in Arabic has empowered his legal focus, especially in producing a precise legal
language that combines clarity and precision. In addition, his ability to create codification and
terminological systems is at the heart of his linguistic labor in al-Minhāj. In specific, both jurists,
al-Shāfiʿī and al-Nawawī, were concerned with ḥadīth as textual evidence for legal inference.
The above legal, ḥadīth and linguistic training provided the interests, influences, and
qualifications which empowered al-Nawawī to produce the Minhāj.

What is the Minhāj?
Al-Minhāj is the most popular legal digest containing the doctrines of the Shāfiʿī school. As
discussed in Chapter One, digests comprise an essential part of the Shāfiʿī literary tradition. They
were viewed from different perspectives. On the one hand, historically, some see digests as a
product of ‘periods of decline’ (according al-ʿAtābī). On the other hand, others view digests as
products of the ‘golden period’. Therefore, digests were seen as either a product of mere
summarizing or an erudite and precise collection of foundations and “unique, precious elements”
107 This

quote is from Ibn Abī Shuhba’s biographical dictionary of grammarians and linguists, Ṭabaqāt al-nuḥāt wa
al-lughawiyyīn, unpublished manuscript that is cited in:Al-Duqr, al-Imām, 67.
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alone, according to the famous historian and Mālikī jurist Ibn ʿAbd al-Barr (d. 463/1071).108 It
suffices here to mention that even though the expansum of the eponymous founder of the school,
al-Umm, which is believed to contain the culmination of his legal opinions, became virtually
obsolete.109 In comparison, the two digests summarizing those opinions by his students, alBuwayṭī and al-Muzanī, unseated the founder’s work and became the central works upon which
all the later works of the school rely.
In terms of structure, as a legal digest, Minhāj consists of 70 chapters that revolve around
the four standard departments of Islamic fiqh manuals: (1) worship (ʿibādāt), (2) interpersonal
transactions (muʿāmalāt), (3), family issues (usra), and (4) fixed penalties, inheritance
calculations, judiciary, and testimonies (ḥudūd wa ḥisābāt wa qaḍāʾ wa shihādāt). Although
these headings are not written, this is generally the standard order and scope of legal digests. The
book starts with Ritual Purity (ṭahāra) and ends with (the rights of) The Mothers of Children
(ummahāt al-awlād). These chapters vary in length, and many have several subsections within
them. In terms of its main contribution, as discussed in detail below, it is the painstaking
accuracy, precision, and consistency in formulating the doctrines of the madhhab. Minhāj is said
to cover 70,000 juristic issues.110 In terms of literary genre and genealogy, although it is a digest,
Minhāj is itself an abridgment of yet another abridgment, it is half the size of al-Muḥarrar of the
eminent, contemporaneous other ‘Master’ of the madhhab, Abī al-Qāsim ʿAbd al-Karīm alQazwīnī al-Rāfiʿī (505-676/1112-1278). Al-Muḥarrar is also itself an abridgment of al-Ghazālī’s
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al-Wajīz, which is in turn an abridgment of another work by the latter titled Wasīṭ, based upon an
abridgment of an even bigger work of al-Ghazālī’s, al-Basīṭ. This last book is also an abridgment
of another book, Nihāyat al-maṭlab fī dirāyat al-madhhab, by al-Ghazālī’s teacher and towering
figure, the Imām of the Two Sanctuaries ʿAbd al-Malik al-Juwaynī (d. 478/1058). This last work
is said to be a summary of the legal opinions in al-Shāfiʿī’s al-Umm, al-Imlāʾ, and Musnad, and
al-Muzanī’s Mukhtaṣar.111 It must be noted that al-Nawawī is not the sole abridger of
Muḥarrar.112 While al-Minhāj is an abridgment of Muḥarrar, the latter is itself also a semiindependent abridgment based on another larger work, al-Ghazālī’s Wajīz.113 On this note, in
Tuḥfa, Ibn Ḥajar writes about al-Muḥarrar that, “Its designation as a digest is due to the fewness
of its words, not because it being an abridgment of a certain book.”114
There are myriad testimonies highlighting the importance of Minhāj. Although there are
many statements praising the Minhāj, it suffices here to mention two. In his commentary on the
Minhāj, which is considered one of the two most authoritative commentaries, alongside Ibn
Ḥajar’s, al-Shams al-Ramlī (d. 1004/1596) describes it as, “It is a book that intellects could not
match, nor did aspirations aim high to weave a work similar to it… it outdoes expansums,
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to al-Ahdal, there are others including Tāj Maḥmūd al-Iṣfāhīdī al-Karmānī (d. 807/1404) under the
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appendix to Nawawī’s Minhāj (Riyadh: Dār al-Minhāj, 2012), 630.
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despite its smallness, and outshines digests, with the abundance of its information.”115 It must be
noted that Minhāj is not a standalone work, but it is rather a culmination and the outcome of a
complex verification process, which I will analyze below. This process took place in two other
important juristic projects by al-Nawawī: filtering and assessing the corpus of scriptural proofs
of the doctrines of al-Shāfiʿī, especially ḥadīth proofs, and, second, reconciling the two
interpretive approaches of the Iraqian and Khurasanian sub-school. These two formidable
undertakings were carried out independently in two other works, al-Majmūʿ and Rawḍa,
respectively. However, even though Minhāj is essentially a site of interplay of juristic and
hermeneutic processes, there are two other incomplete works by al-Nawawī which are regarded
as being even more authoritative and reliable than Minhāj. First, there is al-Taḥqīq, an
incomplete digest, in which al-Nawawī only reached to the chapter on Ṣalāt al-musāfir (the
Prayer of the Traveler). The majority of later Shāfiʿīs, including al-Dimyāṭī116 and Ibn Hajar,117
agree on the superiority of Taḥqīq to Majmūʿ in terms of it authoritatively hosting the doctrines
of the madhhab; even though both are incomplete and belong to a later period of Nawawī’s life
that came after composing al-Minḥāj.
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It must be noted, however, that al-Nawawī’s verification and reconciliation project, which
he carried in Rawḍa, and his scriptural proofs for all the doctrines of the madhhab, which was
done in al-Majmūʿ, both favored the Iraqian ṭarīqa; with its traditionist trajectory and attention to
authenticating the chains of transmission of the juristic opinions of the al-Shāfiʿī and his
mujtahid companions. This tendency of course culminated in his juristic work in Minhāj.
Nevertheless, al-Nawawī is never explicit about this leaning. Commenting on this leaning
towards the interpretive approach of the Iraqians, Halim writes,
In his Majmūʿ, for instance, which is essentially a collection of the doctrines of the community
of the Iraqian jurists, he proceeds as he did in his Rawda to record the doctrines of the Iraqians
and follow up on their legal interpretations and inferences. Whenever he discovers that the
Iraqian elaboration of a particular case contradicts the doctrine and reasoning of al-Shāfiʿī, he
interposes his own reasoning, with reference to his mastery of al-Shāfiʿī’s teaching and the
literature of other jurists in the madhhab.118

Turning to our author’s own intention from authoring this digest, al-Nawawī writes the following
in the introduction to al-Minhāj’ regarding the reasons behind writing it, his interest in al-Muḥrar
and its significance, scope, and the task of making it shorter for the purpose of memorization,
which is an integral part of juristic education, or a reference:
Our [Shāfiʿī] colleagues (aṣḥābunā), may Allah grant them mercy, have abundantly authored
expansums (mabsūṭāt) and digests (mukhtaṣarāt). The most masterly expansum is al-Muḥarrar of
Imām Abī al-Qāsim al-Rāfiʿī, may Allah grant him mercy, the ones known for its [reliable]
verifications. It has numerous benefits, and in authenticating the [established positions of the]
madhhab, a reliance of muftīs and others, who possess a relevant desire. Its author, may Allah
grant him mercy, was committed to referencing that which the majority of [al-Shāfiʿī’s]
companions (aṣḥāb), and he indeed fulfilled his commitment, which was the most critical of
missions. Nevertheless, its size is voluminous in a way that hinders most of its contemporaries
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from memorizing it, except those of special providence. Thus, I decided to summarize it in half of
its size, in order to ease its memorization, in addition to new precious additions, God-willing.119

Regarding the practical use of Minhāj, the best proof of its immense practicality, whether for
pedagogical or judicial purposes, is to examine how widely it was memorized. Memorizing
Minhāj was not only part of the requirements in many traditional Islamic seminaries, it was also
a source of pride, so much so that many students and scholars (both men and women) who
managed to memorize it added the designation al-Minhājī to their last name.120 Not only that, alAhdal, an author of an important treatise on the terminological system of the Minhāj, titled
Sullam al-Mutaʿalim al-Muḥtāj ilā maʿrifat rumūz al-minhāj, is said to have made a daily
practice (wird) to read a quarter of Minhāj.121 On this practical function of the Minhāj, Halim
notes that,
One of the most authoritative repositions of the school’s doctrines, whose practical
purpose was to aid the jurist-muqallid or judge in a court to issue a legal opinion or
judgment accurately representing the madhhab’s position, Minhāj also attracted more
commentary than any other of al-Nawawī’s primary legal works. Moreover, Minhāj also
became a standard curricular textbook and subject for memorization in colleges of law,
and formed part of the qualifications required to obtain a license to transmit the Shāfiʿite
school’s doctrine.122
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After providing an overview of the contents of the Minhāj, its genealogy, importance, practical
purpose, and the objectives behind writing it, I will now move to explore the two main reasons
that I argue endowed the work with its eminent status among Shāfiʿī legal manuals.

A Linguistic and Legal Exploration of the ‘Methodology’
First: The Language
The most immediate element that one encounters when attempting to discover what sets Minhāj
apart is its linguistic character and nuances. To fully understand the significance of Minhāj and
the objective its language needed to deliver, we must first understand the juristic and intellectual
aim behind composing the volume. As Calder asserts, al-Nawawī “Analyzed and summarized all
that came before him, and his work was the starting point for all that came after him.”123
Accomplishing such a monumental mission of analyzing and summarizing a huge reservoir of
legal opinions necessitates a suitable and precise linguistic vehicle. In order to demonstrate the
breadth of al-Nawawī’s legal review, he said that he consulted a hundred books that contained all
the different legal opinions of the Shāfiʿī school before him.
The first and most striking linguistic feature of Minhāj is its clarity and unmistakable
accessibility. The mission of explaining religious doctrine to people in order to carry it out
correctly, as expressed by al-Nawawī in the previous quote, aligns perfectly with such
accessibility. The second linguistic feature of the work is its craftily designed terminological
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system, which is used consistently throughout the work. In order to unpack these linguistic
features of the Minhāj, we have to examine the precise scope of the terminological conventions
which Nawawī has set. In his introduction, al-Nawawī details his methodology in the following
passage and hints at the task that al-Minhāj is to accomplish. Here he elaborates on the unique
aspects and terminological system of this work:
Our [Shāfiʿī] colleagues (aṣhābuna), may Allah grant them mercy, have abundantly
authored expansums (mabsūṭāt) and digests (mukhtaṣarāt). The most masterly expansum
is al-Muḥarrar of Imām Abī al-Qāsim al-Rāfiʿī, may Allah grant him mercy, the one
known for its [reliable] verification. It has numerous benefits, and it is the most reliable
work in authenticating the [doctrines of the] madhhab, a reliance of muftīs and others
who possess a relevant desire. Its author, may Allah grant him mercy, was committed to
reference that which the majority of our [Shāfiʿī] companions (aṣḥāb) have determined as
doctrines. He indeed has fulfilled his commitment, which is the most critical of missions.
Nevertheless, its voluminous size hinders most of its contemporaries from memorizing it,
except those of special providence. Thus, I decided to summarize it in half of its size, in
order to facilitate its memorization, in addition to new precious additions, God-willing,
including: (1) Cautioning regarding some restrictions in some issues, which are omitted
from the original text. (2) Rare occasions that he [al-Rāfiʿī] mentioned in al-Muḥarrar
that are contrary to the chosen positions (mukhtār) in the madhhab, which, as you shall
see, God-willing, are clear-cut. (3) Substituting what is uncommon or insinuating that
which is not correct from its wording with that which is clear, more precise, and
unambiguous phrasing. 124
The above passage demonstrates several important linguistic and terminological elements of the
Minhāj that I will attempt to unpack below.
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Firstly, since the author has stated his interest in producing a ‘thinner’ work that can
easily be memorized, this highlights both the centrality of memorization to the educational
process, and the importance of utilizing succinct language, albeit without undermining clarity.
Despite the legalistic complexity of the content, the language is strikingly accessible and lucid,
so much so that, according to al-Khaṭīb, “it is so clear to the extent that a student of sacred
knowledge can read and understand it without any need for explanation.”125 This emphasizes the
idea that the main reason for the numerous commentaries written on Minhāj is not explain its
technical language, but to unpack it subtlties and juristic achievements (Chapter One provided a
brief overview of the objectives of writing legal commentaries). Second, as illustrated above,
clarity and precision of language is a central juristic objective of Minhāj, including, as alNawawī emphasizes, “Substituting what is uncommon or insinuating that which is not correct
from its wording with that which is clear, more precise, and unambiguous phrasing.”126

The Methodology’s Terminological System
Even though some experts have noted that al-Nawawī used systematically in it, there are 17 main
terms that are at the core of Minhāj’s terminological system. Al-Nawawī details these terms—
that are central to his juristic trajectory—in the following passage from his Introduction, which I
translate here in full, to highlight its importance:
Explaining the ‘two opinions’ [of al-Shāfiʿī] (sing. qawl), those of his companions (sing.
wajh), paths [of narrating the established position of the madhhab, mainly between
Iraqians and Khurasanians] (sing. ṭarīq), and the levels of difference (marātib al-ikhtilāf)
125 Al-Khaṭīb,
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of all of them. Thus, when I say the ‘among most apparent’ (fī al-aẓhar) or well-known
(mashhūr) from among one or more qawls. If the disagreement is significant, I would use
the terms ‘the most apparent’ (al-aẓhar), otherwise, I would use ‘most well-known’.
Whenever I say, what’s ‘more valid’ (aṣaḥḥ) or ‘valid’ (ṣaḥīḥ), this means it is related to
the two or more positions of companions [of al-Shāfiʿī]. If there is a stronger
disagreement, I would use ‘the more valid’ or ‘valid’ position is so and so. Whenever I
say the established position (madhhab), then this means it is chosen from two or more of
the paths of transmission (ṭarīqas). When I say the text (al-naṣṣ), then it is that of alShāfiʿī, may Allah grant him mercy, and then there is a weak opinion by his companions
(wajh) or an authenticated qawl. Whenever I say the New (jadīd) [position], then the ‘old’
(qadīm) one is different from it, or the qadīm, or according to an ‘old’ opinion (fī qawl
qadīm), then the ‘new’ one differs from it. Whenever I say ‘it is said that’, then this is an
indication that this is a weak wajh, and that the valid (al-ṣaḥīḥ) and the most valid (alaṣaḥḥ) are different from it. Whenever I say, ‘and according to a certain qawl’, then the
preponderant opinion is different from it.
-

Precious issues that I add to it, that they should not be voided. At the beginning of which
I state, ‘I say’ (qult), and at the end I say, ‘And Allah knows best’ (wa Alāhu aʿlam).
Whatever additional wording I find, and the likes of that, I find as more than what is in
Muḥarrar, I adopt if there it must be. The same applies to whatever supplicatory prayers
(adhkār) I find that are different from what is in Muḥarrar and other books of, I affirm it.
It is because I have verified those from the reliable books of ḥadīth. It also may be the
case that I bring ahead some issues from the chapter at hand for a reason or for the sake
of summarizing. I may bring forward an entire chapter due to its suitability. I hope that if
such an abridgment is made that it would be considered a commentary on the alMuḥarrar. This is because I do not omit any of its rulings, to begin with, even from
among what I differ with, even if it is very weak and among the precious points I have
previously mentioned.

The passage above is key to understanding al-Nawawī’s terms, which have become a standard in
the Shāfiʿī literary tradition, ever since he authored al-Minhāj.
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Based on the source-subject of legal opinion that was reviewed, and indicating their level
of strength in relation to a relevant legal disagreement within the school, the above terms can be
classified into three categories. The first category of these referential terms are those that indicate
that a said juristic opinion belongs to the eponymous founder. These terms are: (1) the most
apparent (al-aẓhar), which occupies the highest status in terms of authoritativeness; (2) the most
well-known (al-mashhūr), which indicates an opinion that was more popular than its
counterparts and occupies a firm standing; (3) ‘old’ (qadīm) (i.e., expressed by al-Shāfiʿī in Iraq
before coming to Egypt, where he revisited some of his positions); (4) ‘new’ (jadīd) (meaning
was issued in Egypt), (5) in one opinion (fī qawl), meaning an uncategorized opinion belonging
to al-Shāfiʿī; (6) in an ‘old’ opinion (fi qawl qadīm), such-and-such was said (qīl kadha); (7) in a
certain opinion (fi qwl kadhā); (8) the two opinions (al-qawlān), and; (9) the opinion (al-qwāl).
In the second category, we find the terms indicating that the opinions discussed belong to alShāfʿī’s immediate companions and students (aṣḥāb). Those include: (10) al-Shāfiʿī’s
companions (al-aṣḥāb); (11) the valid opinion (al-ṣaḥīḥ); (12) it is said (qīl); (13) according to
one perspective (fī wajh); (14) according to two perspectives (al-wajhān), and; (15) the
perspectives (al-awjuh). Finally, there is a category that includes terms indicating that a certain
ruling combines the opinions of both al-Shāfiʿī and his companions: (16) the text (al-naṣṣ), and;
(17) the doctrine (al-madhhab).
An important starting point in attempting to unlock the intricacies of this technical system
of the Minhāj is al-Nawawī’s own two short treatises on the subtle points (nukat) and terms of
the Minhāj. The production of these supplementary works by al-Nawawī himself is a sign of his
own regard to the Minhāj and that it is not accidental, in addition to the educational need to
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unpack it, of course. In Daqāʾiq al-Minhāj (lit. the subtitles in the Minhāj), al-Nawawī states
from the beginning that his work’s intention is to explain, “the difference between its terms [the
Minhāj’s] and those of al-Muḥarrar.”127 This proves that not of al-Nawawī’s terms were
completely original. Rather, some of them were adopted from al-Rāfiʿī. Those were appropriated
and further developed and used systematically by al-Nawawī.
There are several other works that focus on the terminology in Minhāj. These works
belong to the genre of juristic terminologies (al-muṣṭalaḥāt al-fiqhiyya), a genre to which I
would like to turn. In the Arabic language, the root for muṣṭalaḥ comes from Ṣ-L-Ḥ, which
signifies making peace, reconciliation and reform. Interestingly, this resonates with one of the
meanings of ‘term’ in English, like agreement and concordance, or “provisions that determine the
nature and scope of an agreement,” according to Merriam Webster.128 According to al-Waṣīt
Arabic dictionary, it is “the agreement among a certain group [i.e., specialists] on a specific
matter.”129 Thus, based on these basic etymological parameters, the success of a term coined by a
specialist is measured by its ability to become a shared vehicle for a meaning anew, and in ways
that dispose of previous disagreement, and express clearly the reality of that which it includes.
Normally, even though a term should differ from the linguistic understanding of its wording,
Muslim scholars made conditional that there should be some resemblance between the two: the
linguistic and the technical meanings.
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Al-Nawawī’s terminological contribution is innovative. According to al-Khaṭīb alShirbīnī (d. 977/1569), himself a commentator on al-Minhāj and an author of a work that focuses
on its terms, with regard to this terminological system, he comments on the beginning of the
previously mentioned from Minhāj’s Introduction, “Explaining the ‘two opinions’ (qawlayn),
those of his companions (wajhayn), ‘two paths’ [i.e., of the Iraqis and the Khurasanians] (sing.
ṭarīq), and the levels of difference,” by saying, “No one has beaten the author [i.e., al-Nawawī]
to such terminology. It is a fair terminological convention, unlike that in al-Muḥarar.”130 AlShirbīnī moves on to mention that al-Rāfiʿī used some of these terms but in an inconsistent
manner, while, except for some cases, al-Nawawī is generally consistent. He also cites al-Isnawī,
who is generally speaking critical of al-Nawawī, arguing that al-Nawawī’s claim to complete
consistency is “rejected.”131 That is to say, internal critics within the Shāfiʿī school anchored the
authority of the Minhāj in al-Nawawī’s unparalleled contribution to language and terminology.
Although there are several works that study the juristic terms of Minhāj, I will be
focusing on three. The first is the terminological study of Minhāj as a recently published treatise,
Risālat al-tanbīh, by Shaykh Mahrān Kuttī b.Abd al-Raḥmān Kuttī (d. 1408/1988). The editor of
the work, who himself published other books on the on the terminology of the Shāfiʿī school,
asserts that it is “the best authored book on explaining the terms of Shāfiʿī fiqh, and the best
work to resolve the terminological issues in Minhāj and its commentaries, especially the
commentary of the verifier Imam Jalāl al-Dīn al-Maḥallī, Kanz al-Rāghibīn, may Allah grant him
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mercy.”132 Risālat al-tanbīh provides an extensive discussion of all the terms of al-Nawawī,
including a running commentary of the above mentioned translated passage.
The second is al-ʿAlawī’s al-Ibtihāj fī bayan iṣṭilāḥ al-minhāj, a short treatise that is also
virtually a running commentary on the above section of Minhāj’s Introduction, which lays out its
terminological conventions.133
The third work is al-Ahdal’s Sullam al-Mutaʿallim al-Muḥtāj ilā maʿrifat rumūz alminhāj, which surveys Minhāj providing a focused study of its juristic terms, along with the
terms used in three of its commentaries, including the Tuḥfa, the second book that this thesis will
focus on, and comes up with important statistical findings. These findings demonstrate the
significance of the influence of this terminological system to Nawawī’s grand project of
verification. First, the term ‘most apparent’ (al-aẓhar), a central term for the process of
verification, which indicates the result of the process of preponderance and that the nonpreponderant opinion, is still a solid opinion on its own, that occurs 395 times in Minhāj. The
term ‘well-known’ (mashūr), which indicates both the un-commonality of the said opinion of
Imām al-Shāfiʿī and its weakness (occurring 23 times). As for the term ‘most valid’ (al-aṣaḥḥ), it
occurs 1,038 times: it is a term that is only associated with the opinions of the companions of alShafiʿī, who derive their opinions from the al-Shafiʿi’s maxims, texts, and apply their own
personal reasoning (ijtihād) to them, except when their views are demonstrably different, like alMuzanī and Abū Thawr. As for the valid (al-ṣaḥīḥ), there are such 176 occurrences, indicating
132
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that the difference in strength/validity between the two sides of its relevant juristic
preponderance is minimal. Al-Ahdal cites an important opinion by the eminent Shāfiʿī Muftī of
Mecca, Muḥammad Saʿīd Hilāl Sunbul (d. 1175/1761), that adjudges that it is permissible to
follow the non-preponderant opinions which are distinguished from aẓhar and aṣaḥḥ, as opposed
to the non-preponderant ones that distinguished from mashhūr and ṣaḥīḥ. In addition, as for alShāfiʿī’s own preponderant ‘new,’ or jadīd legal opinions that were issued in Egypt, Minhāj
contains 75 such occurrences, while the preponderant ‘old,’ or qadīm opinions constitute 28
cases.134 As for the term ‘al-madhhab is so and so’, meaning the doctrine, there are 187 cases of
such rulings. The other statistical findings include: the Shāfiʿī’s-companions-related qila,
occurring 499 times; fī qawl, 202 times.135
The above analysis of the linguistic nature of al-Nawawī’s Minhāj shows the importance
of its linguistic character and the centrality of its terminological innovations. In his recent study
of al-Nawawī’s terms in Minhāj, Ayman al-Badārīn asserts that al-Nawawī is the first to come up
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attributing it to al-Shāfiʿī. Whosoever reaches their rank of [being qualified to perform] preponderance, should adopt
it in fatwa. Otherwise, there is no point to both his knowledge or fatwa. However, all such issues, which were
counted, for the majority of them there is a related jadīd opinion. Thus, fatwas should adopt it. These amount to 18
issues.” Al-Ahdal then goes on to detail those 18 issues; al-Ahdal, Sullam, 633–639.
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It must be noted that later scholars have affirmed al-Nawawī’s position in designating these 499 cases of qīla as
weak, except for the 15 cases (12 referred to as qīla and three as fī qawl) that later jurists, contrary to al-Nawawī’s
formulation, deemed preponderant. Al-Ahdal, Sullam, 641.
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with them,136 a finding that cannot be read alone without the previously mentioned statement by
al-Nawawī himself acknowledging that he appropriated some al-Rāfiʿī’s terms. These terms are
keys to understanding Shafiʿī legal opinions and doctrines, as they indicate the level of
disagreement over them, their author, and their ranking in terms of their authoritativeness. It may
be the case that al-Nawawī was not perfectly consistent in his use of these terms, as some of his
commentators attest. However, he surely succeeded in the most effective terminological tools
needed to verify the entire body of legal opinions that came before so effectively, that all Shāfiʿī
jurists and scholars use his original glossary in their writing. As an understudied essential part of
al-Nawawī’s lasting influence on and contribution to the Shāfʿī school, this terminological
system that he adopted and used systematically, has been a standard practice for al-Shāfiʿī
scholars that came after him.

Second: The Law
The second of the two central reasons behind the authoritative status of Minhāj is the legal
efforts of its author in verifying and formulating the doctrines of the madhhab. This monumental
task involved verifying the entire legal corpus that preceded al-Nawawī, especially reconciling
the two hermeneutical sub-schools of Shāfiʿīsm, i.e., the Iraqian and Khurasanian ṭarīqas. The
process of verification (taḥqīq), essentially the consolidation of opinions that are inline with
those of al-Shāfiʿī’s hermeneutic foundations, is typically accompanied by the juristic practice of
136 Ayman
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rule-formulation (tarjīḥ) and authentication (taḥqīq) of scriptural proofs. At the heart of the
following analysis of al-Nawawī’s execution of this process are two factors. First, there is a
special interest in verifying scriptural proofs of Shāfiʿī doctrines, especially ḥadīth and narration
studies, an approach that al-Nawawī inherited from Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ, via the former’s direct teachers
with al-Nawawī studied. Additionally, according to al-Qalyūbī, there is a chain of three scholars
between al-Nawawī, all of whom worked on reconciling the views of the two sub-schools: the
previously mentioned Sallār, Muḥammad al-Qazwīnī (d. c. 700/1301), and ʿAbd al-Ghaffār alQazwīnī (d. 665/1267).137 Also all of al-Nawawī’s teachers were students of Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ. AlNawawī expanded on this narrational investigation in al-Majmūʿ. Second, there is al-Nawawī’s
profound interest in verifying and reconciling what was by his time unmanageably expansive
opinions of the madhhab, especially those produced by the affiliates of the two Khurasanian and
Iraqian sub-schools. This was, of course, a concern added to the objective of authenticating the
narrations of the legal opinions of the founder of the school, i.e., Imam al-Shāfiʿī. He
accomplished this task in Rawḍa. It is important to see the juristic accomplishment of Minhāj as
the outcome and accumulation of these two works. It is believed that he composed them
simultaneously. Commenting on the logical progression from these two works that came to
fruition in the Minhāj, in his chapter on al-Nawawī’s juristic contributions in four works,
Majmūʿ, Rawḍa, Minhāj, and commentary on Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim, Calder notes that,
The Minhāj al-ṭālib.is Nawawī’s mukhtaṣar; it represents the end of a logical progression
from the Majmūʿ, which focused equally on revelation, dispute and the madhhab
(together with a considerable if unsystematic concern for language), through the Rawḍa,
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Shihāb al-Dīn Aḥmad al-Qalyūbī, Ḥashiyya ʿala sharḥ al-Maḥallī ʿalā al-Minhāj, (Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, 1988)
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which eliminated revelation while retaining a complete account of dispute and of the
madhhab, to this work which eliminates both revelation and (on the surface) dispute,
offering only a statement of the madhhab. It is logically the last of his works, since its
conclusions follow from the studies and the surveys of the preceding two. In practice, as
we have seen, it is not necessary to think that he wrote and completed any one of these
works prior to starting the next. Rather, he worked on them in parallel. Their relationship
is essentially logical. Nonetheless, such evidence as can be thought relevant suggests that
he did in fact complete this work after he had completed the bulk of the other two.138
In al-Majmūʿ, arguably the most impressive and expansive multi-volume legal encyclopedia in
Islamic law, which was composed as a commentary on al-Shirāzī’s al-Muhadhdhab (itself part of
al-Nawawī’s own formative educational curriculum), al-Nawawī conducts a deep study of
scriptural proofs, as he indicates in detail in the introduction, complete with starting by
furnishing an ontological function on Islamic law.139 Explaining his methodological focus on
scriptural evidence in al-Majmūʿ, and especially the scope of examining textual ḥadīth proofs, he
notes, “I shall mention in it scores of its [i.e, al-Muhadhdhab’s] blooming insights, and explain
some of its various arts. Among them, the Qur’anic exegesis (tafsīr) of its noble verses, prophetic
traditions, elevated reports, definite fatwas, referenced poems, doctrinal and substantive rulings,
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Calder, Norman Calder and Colin Imber, Islamic Jurisprudence in the Classical Era (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2010), 99.
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He starts by explaining that humans have essentially been created for worship, and then he moves from that to
assert, “The first subject—that the realized ones busied themselves with, the illustratious ones exerted all that they
could afford for its sake, the awakened ones left behind everything for it, and the gnostics spent abundant time in
acquiring—after knowing Allah and performing what is obligatory, is to roll up one’s sleeves to explain that which
makes matters of worship accurate… since they have to be according to the maximums of Sharīʿa.”: Al-Nawawī, alMajmūʿ, edited by Shaykh Najīb al-Muṭiʿī (Jeddah: Maktabat al-Irshād, n.d.), 1:15.
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names and dialects, and restrictions and cautions, as well as other sciences.”140 In this multivolume tome, al-Nawawī managed to authenticate all evidentiary prophetic traditions that
constitute textual proofs supporting the doctrines of the Shāfiʿī school. Other than being one of
the ‘Two Masters’ of the madhhab, his authentication efforts of all such ḥadīth proofs earned him
the title of the ‘authenticator’ (muḥaqqiq) of the Shāfiʿī madhhab. This expanded process of
verification of the scriptural proofs of the doctrines of the school in Majmūʿ constituted the
foundation on which the formulation of final doctrines in Minhāj. Below is a diagram of the
geneology of al-Nawawī’s books.

140 Al-Nawawī

then goes on to further detail the comprehensive of hadīth authentication that he will perform,
adding, “I shall also indicate which from among the prophetic tradtions is authentic (ṣaḥīḥ), fair (ḥasan), raised
(marfūʿ), halted (mawqūf), uninterrupted (muttaṣil), expedient (mursal), interrupted (munqatiʿ), problematic
(muʿḍil), forged (mawḍūʿ), well-known (mashhūr), rare (gharīb), anomalous (shādhdh), disclaimed (munkar), mixed
up (maqlūb), defective (maʿlūl), interloped (mudraj), among others classifications which you shall in their due
places… and if a tradition is narrated in of the two Ṣaḥīḥs of Bukhārī and Muslim, may Allah be well pleased with
them, or in either of them, I restrict myself to referencing it to them, and I never reference it to other collections,
except rarely, and for a reason in some occasions. This is because what they deem so does not need to be
strengthened [i.e., in terms of the level of their authentication] by referencing them in other collections. As for the
one [i.e., tradition] that is not in one of them, I then cite it to whichever work of Sunan collections or other they are
in. If it is in Sunan Abī Dāwūd, al-Tirmidhī, or al-Nasāʾī, which are the compilations of the five foundational works
of ḥadīth, on in some of them, I also here cite it from them. Whatever else that falls outside those I cite to whichever
work it is easy to cite from, God-willing, Most Sublime, explaining its level of authenticity or weakness. Whenever
a tradition is weak, I shall demonstrate its weakness and notify as to the reason of its weakness, if such a description
does not require a lengthy discourse.”; Al-Majmūʿ, edited by Shaykh Najīb al-Muṭiʿī (Jeddah: Maktabat al-Irshād,
n.d.), 16.
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Figure 2: A Geneology of the books of Imam al-Nawawī.

As for the Rawḍa, which is an abridgment of another work by al-Rāfiʿī, his commentary on alGhazālī’s al-Wajīz, it is the main site for al-Nawawī’s efforts to review, synthesize, and reconcile
the entire corpus of his legal school, especially the Khurasanian and Iraqian sub-schools. In its
introduction, he clearly expresses the reasons behind composing al-Minhāj, including the out-ofcontrol state of opinions of the madhhab, due to its expansive legal literature, and the fact that it
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is extremely difficult to arrive at the doctrines of Shāfiʿism under such circumstances.141 It is in
Rawḍa, not al-Majmūʿ, that al-Nawawī uses terms similar to, but less than, the one he uses in
Minhāj, which were discussed above. The ones he uses there are: (1) jadīd, (2) qadīm, (3) ʿala
qawl, (4) ʿala al-ṣaḥīḥ, (5) al-aṣaḥḥ, (6) al-aẓhar, (7) al-mashhūr, (8) al-qawlayn, (9) almadhhab, and (10) ṭarīq. The previously mentioned Risālat al-tanbīh cites al-Shirbīnī from his
commentary on al-Bahja asserting that al-Nawawī’s terminological system in al-Minhāj and
Rawḍa “are close.”142 This proves that, not only is Minhāj the fruit of the juristic and scriptural
investigation in al-Majmūʿ and Rawḍa, but also that Minhāj’s unique and original terminological
system was first developed and applied in Rawḍa.
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In his introduction to Rawda, al-Nawawī details the reasons behind his work, including reconciling the scattered
differences in legal opinions in the school, which leaves the doctrines of the school very difficult to reach. He states,
“The most important type of knowledge in this time is that secondary legal rules (al-furūʿ al-fiqihiyyāt), because all
people are in need of them in all circumstances, even though they are mere instructions, and therefore they are
among the most important matters. The scholars from among our fellow Shāfiʿī and others have produced numerous
books, both expansums and digests, incorporating in them rulings, maxims, proofs, and other mighty and precious
matters, which are known for the ones gifted with providence. The works of our fellows [Shāfiʿīs], may Allah grant
them mercy, are extremely numerous and widespread, with all the disagreements they contain in their [juristic]
choices. Therefore, only a few individuals were able to validate the doctrines of the school. Those are the ones who
were given success, the deep divers, the knowledgeable, and the ones with high aspirations. Then, Allah, Most
Sublime and High, and praise be to Him, has bestowed success from among our later fellows to the one who
reconciled those ṭarīqas, who the refined the madhhab in the best of ways, gathering its scattered elements in
succinct phrases, and comprehended all that he could find from among the celebrated books—this is the eminent,
prominent, erudite, and the one who has correctly taught the madhhab Abū al-Qāsim al-Rāfiʿī, the one of the sound
[legal] verifications. He achieved in his book Sharḥ al-Wajīẓ what no one can outperform; in his comprehension that
is coupled with briefness, perfectionism, and clarity. May Allah reward him for his efforts and multiply his reward,
and join us, as well as other loved ones, in the world of rewarding His honored ones, those who occupy the high
ranks. People of our time have greatly benefited from his book, for all the traits it acquired, but it is huge in size, to
the extent that the majority of people generally cannot study it.”: Yaḥyā al-Nawawī, Rawḍat al-ṭālibīn, edited by
Zuhayr al-Shāwīsh (Beirut: al-Maktab al-Islāmī, 1993),1:4.
142

Kutti, Risālat, 109; Muḥammad al-Khaṭib al-Shirbīnī, Ḥāshiyya ʿalā al-ghurar al-bahiyya, which is a
commentary on the text by Zakariyyā al-Anṣārī, edited by Muḥammad Abd al-Qādir ʿAṭṭa (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub alʿIlmiyya, 1997), 1:74.
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Al-Nawawī’s Methodology of Verification
In order to contextualize al-Nawawī’s juristic contribution through the process of verification of
the legal corpus of his school, which culminates in his comprehensive legal digest Minhāj, we
have to unpack the methodology he utilized to verify and assess the entire legal Shāfiʿī corpus
that preceded him. Due to the nature of the digest, he does not specify the methodology he
follows in Minhāj, nor does he detail his juristic and intellectual objective in its entirety. Rather,
he details it in another work, Majmūʿ, which may be considered one of the most important legal
expositions in Islamic law (Al-Nawawī did not complete Majmūʿ during his lifetime, a task that
was taken up by another towering Shāfīʿī jurist and Shāfiʿī mujtahid, Taqī al-Subkī. However,
the latter was also unable to complete the work by covering all the conventional legal sections.
This task was completed in modern times by another scholar, Muḥammad Bakhīt al-Muṭīʿī (d.
1354/1935). Certainly, this continuum warrants an independent study to examine this work and
the layers of contribution). Al-Majmūʿ is a commentary on Abū Isḥāq al-Shirāzī’s Muhadhhab,
one of two books that, along with al-Ghazālī’s al-Wasīṭ, al-Nawawī describes in his introduction
“in these two book are lessons for teachers, the [culmination] of the research of realized
achievers, and the preservation by attentive students, in past and in current times, in all
quarter.”143 In the Introduction, al-Nawawī specifies that rule-formulation (tarjīḥ) is the objective
of the book, and that he will go to great lengths to explain the rule-formulation process in the
clearest phrasing. Al-Nawawī also identifies the main problem his work tackles and the
momentous task confronting him,
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Know that the books on the madhhab has severe difference among the direct followers
(aṣhāb) [i.e. of al-Shāfiʿī], so much so that it is unattainable for a reader to ascertain the
authenticity of whether an opinion of any of them is the established rule (madhhab),
unless he is able to preview the majority of the famed books of the madhhab. This is why
I do not leave a qawl, wajh, or naql, even if they are weak or faint in my view, without
mentioning it, if God Most-Sublime wills. I do this while explaining the preponderant
and non-preponderant, establishing the weakness of the weak [rule], and falsehood of that
which is fabricated, while expanding in emphasizing the severity of what its author has
said, even if he is one of the most established ones.144
The following is a summary of al-Nawawī’s methodology, based primarily on his own account in
al-Majmūʿ, as well as a few secondary sources. Firstly, his main point of departure is to
distinguish between whether an opinion of al-Shāfiʿī is ‘old’ (qadīm), ‘new’ (jadīd), or
corroborated with uncontested evidence as a doctrine of al-Shāfiʿī. Secondly, al-Nawawī pays
attention to the particular qadīm and jadīd opinions. Thus, unless clearly stated, a new opinion of
al-Shāfiʿī on certain legal issues is affirmed if he states it in contradistinction to the old one.
Hence, if there is no contradiction between them, or if he did not mention anything new about
the issue at hand, the qadīm is the doctrine that should be used for issuing fatwas. Thirdly, if two
opinions of al-Shāfiʿī are in the same chronological category (i.e., both are either qadīm or jadīd)
and are equal in their strength of evidence, the latter one is to be adopted; otherwise, the one
among them that is preponderant by al-Shāfiʿī himself. Fourthly, if there are two opinions by the
founder and it is not known when they were issued in respect to one another, and whether he
deemed one of them preponderant, a juristic evaluation must be applied by scholars who are
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qualified in both rule-formulation (tarjīḥ) and authentication (takhrīj).145 Fifthly, however, if
there is a difference in opinion between the aṣḥāb regarding which of the two opinions is the
preponderant one, the following three criteria must followed: (a) to follow the law-determination
(taṣḥīḥ) based on the position of the majority, and then the more knowledgeable, and then the
first precedence that was issued. The opinion of the most knowledgeable if given precedence
should there be further difference; (b) to take into consideration the capacity and stature of those
who narrate two opinions on the same matter, whether they be from al-Shāfiʿī (aqwāl, sing.
qawl) or those of his companions (wujūh, sing. wajh), or: (c) to take what is concurrent with
other madhhab.146
It is noteworthy that al-Nawawī’s approach to narration and authentication of the
opinions, as cited previously in the fifth element of his methodology (points a, b, and c), is
highly influenced by Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ (d. 643/1245). Several teachers of Shāfiʿī fiqh with whom alNawawī studied in Damascus were all students of the towering student of the ḥadīth master Ibn
al-Ṣalāḥ. These include the aforementioned Abū Ibrāhīm Isḥāq b. Aḥmad b. ʿUthmān alMaghribī (d. 650/1252), Tāj al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. Ibrāhīm b. Ḍiyāʾ al-Fazārī (d. 690/1291),
Abu- Muḥammad Abd al-Raḥmān b. Nūḥ al-Maqdisī (d. 654/1256), and Abū al-Faḍāʾil Sallār b.
al-Ḥasan al-Irbalī (d. 670/1271). This is perhaps relevant to explaining to his deep interest in
combining traditionist and legal studies. Even though al-Nawawī never met Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ, some
145 Al-Nawawī,

Majmūʿ, 108–09; Muḥammad b.Sulaymān Al-Kurdī. Al-Fawāʾid al-Madaniyya fīman yuftā
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intellectual history of the Shāfiʿī school by ʿAlī: Muḥammad Ibrāhim Muḥammad Alī, al-Madhhab ʿinda alḤanafiyya, al-Mālikiyya, al-Shāfiʿiyya, al-Ḥanābila, edited by Turkī Muḥammad Ḥamīd al-Naṣr (Kuwait: al-Waʿyī
al-Islāmī, 2012), 271–311.
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also mentions that there are some jurists who adopt the opposing view, mainly stating that if an
opinion of al-Shāfiʿī differs with other madhhabs, it should be adopted since it he only did saw based on his
familiarity with the textual evidence. Among those is Abū Ḥāmid al-Isfārīnī. See: al-Nawawī, Majmūʿ, 109-110.

106

biographies wrongly insert his name among al-Nawawī’s teachers. This was not only important
to enhancing al-Nawawī’s authority in ḥadīth the eyes of later generations of Shāfiʿī scholars.
More importantly, it is historical, since, as Faschrizal asserts, “through him [i.e., Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ], he
aimed to trace back the authority of his learning transmission to Abu al-ʿAbbās Aḥmad b. ʿUmar
b. Surayj (d. 306/918). Ibn Surayj, as has been pointed out by Wael Hallaq, was considered the
most important figure in the Shāfiʿī school after al-Shāfiʿī, for his role in the establishment of
regular transmission of doctrine and the spread of the madhhab.”147
This historical significance of Ibn Ṣalāḥ lies in him being one of the few scholars who
attempted to reconcile the two schools of legal hermeneutical approaches (ṭarīqas) that emerged
after Ibn Surayj, and via both: the Iraqis, who are known for their narrational rigor, and the
Khurasanians, known for juristic innovation. This is significant as one of most important legal
credentials of al-Nawawī was his ability to combine the two approaches of the two sub-schools,
as Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ’s isnād was the most authoritative in representing the Shāfiʿī madhhab.”148

Examples of al-Nawawī’s Verification
To exemplify al-Nawawī’s contribution in Minhāj, as well as how the tome is built on alNawawī’s efforts from other books, I will engage with three different examples that demonstrate
different outcomes from his verification (tarjīḥ). In the first case, al-Nawawī sides with and
defends the doctrine of al-Shāfiʿī. In the second, he uses his independent reasoning (ijtihād) to
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arrive at a different position from that of his school. In the third, he takes an educated and
evidenced position to select from different opinions.

Defending the Doctrine
The first is the case of wiping the head during ritual ablution (wuḍūʾ), in which al-Nawawī
champions and affirms the doctrine of al-Shāfiʿī, a ruling that is unique to his Shāfiʿī madhhab
and is not shared by either of the other three Sunni schools, based on an opinion that goes back to
the founder. In Minhāj, al-Nawawī states in the section on the supererogatory acts of ritual
washing (sunan al-wuḍūʾ),
Among its supererogatory acts is to use a natural toothbrush (siwāk) sideways, not one’s
finger, according to the most valid (fī al-aṣaḥḥ) position. It is supererogatory [to perform
it] in cases of prayer, bad breath, and it is not disliked when fasting, except after midday;
to invoke tasmiyya [i.e., the formula ‘bism Allāh al-raḥmān al-raḥīm’], and if someone
leaves it, they should invoke it [the intention] during the act; to wash the hands, but if one
was not certain whether they are clean, it is disliked to wash them inside a container
before washing them; to wash the mouth and to cleanse the nostrils, and the most
apparent (al-aẓhar) position is that it is better to separate between them, and it is the most
valid opinion to wash the mouth by scooping water into one’s palm trice, and then using
the other hand to cleanse the nostrils trice. One should perform both with intensity, except
when fasting. I [al-Nawawī] say it is more apparent to prefer combing both with three
scoops, washing the mouth and then cleansing nostrils from each scoop. And Allah
knows best, and to perform both washing and wiping trice.149
Other than noting the occurrence of the special terms of verifying juristic positions, this last
sentence is key. While the other three Sunni madhhabs hold the juristic position that wiping the
head needs to be done only once during ablution, according to the Shāfiʿī school, it is preferred
149 Al-Nawawī,
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to be done three times. In his juristic argument al-Majmūʿ, al-Nawawī cites that al-Shāfiʿī and his
companions use prophetic traditions and analogical reasoning (qiyās) in defense of their position.
In so doing, he presents that a rigorously authenticated tradition that is narrated by Imam Muslim
which states that, “The Prophet, Allah’s peace and blessings be upon him, performed wudūʾ
doing everything thrice, thrice” (tawaḍḍaʾ thalathan thalathan). He starts by arguing that this
means that the Prophet performed all aspects of ablution three times, including the wiping of the
head, as “The point of indication (dalāla) from which comes his wording tawaḍḍaʾ (lit.
performed ritual ablution) includes both wiping and washing.”150 Typically ‘washing’ (ghasl) is
understood to cover all parts of ablution, except the head, which is wiped. It is established among
all Sunni madhhabs that washing the prescribed parts should be done three times. However, here
al-Nawawī starts his argument by noting that the above-mentioned instruction to do things three
times extends to wiping the head. He then proceeds to cite scriptural proofs of two fairly
authentic (ḥasan) traditions, and discusses their validity, stating that the Prophet wiped his head
three times while performing wuḍū, one narrated by Abū Dawūd and the second by al-Bayhaqī.
Al-Nawawī then enumerates a few cases of analogical reasoning, arguing that, first, there
is no textual reasoning to exclude the head from remaining body parts that should be washed
three times. Second, while cautioning against extending this analogy to the ritual purification
performed during cases of lack of water, using sand (tayammum), he cites other analogies on
how a ruling that concerns a principal part (aṣl), applies to all others. He then engages with all
the Shāfiʿī opinions on the matter, and concludes, “As for their saying that al-Shāfiʿī, may Allah
be pleased with him, has violated the consensus (ijmāʿ), this is not true. Anas Ibn Malik, ʿAṭā,
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and others subscribe to this position, as we have previously demonstrated, according to the
narrations of Ibn al-Mundhir.”151
Regarding the same issue of wiping the head three times, in Rawḍa, al-Nawawī asserts
that it is recommended to perform, “Repetition thrice with parts that should either be washed or
wiped, whether obligatory or supererogatory.” Still, he adds that in addition to the previous
assertion, “I hold a rare (shādhdh) opinion that one should not repeat it.”152 This last part differs
from his argument in the al-Majmūʿ, where he asserts that it should be done only once. It is not
uncommon for jurists, including al-Nawawī, to occasionally adopt different positions in different
books. However, in al-Minhāj, he succinctly covers the matter when covering the supererogatory
of elements wuḍūʾ, stating: “And performing it three times for both washing and wiping.”153

Differing with the School Through Rule-Formulation
The second example of al-Nawawī’s verification is his judgment regarding the trading of a debt
for another debt. Al-Nawawī asserts in al-Minhāj that, “Selling a debt to someone else other than
the one to whom it is owed is invalid (bāṭil) according to the ‘most apparent’ (fī al-aẓhar)
[position].”154 Al-Shāfiʿī and the majority of commentators, including al-Haytamī155, disagree,
deeming it valid. Fī al-aẓhar, literarily ‘the most apparently’, is a term which he uses to indicate
a preponderance between two strong opinions both of which belong to al-Shāfiʿī himself. To
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understand how such a judgment is arrived at through evidentiary verification in Minhāj, we first
turn to al-Majmūʿ. Therein, al-Nawawī starts his investigation into the matter by providing a
scenario in order to visualize the situation. He then cites al-Shāfiʿī’s prohibitive opinion and
another one by Imam Malik which deems it permissible to trade a debt if it is due. He then cites
the consensus within the Shāfiʿī madhhab on the matter, after which he proceeds to mention that
Imam Aḥmad Ibn Ḥanbal cites the existence of consensus on this later position, citing a ḥadīth
that confirms the prohibition. After examining the textual validity of the aforementioned weakly
authenticated (ḍaʿīf) tradition, al-Nawawī concludes, “If the chain of narration is not verified, the
consensus cannot be upheld, since there is a disagreement about this particular form [of the
debt]. Otherwise, it should be metaphorically understood to explain a debt that is unanimously
prohibited, which is the case here.”156
In Rawḍa, al-Nawawī conducts a detailed examination of the types of debts and their
monetary and non-monetary forms. Detailing the opinions on the validity of changing the form
of a non-monetary debt or selling it, he rules out the validity of transferring debt, after engaging
with an opinion that allows it, but only conditional to it being used at a fixed price. He cites this
opinion from al-Ghazālī’s al-Wasīṭ. As for substituting monetary debts for non-monetary
compensation, he agrees with a ‘new’ (jadīd) opinion by al-Shāfiʿī, al-Ghazālī, and Ibn al-Qaṭṭān
(d. 359/970). He follows this assertion with a branching out of the different cases and a special
engagement with some Khurasanian jurists, like al-Ghazālī and al-Baghawī (d. 516/1122),
agreeing with the latter that the exchange should not take place in the same setting. Monetary
debts, which are likely to be the form he meant in al-Minhāj, are prohibited. As for the debts of a
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loan or compensation for damage, they can be converted, except if the debtor, al-Nawawī asserts,
owns money that is held by a guarantor.157
In his examination of the issues in which the author Minhāj adopted an opinion contrary
to the Shāfiʿī doctrine, Ibn Sumayṭ comments that the agreed upon position among Shāfiʿī
scholars is that the rule-formulations (tarjīḥāt) of al-Nawawī in al-Majmūʿ are superior to those
in Rawḍa. He argues that at the crux of this difference between al-Nawawī and his
commentators, is that when they performed rectification (taṣḥīḥ) by way of evidencedetermination, based this on the assumption that—unlike al-Nawawī—the debtor is unable to
pay.158

Independent ‘Juristic Preferences’
There is a subtle difference between two forms of verification (taḥqīq) that many jurists conflate,
there is rule-formulation (tarjīḥ), which means exercising preponderance among reliable
positions of the imām of the madhhab, while ‘juristic choice’ or ikhtiyār, means choosing another
opinion from outside those by appealing to an evidence. In his monograph, Ikhtiyārāt al-imām
al-Nawawī allatī tafarrad bihā min al-madhhab al-Shāfiʿī, which is focused on the juristic
choices of al-Nawawī, al-Khaṭīb defines it as the case “in which a jurist qualified to perform
independent juristic reasoning (mujtahid) differs with either the doctrine of his followed Imam or
some of the formulated rules of the madhhab based on evidence.”159 In the section on paying a
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compensation (fidya) for not performing obligatory fasting in Minhāj, al-Nawawī states, “If one
dies after being able to fast [and not making up the fasting], his or her custodian (walī) does not
need to fast on his [the deceased’s behalf] behalf. Rather, he should take from the inheritance
everyday a little over half a kilo (mud) of food. The same applies to cases of [fulfilling] a vow
(nadhr) or an atonement (kaffāra). I say [i.e., al-Nawawī]: the ‘old’ position is more apparent. A
walī is any relative based on my juristic choice (ʿalā al-mukhtār).”160

Shāfiʿism After al-Nawawī
The Shāfiʿī madhhab is not the same before and after al-Nawawī. With regard to this process of
verification (taḥqīq) of the legal corpus of the Shāfiʿī school that preceded al-Nawawī and how
he was able to formulate the doctrines of Shāfiʿism, it is important to note that although alNawawī is the uncontested virtuoso of this process, he is definitely not the first to engage with it.
Verification of the huge—to the point of being unmanageable and divisive—legal corpus of the
Shāfiʿī school was the main drive for literary production within the Shāfiʿī madhhab in the
seventh/thirteen century. One of the reasons for such diversity is also the existence of two subschools, the Khurasanians, who specialized in systematic inference, and the Iraqis, who focused
on the mastery of authenticating the narration of the views they adopted. The two main
champions of the process who managed stabilize the school by way of verifying and the entire
corpus that preceded them and to reconcile the aforementioned sub-schools, were al-Rāfiʿī and
al-Nawawī, the authors of al-Muḥarrar and its abridgment, Minhāj, respectively, who then came
to be known as the ‘Two Masters’ (al-Shaykhān). However, it must be noted that there are other
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figures who worked within the frameworks of the two sub-schools, in an attempt to reconcile
them.
Within the Shāfiʿī madhhab, Minhāj is considered the crown jewel of the verification
period, during the sixth and seventh/twelfth and thirteenth centuries, and the hallmark of
stabilization of the Shāfiʿī literary tradition. As seen above, al-Minhāj embodies the culmination
of two preparatory efforts in Majmūʿ, whose main focus is scriptural evidence, and second,
Rawḍa. Rawḍa, in particular, is of major importance to establishing the doctrines of Shāfiʿism as
expressed in Minhāj. It focuses on an expansive application of verification of the doctrines of the
Shāfīʿī school, from the founder onwards. This process includes the filtering out of weak (ḍaʿīf)
and non-preponderant (marjūḥ) legal opinions and, second, the consolidation of opinions that are
inline with opinions and foundations of Imām al-Shāfiʿī. The Minhāj’s claim to its authoritative
standing stems from it being a culmination of all previous efforts to reconcile the two approaches
(ṭarīqas) of Iraqis and the Khurasanians, which were developed and crystallized in the fifth and
sixth/eleventh and twelfth centuries. Although al-Nawawī studied these two juristic approaches
thoroughly and reconciled them in Rawḍa, Minhāj is the summation of the outcome of the
chosen doctrines of that process, using the above-cited original and effective terminological
system.
One of the primary aspects of the legal differences between the two sub-schools that
reflects the science of ḥadīth is that essentially the difference between the two sub-schools
centers around the paths of transmission of legal opinions. To provide al-Nawawī’s primary
position on the two sub-schools, he points,“Know that narrations of the texts of al-Shāfiʿī, the
rules of his madhhab, and the opinions (wujūh) of our early fellow followers by our companions,
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the Iraqis, are more exact and authenticated than the narrations of the Khurasanians. The
Khurasanians are mostly better in processing the [the narrations], in research, in derivation, and
in classification.”161Although al-Nawawī’s legal project of reconciling the two sub-schools is
seen by many as being balanced, one can see some favoring of the Iraqian school in his work,
especially in terms of their superiority in narration, which echoes ḥadīth methodology.
Expanding on this preference for the Iraqis, Halim notes,
Except in the Minhāj, which is devoid of any detailed, epistemological elaboration of the
ṭarīqa’s doctrines, the same models of reconciliation based on al-Shāfiʿī methodology
may be found in all of al-Nawawī’s legal writings. In His Majmūʿ, for instance, which is
essentially a collection of doctrines of the community of the Iraqi jurists, he proceeds as
he did in his Rawḍa to record the doctrines of the Iraqis and follow up on their legal
interpretations and inferences. Whenever he discovers that the Iraqi elaboration of the
particular case contradicts the doctrine and reasoning of al-Shāfiʿī, he interposes his own
reasoning, with reference to his mastery of al-Shāfiʿī’s teachings and the literature of the
other jurists in the Madhhab. Despite the fact that al-Nawawī is not always explicit about
the principle he refers to in elaborating such cases, he was widely trusted as an interpreter
of al-Shāfiʿī’s hermeneutic principles, and it was this that allowed him to narrow the
differences between the major ṭarīqas among the Shāfiʿī jurists. Following this model of
reconciliation, al-Nawawī traced all the doctrines of the ṭarīqas as transmitted by alShirāzī and al-Ghazālī (through) al-Rafiʿī, and brought any doctrine he thought of as
deviating from the madhhab back into line with al-Shāfiʿī’s juristic paradigm.162
After al-Nawawī, whatever he and al-Rāfiʿī agree upon has been unanimously adopted as
representing the doctrine of the school. In case they differed, al-Nawawī’s positions are believed
to take precedence. In his important work on the hierarchy of positions for fatwa, al-Kurdī
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asserts the superiority of the position of the Two Masters and that there is no reason to refer to
works that preceded them, arguing, “for they are more knowledgeable of the texts, and the
opinions of those who oppose them. They cannot be opposed except based on a compelling
affirmation, regardless of whosoever knows it or is ignorant about it… the utmost degree of
ijtihād, coupled with good intention and sincerity in filtering (taḥrīr) the legal opinions of the
madhhab, which compels us to believe that they never contradicted an opinion except for a
compelling reason, like it being weak or based on weak reasoning.”163 This has been the position
of the madhhab which has been affirmed by all the later scholars, including all the later
commentators. The books of the Two Masters have had a lasting effect on Shāfiʿī scholarship.
Commenting on this lasting effect, El-Shamsy writes, “The synthesizing function of these two
scholars explains why their works, and particularly al-Nawawī’s, became the authoritative lens
through which later Sh fi' s perceived the doctrinal history of their school.”164
This adoption of the positions of the Two Masters has also led to two other outcomes:
first, that legal works predating the works of the Two Masters became practically irrelevant.
Second, that the funneling of the legal authority within the Shāfiʿī school through the two most
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ī

ã

ā

ī
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Al-Shamsy gives the following context, “Al-R fi’ and al-Nawawī were part of an encyclopedic drive in the
Mamluk era to gather and sift all existing Islamic knowledge; a movement that animated all legal schools and
Islamic disciplines. This was particularly important for the Sh fiʿīs in the thirteenth century because of the
economic, and then military, destruction of their eastern centers of learning in Transoxania, Khorasan, and Iraq, and
the accompanying influx of scholars and literature into the Mamluk realm. Al-R fi' s and al-Nawawī’s achievement
was to bring together and fuse into a unitary doctrine the entire known intellectual legacy of the Sh fi' school and to
publicize and circulate it in works ranging from compact compendia (mukhtasar t) to huge commentaries (al-Rafiʿīs
Muḥarrar, ʿAziz , and Sharḥ kabīr , and al-Nawawī’s Minhāj al-ṭ lib n, Rawdat al-ṭālibin, and Majmūʿ)”; Ahmed
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authoritative commentators on al-R fi' and al- Nawawī, i.e. Ibn Ḥajar and al-Ramlī, “also
constrained the future scope of Shāfiʿī scholarship.”165

Conclusion

As part of his study of the influence of al-Nawawī’s terminologies on the later Shāfiʿīs, a
contemporary Palestinian academic described this influence as “the bottleneck of an hourglass,
as it collected the extract of the books of early generations (mutaqaddimūn), passing through it to
the later ones (mutaʾakhkhirūn). As such, it represents the apex of a pyramid for the early
generations and their opinions, the summation of which was contained therein. It is the base of
an inverted pyramid for the books of the later generations, as they all detail what’s in it.”166 This
may sound like a hyperbole. But it is not. First, whatever he and al-Rafīʿī agreed upon became
the uncontested doctrine of the school and in cases where they differed, precedence is given to
al-Nawawī’s position. Second, it is not an exaggeration to say that all subsequent Shāfiʿī juristic
production, either directly or indirectly, revolves around al-Nawawī’s works and views—far
more than al-Rāfiʿī—especially in Minhāj. Minhāj became the most authoritative, uncontested
digest within the Shāfiʿī world, save for another incomplete digest by al-Nawawī as well, alTaḥqīq.
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There are two main reasons for this status. First, the linguistic nature of Minhāj. This
includes its clarity, precision, and the adoption of an original and effective terminological
glossary that has become standard in all Shāfiʿī works since the authoring of Minhāj. As my
findings demonstrate, some of these terms were first used by al-Rāfiʿī, albeit inconsistently, then
developed in another work by al-Nawawī, i.e., Rawḍa, and then used effectively in Minhāj (as
well as in al-Taḥqīq, the last of al-Nawawī’s work, although incomplete, as my personal reading
shows). This examination of the role terminological system of al-Nawawī has been ignored in
academic research. The second reason for the status of Minhāj is that it is the fruit of alNawawī’s effort in reconciling the two Shāfiʿī sub-schools, in a way that favors the Iraqian
ṭarīqa and is inspired by his interest in ḥadīth studies and due to Ibn Ṣalāḥ’s influence.
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CHAPTER THREE
The Masterpiece:
Ibn Ḥajar’s Exceptional Legal Commentary

This chapter will focus on Ibn Ḥajar’s commentary on al-Nawawī’s Minhāj and the reasons
behind its eminent status in the Shāfiʿī literary tradition. It includes an overview of its content,
genealogy, and the reasons behind composing it. In addition, building on findings from Chapter
Two, it will have two central focuses. First, it will examine the linguistic and terminological
content of the Tuḥfa, positing that this neglected dimension is central to studying legal
commentaries. This examination will include an investigation of the functions of the new terms
that Ibn Ḥajar coined and a comparison between his terms and those of al-Nawawī. This is
especially important for two reasons. On the one hand, this will demonstrate the philological
preoccupation of the commentarial genre, especially since Tuḥfa is a salient example of this
genre and the commentarial tradition. On the other hand, there are a few treatises that examine
its terminological convections of Tuḥfa. Studying those works directly pertains to the objectives
of this chapter. Second, this chapter will explore the reasons that empowered Tuḥfa’s juristic
contribution to be so revered by Shāfiʿī students, teachers, muftīs, and judges. Therefore, I will
attempt to answer the question of what kind of juristic investigationsoccupied authors of
commentaries. This way, we can have a window into the mind of juristic commentators, the
debates and operations they are interested in, how they engaged with their interlocutors, and,
ultimately, an overview of the nature of their ijtihād operations.
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What makes Tuḥfa a masterpiece?
Interrogating a commentary for the sake of understanding the reasons that lead to its
authoritative status has to examine the commentary in itself, its relation to the original text
(matn), and analyzing its commentarial approach and elements. In this regard, what warrants a
legal commentary a higher status over others? What intellectual tools and crafts go into the
making of a legal commentary? As shown in Chapter One, the two earliest texts that proved
influential in containing the doctrines and foundations of the Shāfiʿī madhhab were the two
digests of al-Muzanī (d. 263/877) and al-Buwayṭī (d. 232/847). However, due to mounting
social and educational needs to better understand juristic rulings and their applications, the
period of spreading the Shāfīʿī school in the late third-early fifth/late ninth-early eleventh
centuries, witnessed the emergence of one the first and most influential early expansums, a
commentary; that is the commentary of judge Abū al-ʿAbbās Ibn Surayj (d. 306/919).
According to Calder, Ibn Surayj is arguably the most important force in spreading the Shāfiʿī
madhhab in Khorasan and Persia.167 Ibn Surayj was not only an influential and popular teacher.
He was also an important author-jurist who wrote a celebrated commentary on the
aforementioned important digest of al-Muzanī. The significance of the emergence of the genre
of commentaries is linked to two needs. First, the emerging social and educational need to
master a text with an identifiable teacher and, second, the pedagogical need to produce a taʿlīqa,
virtually a dissertation, by advanced students to fulfill their educational requirements.
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Tuḥfat al-muḥtāj bi-sharḥ al-Minhāj, (lit. the masterpiece for the one in need in
commenting on [al-Nawawī’s] the Methodology, thereafter “Tuḥfa”) of Shihāb al-Dīn Abū alʿAbbās Aḥmad b. Muḥammad b. ʿAlī Ibn Ḥajar al-Haytamī (909/1504–974/1567), is the most
authoritative legal expansum in the Shāfiʿī legal tradition. Late Shāfiʿī scholars believe that no
fatwa can contradict that which is agreed on by Ibn Ḥajar in his Tuḥfa and Shihāb al-Dīn Aḥmad
al-Ramlī (d. 957/1550) in Nihāyat al-muḥtāji; also a commentary on al-Nawawī’s Minhāj. The
majority of the post-classical Shāfiʿī verification labor mainly revolves around al-Nawawī’s
works; second to none other than al-Rāfiʿī. While the agreements of al-Nawawī and Rāfiʿī - Two
Masters (al-shaykhān) - came to constitute the doctrines of the Shāfiʿī school from the seventh/
thirteenth onward, Ibn Ḥajar comes into the picture as a leading figure of a circle of
commentators on al-Nawawī’s Minhāj.168 This circle consists of Shaykh al-Islam Zakariyyā alAnṣārī (d. 931/1525) and his students, chief among of them is Ibn Ḥajar. The juristic positions of
all them are seen as valid enough to base fatwas on in the later school; as long as they don’t
contradict the Two Masters, or the foundations of the Shāfiʿī madhhab.169
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The Author
Shihāb al-Dīn Abū al-ʿAbbās Aḥmad b. Muḥammad b. ʿAlī b. Ḥajar al-Haytamī
(909-974/1504-1567) was an eminent Egyptian scholar who moved to Mecca from Cairo, where
he taught and wrote until the end of his life.170 Some accounts deem spelling his last name as alHaythamī as more accurate.171 He was born in a village of Salamant, in the Egyptian Delta. Like
al-Shāfiʿī and al-Nawawī, Ibn Ḥajar was no less of a prolific and polymath author. He produced
around 148 books, the majority of which, 78, are in Shāfiʿī fiqh, 16 in ḥadīth, 1 in Islamic legal
theory (uṣūl al-fiqh), 13 in theology (kalām), 18 in Sufism, 2 grammar, and 1 astronomy, among
other subjects.172 There are several later biographical sources that give a comprehensive
overview of his life. Arguably, the most comprehensive among them is the one penned by Ibn
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investigating the differences in the year of the birth of Ibn Ḥajar’s, Rashīd concludes that, based on
Baʿamr, al-Ghazzī, among other resources, that 909/1504 is the correct year.

Although it is not common, al-ʿAwnī argues that it is more accurate to call him al-Haythāmī, since it is related to
the more accurate way to pronounce the name of his hometown region of Maḥlat Abī Haytham.Al-Sharīf Ḥātim
b.Arīf al-ʿAwnī, Rīy al-bāḥith al-ẓamī bi-tarjīḥ al-thāʾ fī nisbat Ibn Ḥajar al-Haythamī, a short paper, p. 5, retrieved
online on 5 April 2020: http://dr-alawni.com/files/books/pdf/1586773429.pdf
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sequence=1&isAllowed=y)

123

Ḥajar’s student, al-Ṣayfī, titled Nafāʾis al-Durar fī tarjamat Shaykh al-Islām Ibn Ḥajar.173 Our
Ibn Ḥajar should not be confused with another similarly named scholar, Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī
(d. 852/1449), the eminent ḥadīth master.
Ibn Ḥajar’s father died when he was young. When the blows of instability struck Egypt
during the lateera of the Mamluks, which witnessed lots of infighting between the ruling class
and economic instability, his grandfather, himself a shaykh and a Sufi master, moved and took
him along to the village of Maḥalt Abī Haytam. It is for this reason that he acquired the
designation of Haytamī.174 The the two pious shaykhs also taught his father, al-Shams Ibn alḤamāʾil and the latter’s student al-Shams al-Shināwī, took Ibn Ḥajar under their wings and
mentored his religious education. Afterwards he moved to Cairo to start his religious education
in al-Azhar mosque in 924/1518. According to a biography written by one of his own students,
Ibn Ḥajar managed to memorized the Qur’an at a young age and later memorized al-Nawawī’s
al-Minhāj, the very digest he later commented on in the Tuḥfa. This highlights the importance
of early education on later academic achievement; in the same way al-Nawawī studied alGhazālī’s al-Wasīt, the book on which his seminal Minhāj was founded.

173 These

sources include one by his student Abī Bakr Baʿamr al-Ṣayfī, Nafāʾis al-Durar fī tarjamat Shaykh alIslām Ibn Ḥajar (Amman: Dār al-Fatḥ, 2016); al-Shaʿrānī, al-Nūr al-Sāfir ʿan akhbār al-qarn al-ʿāshir, edited by
Aḥmad Ḥālū, Maḥmūd al-ʾAranʾūṭ, and Akram al-Būshī (Beirut: Dār Ṣādir, 2001); ʿAbd al- ayy b. A mad Ibn alʿIm d, Shadhar t al-dhahab f akhb r man dhahab, 10 vols., edited by ʿAbd al-Q dir al-Arnaʾ and Ma m d alArnaʾ (Damascus: D r Ibn Kath r, 1406/1986), 8:370-372; ʿAbd al-Ḥayy al-Kitānī, Fahras al-fahāris wa alathbāt, edited by Iḥsān ʿAbbās (Beirut: Dār al-Gharb al-Islamī, 1982) 1:337-340; Najm al-Dīn Muḥammad b.
Muḥammad Ibn al-Ghazz , al-Kaw kib al-s ʼirah bi-aʼʻy n al-miʼah al-ʻ shirah, edited by Khal l Man r (Beirut:
Dar al-Kutub al- ʻIlmiiyyah, 1997) 2:200-202.
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Ḥ

ā
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Figure 3: ‘The commentarial circle’, consisting of Shaykh al-Islam Zakariyyā al-Anṣārī and some of his students and
students of his students. The opinions of all these scholars, which are contained in their authored expansums, are
considered valid for fatwa in the late Shāfiʿī school, according to al-Kurdī and others.

Ibn Ḥajar was a student of the highest authority in Shāfiʿī fiqh of his time, Shaykh al-Islam
Zakariyyā al-Anṣārī (d. 931/1525). Al-Anṣārī is of special importance to this chapter, as he is
the main teacher of the ‘commentarial circle’, all of whose works are considered valid--under
some conditions--fatwa purposes. According to al-Kurdī,
No fatwa can contradict these two [i.e. Ibn Ḥajar and al-Shams al-Ramlī], rather whatever
contradicts al-Tuḥfa and al-Nihāya, except if these two did not tackle it. Otherwise, the next in
rank to be sourced for fatwa is Shaykh al-Islām Zakariyyā al-Anṣārī, then al-Khaṭīb al-Shirbīnī
(d. 977/1570), then the super commentary of ʿAlī b. Yaḥyā al-Zayyādī (d. 1024/1615), then the
super-commentary of Ibn al-Qāsim (d. 992/1584), then the options of Shihāb al-Dīn Aḥmad alBurulusī, a. k. a. ʿUmayra (d. 957/1550), then the options of the super-commentary of ʿAlī alShubrāmilsī (d. 1087/1676), then the super-commentary of ʿAlī al-Ḥalabī (d. 1044/1635), then the
super-commentary of al-Shubrī, then the super-commentary of al-ʿInānī.175

Ibn Ḥajar is the leading figure of this elite circle of commentators. Among his fiqh teachers are
Zayn al-Dīn al-Sunbāṭī (d. 931/1525), and Shihāb al-Dīn al-Ramlī (d. 957/1550). He is said to
have met with a number of the most iconic scholars of his time, including fiqh experts like Nāṣir
al-Dīn al-Ṭablāwī (d. 966/1559), and fiqh and uṣūl expert al-Laqqānī (d. 958/1551). He was
175 Al-Kurdī,

al-Fawāʾid, 36.
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inspired to start writing based on a dream that he saw during his first pilgrimage to Mecca. He
then started writing a commentary on al-Rawḍ, a fiqh treatise, the original of which was stolen
and destroyed. Ibn Ḥajar later moved to Mecca, allegedly due to the harassment and jealousy he
faced in Cairo by his fellow shaykhs. He settled in Mecca and acquired a wide influence in
teaching and an opportunity to author authoritative works in the late Shāfiʿī school and the title
of the Muftī of the land of Hijaz.
Ibn Ḥajar lived through the closing of the era of the Mamluk dynasty
(648-923/1250-1517), towards the end of the Circassian period (792-923/1382-1517), a period
marked by deep instability, tumultuousness and constant change of political leadership. He also
witnessed the beginning of the Ottoman rule, as the Ottomans moved to take over Egypt and
then transferred its political and some of the scholalry importance to the new capital of the
Islamic Caliphate in Istanbul. He lived most of his life under the Ottomans. Rashid, a Shāfiʿī
fiqh specialist, concludes that there is no known publicly expressed political opinion by Ibn
Ḥajar during his lifetime, except a praise of Sultan Süleyman the Magnificent
(900-974/1494-1566) in one of his books, Al-Manāhil al-ʿaẓba fī mā wa hiya min al-Kaʿba,
because of the latter’s efforts to stabilize the society, especially in Mecca where Ibn Ḥajar
resided.176 He lived during the life of a number of eminent scholars, such as the polymath and
erudite al-Suyūṭī (849-911/1445-1506), the eminent ḥadīth scholar Shams al-Dīn al-Sakhāwī
(831-902/1428-1497), among others, in addition to his Aḥmad al-Ramlī (919-1004/1513-1596),
176 Amjad

Rashīd, Al-Imam Ibn Ḥajar Ibn Ḥajar wa atharuh fī al-fiqh al-shāfiʿī, an MA submitted to the Jordanian
University, 2000, retrieved online in April 2019: (http://mylibrary.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/bitstream/handle/
123456789/99577/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%85%20%D8%A7%D8%A8%D9%86%
20%D8%AD%D8%AC%D8%B1%20%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%87%D9%8A%D8%AA%D9%85%D9%8A%20%
D9%88%D8%A3%D8%AB%D8%B1%D9%87%20%D9%81%D9%8A%20%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81%D9%8
2%D9%87%20%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%A7%D9%81%D8%B9%D9%8A.pdf?
sequence=1&isAllowed=y)
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who was called the “young Shafiʿī,” in praise of his erudition. Al-Ramlī is the second of the two
most authoritative figures in the late Shāfiʿī madhhab, alongside Ibn Ḥajar, who are thought of
the highest authorities in the madhhab.
As for his scholarly status, Ibn Ḥajar is considered as one of the transmitters of the
madhhab. The transmitters (nuqalāʾ, sing. nāqil) of the madhhab is the fifth category in the
hierarchy of the Muftīs of the madhhab, a topic that Calder dedicated an important study to.177
The condition of occupying this category is to memorize the positions of the madhhab, to
transmit its legal tradition, and to understand both its ambitious and unambiguous legal issues.
Ibn Ḥajar was known for his expansive scope of the knowledge of the Shāfiʿī literary tradition,
covering the earliest works in Shāfiʿī fiqh from the writings of the eponymous founder of the
madhhab onward, and in different genres as well, like digests, fatwas, expansums, ḥadīth

177 With

regard to the hierarchy of mujtahids and muftis within the madhhabs and Ibn Ḥajar’s rank in it, there are
five ranks for jurists in relation to their ijtihād: (1) an absolute mujtahid (also called independent mufti): a category
includes the four eponymous founders of the four Sunni legal schools; (2) restricted mujtahid or the dependent
mufti: such individuals chose to follow the madhhab but still through their own unique legal reasoning. The scholars
of this category include the following followers of the Shāfiʿī school, like al-Buwayṭī, al-Muzanī, Ibn al-Mundhir,
and Ibn Jarīr al-Ṭabarī. Despite having their own method and proofs, the main difference between category (1) and
(2) is that scholars in (2) did not have legal theory and hadīth maxims on which legal inferences and substantive
rulings are based; (3) The mujtahids of the madhhab who are also called the ‘possessors of perspectives’ (aṣhāb alwujūh). The scope of ijtihād of the scholars in this category is that despite they followed the maxims and the legal
theory of the Imam of the madhhab, they remained independent in their establishing (taqrīr) of the legal foundations
and theory through proofs. They used the statements of the founder as foundations for inference; the likes of Shaykh
Abū Ḥāmid al-Isfārīnī (d. 406/1016), al-Qaffāl (d. 365/976), and al-Mawazī (d. 340/951); (4) The mujtahids in fatwa
and rule-formulation (tarjīḥ). Scholars in this category established master-jurists who are well versed in the
madhhab of their followed Imam, its proofs, are active in verifying it, and perform preponderance, along with all its
legal and intellectual tools. This category is of special importance to this study because of the centrality of tarjīḥ to
its scope, and because of the debate that relates to whether Ibn Ḥajar belongs to it, and; (5) The transmitters
(nuqala, sing. nāqil) of the madhhab: The condition of occupying this category is to memorize the positions of the
madhhab, transmitting its legal tradition, and understanding it in both ambitious and unambiguous issues. See: alMalybārī, Dirāsa, 210-213. For more on this see: Norman Calder, “Al-Nawawī's Typology of Muftīs and its
Significance for a General Theory of Islamic Law.” Islamic Law and Society 3, no. 2 (1996): 137-164. These
previous categories are important, if only for the sake of understanding the different layers of legal reasoning and the
cumulative nature of the madhhab progress. As even confirmed by Ibn Ḥajar himself, due to the continuous critical
and gradual work done by jurists, each of these categories phase out. For example, he states that the mujtahids in
fatwa and in tarjīḥ, do not exist after the fifth/eleventh century. See: Ibn Ḥajar al-Haytamī, al-Fatāwa al-fiqhiyya alkubrā (Beirut: Dār Ṣādir, n.a.), 4:303. Based on critical and balanced examination of whether Ibn Ḥajar belong to
the fourth or fifth category, Rashīd convincingly asserts that he belongs to the fifth category. See: Rashīd, Ibn Ḥajar,
98-105.
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proofs, and others. He rose to his esteemed scholarly rank and became the uncontested Shāfiʿī
Mufti of Ḥijāz, and was sought for all kinds of fatwas, especially for complex and difficult
questions. Rashīd describes status of the fatwas of Ibn Ḥajar and the attention that scholars have
given them as follows, “the reader will find in his fatwas or authored works tremendous
knowledge, delicate understanding, extensive verification, and impressive critique, that is
seldom encountered in many books.”178
In one of the rare example of treating Ibn Ḥajar’s legal works in western academia, a
chapter by Jackson that examines a fatwa by Ibn Ḥajar that is in form of an independent treatise,
due to the comprehensive treatment it gives to questions of elementary education, Taqrīr almaqāl fī ādāb wa-aḥkām wa-fawāʾid yahtāju ilayhā muʾadibbū.al-aṭfāl (The Decisive Word on
Etiquette, Rules, and Pointers Needed by Children’s Educators). Acknowledging the juristic and
social insights that went to fabric of the work, Jackson asserts, “In ways more than one, Taqrīr
al-maqāl reveals the extent to which medieval jurists, in their capacity as the custodians of the
religious law and hence interpreters of the waqf-endowment deeds, school administrative policy.
Indeed, Ibn Ḥajar’s work might defensibly be read as the published policies of a local school
board.”179 Also in his dissertation on Ibrāhim al-Kurāni and the intellectual life in Ḥijāz in the
eleventh/seventeenth century, Dumairieh mentions Ibn Ḥajar as one of the most important
contributors to the works focused on transmission (isnād). He also identifies him as one of the
few scholars who was able to attract foreign student to move and study in Ḥijāz, transforming it

178
179

Rashīd, Ibn Ḥajar, 91.

Sherman Jackson, “Discipline and Duty in a Medieval Muslim Elementary School: Ibn Hajar al-Haytamī’s
Taqrīr al-maqāl” a chapter in Law and Education in Medieval Islam: Studies in Memory of Professor George
Makdisi, edited by Joseph E. Lowry, Devin J. Stewart, and Shawkat M. Toorawa (Cambridge: E.J.W. Gibb
Memorial Trust, 2002), 19.
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into a educational center from the tenth/sixteenth century onward.180 There is also another
chapter by El-Rouayheb that studies his theological views against the the Ḥanbalī Damascan
jurist Ibn Taymiyya.181
One of the manifestations of the attention that Ibn Ḥajar’s contemporaries gave to his
writing is that theYemeni scholar Imām ʿAbd Allāh b. ʿUmar Ba-Makhrama (d. 972/1565)
authored a two-volume work mentioning the subtle points (nukat) in the Tuḥfa.182 He also wrote
the following about Ibn Ḥajar’s scholarly accomplishments.
… Ibn Ḥajar is considered the seal of the muḥaqqiqīn (verifiers, sing. muḥaqqiq), from whom
[learning] the madhhab is sought, and when a disagreement is occurs, his opinion is given
precedence, and no one else equals him in this except his contemporaneous Imam Shams al-Dīn
Muḥammad al-Ramlī; as in their verification and consolidation of the madhhab, they both
reached a lofty status that gave them precedence among the late Imams, even from their own
shaykhs. Among those is the Shaykh of Islam Zakariyyā al-Anṣārī, al-Shihāb al-Ramlī, Imām Abū
al-Ḥasan al-Bakrī, Zayn al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq al-Sunbāṭī, and others who carried the banner of the
madhhab in the tenth [/seventeenth] century, even though each of them weighs an entire nation in
his own knowledge and verification.183

As for the rank of Ibn Ḥajar among in Shāfiʿī muftīs, although he enjoys an equal standing with
other later scholars, he is considered to be one of the two most superior authorities in the late
Shāfiʿī school. In the same way the doctrines of Shāfiʿism cannot contradict that which alNawawī and al-Rāfiʿī agreed on, according to the consensus of later scholars, fatwas are cannot
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Naser Dumairieh, Intellectual Life in the Ḥijāz in the 17th Century The Works and Thought of Ibrāhīm al-Kūrānī
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contradict what in Ibn Ḥajar’s Tuḥfa or al-Ramlī’s Nihāyat al-muḥtāj. However, whenever there
is a disagreement between the two, Ibn Ḥajar’s position overrides, even if slightly.
Ibn Ḥajar and al-Ramlī have followings and influence in different geographies. Scholars
of Ḥaḍramout, the Levant, Kurdish scholars, scholars from Dagestan, and the Hijāz give
preference to Ibn Ḥajar. The Egyptians have historically adopted what al-Ramlī has written,
especially in Nihāya, since it was audited to its author in the presence of four hundred scholars
who critiqued, one opinion claims. The author of Maṭlab al-iqāẓ, however, narrates that even
though it is established that Ibn Ḥajar is superior to al-Shams al-Ramlī, late Egyptian Shāfiʿīs
give presence to the latter because of, “The lofty status of his father, al-Shihāb al-Ramlī and
rank as an Imam. His fame sprang from him to his son. Fame has an influence.”184 In the Hijāz
al-Ramlī acquired more influence, with the arrival of many Egyptian scholars there. As for the
ranking of Ibn Ḥajar’s own books for fatwa purposes, al-Tuḥfa tops the list, followed by Fatḥ
al-Jawād, then al-Imdād (which was abridged by the previous work), then al-Manhaj al-qawīm,
then his fatwa collection, titled al-Fatāwa al-fiqiyya al-kubrā, and then legal work al-Īʿāb shraḥ
al-ʿAbāb.
According to El-Shamsy, madhhab-doctrine restrictions, like making the main doctrines
of the madhhab limited to the agreements of al-Nawawī and al-Rāfiʿī, and later doctrines based
on the agreements of Ibn Ḥajar and al-Jamāl al-Ramlī, have led to two outcomes. First, that the
past works that predate these two scholars became practically irrelevant. Second, that the
funneling of the legal authority within the Shāfiʿī school through the two most authoritative
commentators on al-R fi' and al-Nawawī, i.e. Ibn Ḥajar and al-Ramlī, “also constrained the
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ā

184

130

future scope of Shāfiʿī scholarship.”185 Below, however, I will provide some example of Ibn
Ḥajar’s juristic innovations exemplifying that despite these restrictions, there was still room for
innovative juristic operations and contributions. These types of compartmentalized ijtihād
(ijtihād juzʾī) that does not overhaul the Shāfiʿī legal methodology or rulings.

What is the Masterpiece?
Tuḥfat al-muḥtāj is Ibn Ḥajar’s is one of the most celebrated commentarial expansums. The
book studies, explains, critiques, and comments on al-Nawawī’s referential digest of Minhāj alṭālibīn. Each of the two texts represents the highest most authoritative legal text in their
respective genres. Both the Tuḥfa and al-Ramlī’s Nihāyat al-muḥtāj, also a commentary on
Minhāj, are considered the two most authoritative late commentaries in the Shāfiʿī school, to the
extent that, as mentioned previously, Shāfiʿīs agree that no fatwa can contradict whatever these
two commentaries agree on. Although the genre of expansums and the writing of commentaries
was discussed in Chapter One, the following note is relevant. In theory, authors compose their
works based on the belief that they can be understood on their own, without needing an
explanation or commentary.186 Explaining his reasons behind writing the Tuḥfa, in its opening,
Ibn Ḥajar asserts in his Introduction,
For a long time I have been thinking about gracing myself (atabarrak) by serving a book of fiqh
by the godly spiritual pole, the godly scholar, and the uncontested Friend of Allah, the
indisputable verifier (muḥarir) of the madhhab Abī Zakariyyā Yaḥyā al-Nawawī, may Allah
sanctify his soul and illuminate his grave. It is now, the twelfth of [the month of] Muḥarram, [of
the year] nine hundred and fifty-eight [/1551] to serve his methodology, which is explicitly clear
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and implicitly full of treasures and resources, by way of summarizing and approving its recycled
commentaries, and answering to its expansive examinations, restricting lengthy discourse to
evidence and relevant disagreement and justification, and to citing opinions and examinations to
their authors. This is because high aspirations have been suspended from performing verification,
let alone when they are lengthy. I shall resort to the opposite of that [i.e. succinct discourse], by
way of rebutting its analogy or underlying cause (ʿillah), or what is detective about the original
text in its briefness.187

Short as it is, unpacking this previous passage is key to grasping and identifying the conceptual
operations that take place in a commentator’s mind. As Ibn Ḥajar posits, summarizing,
reviewing and approving the findings of other commentaries, evaluating the original texts
examinations and conclusions, proving and verifying its conclusions and verifications,
demonstrating the values and subtle points of Minhāj, and supplementing its formulated rules
with scriptural evidence--are all part of objectives of a juristic commentary. This chapter will
include below some examples of these functions. Also, while providing supportive juristic
evidences to al-Nawawī’s arguments, it must be noted Ibn Ḥajar does not hold back from
differing with al-Nawawī when the latter’s independent legal preferences differ with Shāfiʿī
doctrines. All the above are among the many reasons why scores of later Shāfiʿī experts revere
the Tuḥfa.
With regard to the genealogy of Tuḥfa and the influences that went into it, it must be
noted that between the time of al-Nawawī and Ibn Ḥajar, there were a little above sixty other
commentaries written on Minhāj; in addition to few dozen other related works, between glosses,
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abridgments and poetic renditions.188 Ibn Ḥajar was clearly familiar of some of these works,
especially since several of them were by his own teachers. Chief among them is the abridgment
by Shaykh al-Islam Zakariyyā al-Aṣārī, Manhaj al-ṭulāb, and four different commentaries by
Ibn Ḥajar’s own teacher, Muḥammad al-Bakrī al-Ṣidīqī (d. 952/1545). With regard to tracing
main influences on Ibn Ḥajar in his Tuḥfa, al-Saqqāf argues in al-Fawāʾid al-Makkiyya, Ibn
Ḥajar particularly benefited from al-Jalāl al-Maḥallī’s (846/1459) commentary on Minhāj.189
In terms of structure, Tuḥfa follows that of Minhāj, with its seven main chapters, which
vary in length. It is a little more than double the Minhāj’s size. Tuḥfa is a running commentary
that includes meticulous juristic, linguistic, theological, and jurisprudential investigations. The
most commonly circulated edition of the commentary of Tuḥfa is printed alongside two glosses
and consists of ten volumes. In specific, it is arguably the most referenced late work, and its
centrality for fatwa cannot be understated. The book continues to attract study groups and has
been published in several editions.190

188 The

Dār al-Minhāj edition of al-Nawawī’s Minhāj, the secondary edition I use in this research, provides a
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For example, here is a link from the Facebook page of an Egyptian distributor, accessed on March 2020: https://
www.facebook.com/search/top/?
q=%22%D8%AA%D8%AD%D9%81%D8%A9%20%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AD%D8%AA%D8%A7
%D8%AC%22&epa=SEARCH_BOX Also, a recent ten volume critical edition of Dār al-Ḍiyāʾ, Kuwait, edited by a
Dagestanian scholar, Anwar b.Abī Bakr al-Shaykh al-Dāghistānī, has attracted lots of attention, especially on social
media, with lots students of Shāfiʿī fiqh and buyer putting their pictures carrying the box it comes in online. Also, in
another example of the continuous interest of the work, A preface to a recent abridgment of Tuḥfa written by Aḥmad
al-Ḥaddād, the current Mufti of Dubai, calls Ibn Ḥajar the “seal of authors… and the reliance of the late jurists and
ḥadīth specialists, because of its [i.e. Tuḥfa] comprehension of the texts of Imam al-Shāfiʿī, the master of the
madhhab, with additional tracing of the opinions of imams of the madhhab, with his verifications, rulereformulations, and authentication”: Muṣtafa b.Ḥāmid b.Sumayṭ, Mukhtaṣar al-masāʾil al-fiqhiyya li tuḥfat almuḥtāj bi sharḥ al-Minhāj (Tarim: Maktabat Tarīm al-Ḥadītha, 2013), 4.
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As for the reception and status of Tuḥfa, there are several indications of its rank in the
Shāfiʿī literary tradition. In demonstrating its high status the author of Maṭlab al-Īqāẓ, ʿAbd
Allāh Balafqīh asserts,
Know that the explanatory commentary (sharḥ) of al-Minhāj titled tuḥfat al-muḥtāj, since it was
the last of the authored works by Shaykh Ibn Ḥajar, may Allah most High grant him mercy, in
substantive aspects of law (furūʿ fiqihyya), and since it was audited to him numerously, it was
edited and refined, so much so that it became the most known among his works in its refinement
and the most obvious in its verification and preponderance. Thus, when it reached such a rank,
the Muslim community received it approvingly by the Imams of Islam (talaqathu bil-qabūl
aʾimmat al-Islām), and it became a reliable work for laymen and specialists alike, and a
referential work for judges and rulers.191

Seeing juristic erudition of the commentarial engagement of Tuḥfa, many scholars and jurists
were inspired to write glosses that comment on it. They are twenty-two in total. Interestingly,
one of them is Ibn Ḥajar’s own, titled Ṭurfat al-faqīr bi-Tuḥfat al-Qadīr. However, it is
incomplete.192 After introducing the text, its author, its influence, genealogy and rank, This
chapter will turn now to studying the linguistic and the juristic aspects of the text.

Language and the Masterpiece
What kind of language serves as a vehicle suitable for achieving the purposes of an advanced
legal commentary? What are the main juristic operations it needs to perform? Based on the
conclusion of Chapter Two, one of the most lasting and significant influences of al-Nawawī on
later Shāfiʿī literary tradition is the unanimous adoption of his juristic terminological
conventions by later scholars. In al-Nawawī’s case, he needed to invent terms that identify the
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authors of legal opinions under consideration, the level of strength of these opinions, and the
strength of the relevant disagreement surrounding them. These various opinions existed in the
Shāfiʿī madhhab before al-Nawawī; whether by al-Shāfiʿī, ‘old’ and ‘new’ opinions, his
Companions, the early mujtahids, known as aṣḥāb al-wujūh, who died before the beginning of
the fourth/tenth century, or later scholars. Having adopted the consensus of Shāfiʿī scholars that
the agreements of al-Nawawī and al-Rāfiʿī constitute the doctrines of the school, Ibn Ḥajar’s
scope of juristic evaluation, and by extension his terminological language, is different from that
of al-Nawawī. Some scholars who came after al-Nawawī explained and refined his glossary. Ibn
Ḥajar is no exception. In addition to adopting and building on al-Nawawī’s terms, he added to
them new ones that serve his new and unique juristic purposes, which are different from alNawawī’s. Other Shāfiʿī author-jurists saw his terminological contributions as worthy of
dedicating books to studying them.

Terminological Innovations
I will turn here to examining Ibn Ḥajar’s new terms in his Tuḥfa. Terminological innovations
constitute a significant element of the late-classical commentaries (ʿaṣr al-ḥawāshī) which, to
my knowledge, has not been studied. A cursory look at the Tuḥfa reveals the presence of
terminological innovation that serves the commentarial purposes of the work. It is important to
keep in mind that the most central purpose and focus of the deep reading performed in
commentaries is to arrive at, authenticate, and prove the doctrines of their respective legal
school. It is through this lens that we can understand the scope and purpose terminological
contribution of a commentator like Ibn Ḥajar. The terms Ibn Ḥajar uses in his debates and
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engagements with his main interlocutors, other commentators on Minhāj. Engagement with
other commentators for the sake of formulating the doctrines of the madhhab is the central
mission of the juristic commentarial tradition. Below I will engage with two examples of Ibn
Ḥajar’s main terms, one relating to juristic authorities and the other to doctrinal issues. This will
be followed by an examination of independent works that focused on studying the special terms
of Ibn Ḥajar in the Tuḥfa.
The first example I want to engage with is the term ‘commentator’ (shāriḥ) that Ibn Ḥajar
uses wildly. Sometimes Ibn Ḥajar plainly mentions the name of his interlocutor, at others the
identity of the commentator is kept anonymous. We see in the following examples a succinct
and precise representative of such an engagement. For example, in the section on “Facing the
Kaʿba, What Constitutes a Substitute for it, and the Subsequents of that”, Ibn Ḥajar affirms the
obligation to direct one’s prayer to the very physical structure of the Kaʿba. These measures
include taking all needed steps to achieve this goal, as much as one possibly can. He starts by
disagreeing with the opinion of Ibn Surayj that his opinion to face Mecca suffices is wrong,
along with discrediting an inauthentic ḥadīth that the latter bases his opinion on. He states that
the opinion of another scholar who remains unnamed but still referred to as ‘the commentator’
regarding not accepting intense fear as an excuse for praying without facing the Kaʿba is
“problematic.”193 He then moves to discussing and disproving Judge ʿAlī al-Qunawī (d.
729/1329), arguing that if someone is in front of the Kaʿba, parts of their body, for instance their
arm, should face the Kaʿba. He then moves on to the following encounter with a commentator
(the original text from al-Nawawī’s Minhāj is in bold).
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The obligation to face the direction of the Kaʿba (qibla) (specifically relates) to cases when it is
easy, [during] (the entering into the prayer by invoking ‘Allahu akbar’ (taḥarrum)). Yes, the
relied-upon doctrine (muʿtamad) with regard to [being on a mount or vehicle used for traveling]
is that it has to be stationed for long. This is inline with the expression of a commentator. Based
on that, it appears that the intention is that, that which customarily breaks the continuation of
traveling. So, as long as it is stationed, s/he [i.e. the traveller] cannot only pray on it except if
facing the direction of the qibla.194

As we can see, at every turn, Ibn Ḥajar is engaging with different opinions and authors,
relentlessly verifying and formulating the doctrines of the madhhab. In the previous example,
he agreed with the unnamed commentator. A quantitative search of the occurrences of the word
shāriḥ, i.e., commentator, in the text of Tuḥfa, shows that it occurs 380 times.195 This shows the
extent of the engagement that is part of the commentarial function.
In another example, in the section on the expiation (kaffāra) for engaging in intercourse
during the fasting time in the month of Ramaḍān, we find the following engagement with
another commentator. In this section, al-Nawawī asserts that an expiation must be made whether
the partner is a spouse or otherwise, but not if the sexual encounter happens while fasting
outside Ramaḍān, during the dispensation from fasting while traveling, or for whoever thinks
that the time for fasting has not began. Ibn Ḥajar qualifies this position here by arguing that in
this example,
… there is no expiation needed, even if one considered sinful, if one believed that sunset has
entered without a proof or while doubting, or discovered after intercourse that it is daytime. The
individual here did not intend to violate. Paying expiation can be averted by mere doubt, in the
same way a corporal punishment (ḥadd) is. Therefore, sinfulness may be disregarded, based on
what preceded; that breaking one’s fast by the end of the day can only happen if based on ijtihād
[i.e. that the time for fasting has ended with sunset entering]. Similarly, there is no expiation here,
194
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based on what a commentator has mentioned. Others have looked into the matter and made a
distinction whether one is doubting if they have intended to fast [i.e. outside Ramaḍān] or
otherwise.196

Here, as we can see, is an attempt to cite and agree with other opinions of other commentators
on a secondary probable case, in order to provide a comprehensive treatment on the topic of
expiation for breaking one’s fast due to a sexual encounter.
The second term I want to engage with, one that relates to Tuḥfa's doctrinal
investigations, is the unique term ʿalā al-muʿtamad, or literally ‘based on the adopted
[doctrine]’. The term indicates the outcome of verifying two opinions by al-Shāfiʿī. The term
muʿtamad was first coined and used in a technical fashion by Ibn Ḥajar’s teacher, Shaykh alIslam Zakariyyā al-Anṣārī.197 An electronic numeration of the number of times the term appears
in Tuḥfa shows that it occurs 420 times.198 Here is an example of its use:
… A written contract (does not dissolve), even if flawed (because of insanity), or the fainting (of
the slave who has a contract to be freed after paying for his freedom in installments (mukātab)) or
imposing interdiction upon him due to lunacy, in case such a measure is needed from one of the
two parties as in the case of pawn. If he [the slave] is proven to own no money, the master can
dissolve the contract, thus returning to his possession. In this case, the master has to sustain him,
if it appears that the slave does not own any money that covers the amount needed to dissolve the
contract and set him free. The Imam said that we prefer it to be in the hands of the master,
otherwise that dissolving the contract is imposed as in the case of lack of money, and then
afterwards it appears. If the slave possesses money he may go to the ruler and affirm the written
contract and that the time of payment is due, demanding the term of the contact, admitting the
oath of disclosure (yamīn al-istiẓhār) that him due remains unfulfilled. (And) at this time, (the
196
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judge) must (deliver) to him out of his money (if there is money that belongs to him) which the
master has not taken away, even in the case of a slave who interdicted, if there is an interest for
the master to set the slave free based on the relied upon doctrine (ʿala al-muʿtamad), since he acts
on his [the slave’s behalf] due to his lack legal capacity; unlike in the case of an absent slave
whose money is present.199

This term, as shown in the above example, shows that the scope of Ibn Ḥajar’s juristic ruleformulation goes as far back as to evaluate the opinions (aqwāl) of the eponymous founder.

Terminological Studies of the Tuḥfa
There are two main books that examine the terminological innovation and contribution of Tuḥfa
to the commentarial tradition. The first is by the eminent eighteenth-century scholar Muḥammad
b. Sulaymān al-Kurdī (d. 1194/1780), author of the influential book on methodology of iftāʾ for
the late Shāfiʿīs, al-Fawāʾid al-Madaniyya fī man yuftā bi-qawlihi min al-Shāfiʿīyya, titled
ʿUqūd al-durar fi bayān muṣṭalaḥāt Tuḥfat Ibn Ḥajar.200 The second book is Tadhkirat alIkhwān fi bayān muṣṭalaḥāt Tuḥfat al-muḥtāj li-Ibn Ḥajar by al-Kurdī’s student, Muḥammad b.
Ibrāhīm al-ʿAlījī al-Qulhānī (date of death unknown).201 This interest of both al-Kurdī and his
student in the terms of Tuḥfa is a testimony to the importance of these terms to later juristic
investigations, especially those focusing on commentaries. Al-Kurdī’s work, in essence, is an
extensive and careful study that focuses on three central terms that Ibn Ḥajar mentions
throughout the Tuḥfa in numerous juristic discussions. The first term is the previously discussed
“a commentator” (shāriḥ), which we encountered previously. Ibn Ḥajar uses it widely. There is
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a common misunderstanding that the identity of the “commentator” is mainly Ibn Shuhba (d.
851/1448), as being one of the main interlocutors of Ibn Ḥajar throughout his Tuḥfa.202 Through
numerous examples, and tracing the references and the resemblance of the juristic position of
several commentators, al-Kurdī convincingly concludes that the identity of the unnamed
commentator cannot be restricted to Ibn Shuhba.203 The second term that al-Kurdī engages with
in detail is the common phrase “some of them have said” (qāla baʿḍuhum). Again, through
examining many examples where the term is used and cross-referencing, al-Kurdī concludes
that the common conception that the person meant here is al-Jalāl al-Ramlī, Ibn Ḥajar’s main
rival, is wrong. Rather, he concludes that it can mean others as well; mainly Ibn Ḥajar’s
contemporaneous commentators on Minhāj, especially the Yemeni scholar Abū al-ʿAbbā alṬanbalāwī and some of his colleagues.204 The third term is “as in” (kamā), which he concludes
is a code indicating that whatever comes after it is the adopted doctrine.205
The second, more exhaustive work that focuses on Ibn Ḥajar’s terms is al-Quhlānī’s
Tadhkirat al-ikhwān. The book studies the meaning and uses of thirteen terms unique to the
Tuḥfa, in addition to few other relevant investigations; like an explanation of the books that
represent the doctrines of the school for iftāʾ purposes, on following a madhhab, on the
conditions of what nullifies a ruling of a judge, and few biographies of important Shāfiʿī jurists.
The thirteen terms are: (1) ‘our master’ (shaykhunā), meaning Shaykh al-Islam Zakariyyā al-
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Anṣārī, the teacher of Ibn Ḥajar and the ‘founder’ of the aforementioned commentarial circle;
(2) ‘the commentator’ (al-shārih) or ‘the verifying commentator’ (al-shāriḥ al-muḥaqqiq),
indicating al-Jalāl al-Maḥllī; (3) ‘the Imam’ (al-imām), the title of The Imam of the Two
Sanctuaries al-Juwaynī (d. 478/1085); (4) ‘the Judge’ (al-qāḍī), meaning Judge Hussayn b.
Muḥammad (d. 462/1070), of Khorasan; (5) ‘a commentator’ (shāriḥ), with an indefinite article,
which can mean any of the commentators of the Minhāj or other works; (6) ‘according to what
some have said’ (kamā qālahu baʿḍuhum) or ‘according to what is implied by their talk’ (kama
iqtaḍā kalāmuhum), if used conditional to the being combined with kamā, sometimes signifies
the doctrine while at other times it may not; (7) ‘based on what their talk implies’ (ʿalā ma
iqtaḍā kalāmuhum) or ‘based on what so-and-so have said’ (ʿalā mā qālahuh fulān), a formula
indicating repudiation; (8) ‘based on the relied upon position’ (ʿalā al-muʿtamad), constituting
the ‘more apparent’ (al-aẓhar) between two opinions of al-Shāfiʿī; (9) ‘based on the more valid
perspectives’ (ʿalā al-awjah), i.e. of al-Shāfiʿī’s companions, indicating the preponderant
judgment between two of their positions; (10) ‘that which is apparent’ (alladhī yaẓhar),
signifying that the opinion under investigation is based on the research finding of al-Shāfiʿī’s
companions; (11) ‘the [upshot of] research’ (al-baḥth), meaning that which is clearly understood
from the general discourse of the companions of al-Shāfiʿī that they transmit from the founder
through general means of transmission; (12) if using diacritical, the term ‘possible’ (muḥtamal
 ) ُﻣﺤﺘَ َﻤﻞis used, then indicating preponderance, while ‘probable’ (muḥtamil  ) ُﻣﺤﺘَ ِﻤﻞmeans there is
no preponderance (and if there is no diacritical differentiation, then the position must be
checked in the books of later scholars), and, lastly; (13) ‘the choice’ (al-ikhtiyār), indicating the
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juristic inference of a scholar based on his jurisprudential evidence by way of independent
reasoning (ijtihād), which is different from the approved opinions within the madhhab.206
The above shows that, first, Ibn Ḥajar adopted al-Nawawī’s original terminological
conventions, which the former used in his extensive rule-formulation of the entire legal corpus
that preceded him. An example here is ʿalā al-awjah, which is built on al-Nawawī’s own alawjah, lit. ‘more valid’ perspective, indicating a preponderant opinion belonging to al-Shāfiʿī.
Second, similar to al-Nawawī, Ibn Ḥajar invented some terminological conventions that serves
the unique needs of his juristic orientations. These include shāriḥ and qāla baʿḍuhum, both of
which pertain to discussions and rule-formulations based on the opinions of jurists and
commentators that came after al-Nawawī. Also the original terms like al-baḥth and al-ikhtiyār.
This last one is especially important as it became the standard text to deal with such
verifications of opinions that are evidence based but are from outside the known opinions of alShāfiʿī, especially, as shown in Chapter Two, in relation to al-Nawawī.
Lastly, before moving to examining the juristic operations of Tuḥfa, a brief engagement
with Ibn Ḥajar’s language in terms of its tone and level of its difficulty is needed. While alNawawī is known for his lucid, precise, and accessible language and prose, to the extent that
even for his advanced legal manual Minhāj, “a student of sacred knowledge can read and
understand it without any need for explanation,” the same cannot be said of Ibn Ḥajar.207 Ibn
Ḥajar’s language is verbose and can at times be complex and hard to follow. Despite his
commentary on Minhāj being hailed as the most authoritative and erudite, it is also widely seen
206
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as “the most difficult commentary, with a difficult phrasing.”208 Along with acknowledging Ibn
Ḥajar’s juristic mastery, a cursory reading of Tuḥfa also demonstrates that his language is
verbose and at times obscurely academic and wordy; especially when compared to that of alNawawī’s, as well as that of his rival jurist, al-Jalāl al-Ramlī.

The Masterpiece and the Law
After al-Nawawī and al-Rāfiʿī, later Shāfiʿī scholars worked mainly based on the foundation
that these Two Masters developed, explaining, defending and expanding on the doctrines that
they two of them arrived at. As shown in Chapter One, the commentarial efforts of later scholars
ultimately focused more on al-Nawawī’s works. One important observation here is that there
was a shift in the genre containing the Shāfiʿī doctrines from digests, which mainly contained
the doctrines cultivated by al-Nawawī and al-Rāfiʿī, to expansums. The expansums that housed
Shāfiʿī ijtihad and doctrines, as we shall see below, were authored by a circle of scholars
consisting of Shaykh al-Islam Zakariyyā al-Anṣārī (d. 926/1520) and his erudite students. This
circle includes: al-Shihāb al-Ramlī (d. 957/1550), and his son al-Shams al-Ramlī, (d.
1004/1596), al-Khaṭīb al-Shirbīnī (d. 977/1570), Ibn Ḥajar Ibn Ḥajar, and others.
Ibn Ḥajar’s juristic operations within the framework of the Shāfiʿī school can be
characterized by his uncompromising attitude towards compliance to Shāfiʿī orthodoxy and
defense of the Shāfiʿī school, its founder, and its doctrine. Unlike al-Nawawī, who performed
208
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independent evidence-based inference through which he arrived at numerous unique juristic
preferences (ikhtiyārāt), Ibn Ḥajar, despite his outstanding juristic credentials, was a different
jurist. He was highly committed to the principles and doctrines of the Shāfiʿī school in a way
that eclipsed any personal interest in pursuing any unique or independent positions. Ibn Ḥajar
could have surely performed juristic review between established and existing legal opinions, in
addition to defending Shāfiʿī doctrines. However, one can characterize the majority of his legal
work as a defense of the opinions of the Two Masters or one of them, especially in the face of
later scholars who disagreed with the al-Nawawī, especially al-Bulqīnī, al-Isnawī, and alAdhruʿī.209 Ibn Ḥajar never chose opinions that differ the school’s doctrines. Even though he
passionately defends the doctrines that al-Nawawī and al-Rāfiʿī agree on, he never agreed with
al-Nawawī on any of the latter's independent juristic preferences, or ikhtiyārāt. “Shāfiʿī
doctrines are not established by the ikhtiyārāt of al-Nawawī, may Allah be well pleased with
him, as he uses this phrasing to indicate that which is preponderant for him, not because it is the
doctrine. We are Shāfiʿīs, not Nawawīs,” Ibn Ḥajar asserted in one of his fatwas by way
narrating this previous statement of Walī al-Dīn al-ʿIrāqī (826/1422).210
Ibn Ḥajar is a faithful defender of the Two Master’s jurisprudence, without a known
exception. According to Rashīd, the types of legal contributions of Ibn Ḥajar performs in Tuḥfa,
can be classified into the following categories: (1) providing evidence of the established rulings
of the madhhab; (2) exercising rule formulation or preponderance (tarjīḥ) between the rulings
accepted within the madhhab; (3) unifying what is seemingly contradictory from among the
209
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legal texts of the madhhab; (4) restricting what is seemingly unrestricted within the rulings of
the madhhab; (5) identifying legal distinctions among the positions of the madhhab; (6)
reexamining and tracing the debates and opinions of the jurists of the madhhab, and; (7) issuing
fatwas based on extracting corollary rulings (tafrīʿ).211 I will attempt below to provide a few
examples and brief analysis of some of some of the aforementioned juristic operations, in an
attempt to demonstrate the types of ijtihād and legal thought of Ibn Ḥajar. By this I hope to
show that Ibn Ḥajar’s iijtihād, limited in scope as it may, is a testimony that independent and
innovative juristic efforts were still performed in the tenth/sixteenth century by the jurists like
Ibn Ḥajar; even if within areas and scope different from what preceded him, based on the new
needs of the ever-evolving precedent-based legal tradition of the Shāfiʿī madhhab.

Examples of the Juristic Contributions of the Tuḥfa
Rule-Formulation from among Accepted Opinions
In this first example, Ibn Ḥajar exercises rule-formulation (tarjīḥ) between different opinions
that fall within the established views of the madhhab. The issue is whether combining a worldly
intention with a religious one in the same action is valid. This example is especially important
since it relates to one of the most salient issues in Islamic law, i.e. intention (niyya). As we can
see here, as part of his ijtihād on the topic, Ibn Ḥajar engages with this topic by rejecting,
critiquing or building on some of the biggest authorities of the Shāfiʿī school. He definitively
chooses an innovative opinion, rejecting the known opinion of the ‘Sultan of the ʿulamāʾ al-ʿIzz
b. ʿAbd al-Salām (d. 660/1262), who states that combining worldly and other-worldly intentions
211
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leaves no reward whatsoever for any given action. Instead, he builds on al-Ghazālī, who claims
that if the motive of the hereafter is predominant, outweighing that of the here-now, then the
action will be rewarded. Ibn Ḥajar performs preponderance between these opinions arguing that,
unless the worldly motive involved is prohibited, like showing off, one will be reward in a way
commensurate with the religious intention alone. Thus, he comments on al-Nawawī’s text in
Minhāj (which appears throughout all the following examples in bold), as follows,
(Whosoever intended cooling off) or cleaning up [by washing up], (combined with a
recognized intention), as previously mentioned, (then this action is valid); i.e. this does not ruin
one’s recognized intention, (as per the valid (ṣaḥīḥ) opinions). If one did not have a special
intention, then there is no invalid sharing of intentions. Things are treated differently though with
regard to religious reward (thawāb). There is a disagreement whether a thawāb is altogether
granted in this case. The stronger opinions (awjah), based on my explanation, along with its
evidences in the supra-commentary of al-Īḍāḥ and other works, is that one is rewarded for the
intention of worship in a way commensurate with its scale.212

This position is different from Ibn ʿAbd al-Salām, who denies that there is a reward altogether.
It is also different from al-Ghazālī, who argues that if an act of worship is mixed with a
prohibited matter like showing off, there shall be no reward. This is markedly different from the
ijtihād of the former, who believes that the judgment depends on which of the two motives
outweighs the other. There will also be reward for the otherworldly motive according to Ibn
Ḥajar, even if it is little; unlike al-Ghazālī who believes that this will only happen if the
otherworldly motive exceeds the worldly one.213
Another instance of performing tarjīḥ is on the question of whether it is allowed for men
to wear more than one silver ring. Unlike al-Ramlī and al-Khaṭīb al-Shirbīnī, Ibn Ḥajar
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absolutely prohibits wearing more than one, whether on one hand or two, arguing, “What is
ought to be a relied-upon position (alladhī yattajih iʿtimāduh) is the opinion in [al-Nawawī’s]
Rawḍa which is clear in absolutely prohibiting [wearing] multiple rings.”214 Unlike in instances
where al-Nawawī chooses an opinion independent from both the founder and established
opinions within the school, Ibn Hajar’s ijtihād leads him to adopt this position of only allowing
a single ring, contrary to other late-classical authorities in the maddhab.

Restricting the Unrestricted
As an example of an ijtihād in restricting a seemingly general, unrestricted rule, based on the
doctrines of the madhhab, there is the issue of whether a copy of the Qur’an that was desecrated
with a ritually filthy matter should be washed, even if this results in destroying the physical
copy. After citing the predominant opinion that deems the washing obligatory, regardless of the
consequences, Ibn Ḥajar restricts his innovative position to cases in which filth touches the
actual text of the Qur’an, not the cover or the margins. As part of the investigation on filth and
how it should be removed, Ibn Ḥajar asserts,
(The more apparent opinion (aẓhar) is that the water used in the process of purification
(ghusāla) is ritually clean (ṭāhir)), whether for a matter that is ritually deemed impure (najāsa)
that pardoned or otherwise. Distinguishing between the two is not valid, because the place subject
for performing this distinction is the locale before cleansing was performed. This is supported by
what was previously examined, that the pardoned impurities used water (mustaʿmal) (if it
separates) from the place it contaminated, while it is little (without changing), in weight,
keeping in mind that the water a dress absorbs and gives off in clear dirt. Uncertainty in both
cases is valid; (and if the place is cleaned) by there not being a taste, color, or smell [of filth]
that can be easily removed… Someone issued a fatwa regarding a book of Qurʾān (muṣḥaf) that
214
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was desecrated with a ritual impurity that cannot be pardoned, adjuring that it has to be washed,
even if this leads to damaging it, even if it belongs to an [minor] orphan. This should only be
made obligatory on the content if the filth touched the [text of] Qurʾān; unlike if it is on the
leather cover or the margins.215

As we can see, Ibn Ḥajar’s ijtihādic synthesis here results in the possibility of preserving a
desecrated physical copy of a Qur’ān, which was much more expensive before mass printing.
This was achieved by restricting the rule that was previously unrestricted, making it obligatory
to wash impurities off. Previous judicial reviews of the matter concluded that if a copy of a
Qur’an is dirtied, it must be washed completely; even if this results in damaging it. Not only did
Ibn Ḥajar restrict this ruling on the obligation to remove impurity, but he did so in relation to
Islamic scripture, a revered object, and thus preserving the copy, unless the filth touches the
actual scripted text.

Distinguishing Between Juristic Positions
As for identifying distinctions among the legal positions within the madhhab, the following
example which deals with distinguishing the rulings on abortions and coitus interruptus (ʿazl),
gives a good idea of Ibn Ḥajar’s juristic precisionin creating subtle and necessary juristic
distinctions. While some scholars, like Ibn ʿImād al-Aqafahsī (d. 808/1405), argue that it is
prohibited (ḥarām) to cause the abortion before the hundred and twenty day scriptural limit, by
which the soul is ‘blown into the fetus’, which is said to be hundred twenty days from
conception. Ibn Ḥajar draws the line between two abortion and coitus interruptus. In Minhāj, in
the section ‘The Term of Waiting that Ends With Delivering,’ al-Nawawī asserts, “the waiting
period (ʿidda) of a pregnant woman ends with delivery, conditional to the child’s being
215
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attributed to the father is subject of the waiting period, even if based on a probability… it ends
with a dead child, not a clot (ʿalaqa), or tissues (muḍgha) that have an undeveloped human
form, as told by expert midwives. If it does not have a form, and they said ‘it is the origin of the
human form’, it [i.e. the waiting period] is terminated according to the doctrine.”216
Commenting on the previous passage, Ibn Ḥajar moves on to argue,
They [the jurists] differed on intentional abortion when the period has not reached the established
limit to blow the spirit, which is hundred and twenty days. What is seen as valid for Ibn al-ʿImād
and others who agree with him is that it is prohibited. This should not be confused with the
permissibility of performing coitus interruptus (ʿazl), because of the clarity of the difference
between them, as when it is ejaculated, the sperm is a mere inanimate object, that is not yet ready
for life in any way. 217

Rewriting a Baseless Cause for a Rule
Ibn Ḥajar’s juristic operations are more diverse than the previous examples show or this space
allows. Other than performing rule-formulation from among available juristic positions
accepted by the madhhab, restricting ruling that were left without limitations, identifying the
different applicabilities of juristic ruling on different cases, I want to briefly present two more
examples of these diverse operations. This example will be from the sections on interpersonal
transactions (muʿāmalāt). First, on re-examining and tracing the previous debates and positions
of the scholars of the madhhab, here is an example related to favoring one of the children in a
will. In Tuḥfa, Ibn Ḥajar contradicts the position of other scholars, including al-Rāfiʿī, who
deem it preferable for parents to not favor some of their children over others, especially boys;
especially in relation girls’ inheritance or share from an endowment. He argues,
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It occurs to many to endow their money, while still fit, to males from among their children, with
the intention of depriving the females. It has occurred several times that more than one individual
has issued a fatwa declaring the endowment (waqf) in this case annulled. This must be
reconsidered (fihī naẓar). Rather, the valid perspective is that this is correct. Firstly, we do not
submit to the assumption that the objective of deprivation [of the females] is sinful, since our
imams [i.e. the Shāfiʿīs], just like the majority of ulema, agree that giving money, be all or some,
as a gift, endowment, or other, to a particular child/children does not enter into prohibition. This
is even the case if there is no known excuse. This makes it clear that the intention of deprivation
is not prohibited, since it is necessary to particularize [the bigger share] without a known excuse.
They [the jurists] have allowed it, as you know. Secondly, submitting to the position of
prohibiting this act is based on the belief in the existence of a sin that falls outside the actual
endowment, like in the case of buying grapes for the sake of making wine out of it. How can this
make it necessarily unlawful?

Ibn Ḥajar deems this act of favoring a certain child with a bigger share valid, arguing that, first,
this is based on an unestablished assumption of the existence of a sinful intention to deprive a
certain child from inheritance. Second, if this assumption cannot be established, there is another
assumption that the endowment is thus annulled. Ibn Ḥajar also digs deeper and asserts that the
actual intention to give a particular share of an inheritance or an endowment to a particular child
is not sinful, in the first place. Therefore, the juristic rules based on this unestablished
assumption are baseless and invalid.218

Extraction of Corollary Rulings
As an example of issuing fatwas based on original extraction of corollary rulings (tafrīʿ), this
ability to extract new rulings is a salient feature of Ibn Ḥajar’s legal thought. Interestingly, with
regard to whether it is better for someone who prays the dawn prayer in Mecca to perform or to
circumambulate the Kaʿba or to stay until one prays the sunrise prayer. First, Ibn Ḥajar
contradicts both his own teacher, Shaykh Zakariyyā al-Anṣārī, and his contemporaneous Shāfiʿī
218
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jurist, al-Ramlī, both of whom give preference to circumambulation. After presenting three
evidences for the difference in virtue of acts of worship, the superiority of staying in worship
until sunrise, and some scholars’ disliking of circumambulating the Kaʿba right after sunrise,
and rebutting the evidences of the opposing views, he established the superiority of staying in
worship until sunrise.219

Conclusion

In Islamic Intellectual History in the Seventeenth Century, which examines the understudied
intellectual history under the Ottomans and in Maghreb, Khaled El-Rouayheb, asserts that,
contrary to widespread perceptions of stagnation and spread of fanaticism, Islamic (rational)
sciences were cultivated vigorously in this period of Islamic intellectual history.220 He also
argues there existed an “impersonal and textual model of the transmission of knowledge,”
which is based on ‘deep reading’, that he attributes to educational reforms and increased interest
in rational sciences in the tenth/sixteenth century.221 This conclusion is relevant to this research
project. Ibn Ḥajar al-Haytamī is the leading representative the tenth/sixteenth century’s
commentarial tradition, whose deep reading, research and textual activities, have surely
contributed to the process El-Rouayheb describes. Ibn Ḥajar is the most important prominent
representative of the commentarial tradition within the the Shāfiʿī school.
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Ibn Ḥajar’s commentary, Tuḥfat al-muḥtāj, on al-Nawawī’s classic, Minhāj al-ṭālibīn,
stands tall in the post-classical era. It consists of linguistic, juristic, jurisprudential and
theological elements that make it deserving of its status, with no close rivals other than Nihāyat
al-muḥtāj af al-Shams al-Ramlī. There are similarities between al-Nawawī and Ibn Ḥajar in
their projects. First, when it comes to language, Ibn Ḥajar, like all other late Shāfiʿī scholars,
followed and developed the innovative terminological conventions that al-Nawawī invented and
used in his works. Ibn Ḥajar, in return, developed a (smaller) number of innovative terms that
pertain to his discussions, investigations and juristic reviews from the time after al-Nawawī. In
specific, these terms alluded to either his contemporary authoritative interlocutors or doctrinal
investigations. However, his language was much less accessible, much more technical than alNawawī; as well as his main rival, al-Jalāl al-Ramlī. Second, with regard to juristic
investigations, he is considered a first-tier defender of Shāfiʿī doctrines, which consist of the
agreements of al-Nawawī and al-Rāfiʿī. The above shows the breadth and depth of the legal
efforts of Ibn Ḥajar and his independent reasoning, culminating in his work crowning within the
Shāfiʿī school.
Even if limited to a certain scope due to the trickling down and accumulation of
methodological conventions, Ibn Ḥajar’s ijtihād within the commentarial genre is still
momentous and lasting in its effect. His ijtihād in Tuḥfa may not have been absolute, wideranging, or have overhauled the established methodological traditions of Shāfiʿism. Still, his
contributions advanced the madhhab in many ways. This includes exercising rule-formulation
or preponderance (tarjīḥ) between the previous binding rulings, restricting unrestricted within
the rulings of the madhhab, identifying legal distinctions among the different legal positions,
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reassessing the outcomes the previous debates and opinions of the jurists of the madhhab, and
issuing fatwas based on extending corollary rulings. Whether by supporting the established
Shāfiʿī doctrines as concurred by the ‘Two Masters’, performing exercising rule-formulation or
extracting corollary rulings, unifying, restricting, distinguishing different legal rulings and
doctrines—all of these operations are among the many valuable contributions of Ibn Ḥajar to
Shāfiʿism.
However, Ibn Ḥajar was a different scholar and man from al-Nawawī. Al-Nawawī
consolidated the foundations of Shafiʿī doctrines, reviewing the previously unmanageable
diverse Shāfiʿī legal corpus, by way of arriving at the doctrines of the school and authenticating
its scriptural proofs and narrations from the two hermeneutical sub-schools of the Khurasanians
and the Iraqians. At the same time, he also is known for his numerous evidence-based juristic
preferences (ikhtiyārāt) that differ with al-Shāfiʿī’s opinions. The same, however, cannot be said
of Ibn Ḥajar. Despite his juristic qualifications and mastery in rule-formulation, he kept the
scope of his juristic operations faithfully within the conformist boundaries of Shāfiʿī doctrines.
Even though he tirelessly defended al-Nawawī and al-Rāfiʿī in their efforts to establish the
doctrines of the school, he provided many contributions in defense of the madhhab, including
against the evidence-based innovative opinions of al-Nawawī that fall outside the established
opinions of the school’s doctrines, which al-Nawawī himself helped consolidate.222 “We are
Shāfiʿīs, not Nawawīs,” is a succinct characterization of Ibn Ḥajar’s affinities in this regard.
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Conclusion

A literary tradition like the Shāfiʿī madhhab is a complex and multilayered structure, filled with
paradigms, undercurrents, and a massive library. In an attempt to analyze the development of
the Shāfiʿī literary tradition and its two most authoritative texts, this thesis presented a typology
of the Shāfiʿī textual production in order to form a theory of texts. This theory of texts suggests
that the development of the Shāfiʿī library was the outcome of a critical interplay of two main
forces; a continuous tension between internal hermeneutical currents and diverging social needs.
Despite different historical circumstances and developments, this critical and accumulative
process of juristic textual production has ultimately favored a traditionist-leaning hermeneutical
approach. This effort was championed by the verification and authentication projects of alNawawī (d. 676/1278), who came to be considered as an axial authority in the school, along
with his peer and second in influence, al-Rāfiʿī (d. 633/1236). The pair came to be known as the
‘Two Masters’ (al-shaykhān). Despite layers of critical and diverse juristic engagements, the
Shāfiʿī school continues to build mainly on al-Nawawī’s lasting juristic legacy, through scores
of diverse commentaries, super-commentaries, abridgments and contemporary adaptations of
classical texts.
The above-mentioned typology, which adopted a periodization scheme based on the
indigenous developments of Shāfiʿī history, rather than the standard European historical periods,
resulted in further findings. First, that the foundational rationale of the madhhab and the
interpretive tensions that accompanied its beginning continued to influence the Shāfiʿī school;
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especially until its stabilization and, to a lesser degree, beyond. The foundational methdological
and interpretive solution that Imam al-Shāfiʿī put in place when he established the madhhab, in
order to treat the interpretive tensions that burdened the Muslim populace and scholarly
communities during his lifetime, presisted after him. These tensions were mainly between the
traditionalism of the Mālikis and the rationalism of the Ḥanafis. They lingered and were
reinvented as two interpretive sub-schools (ṭarīqas) that competed within the accepted
frameworks of Shāfiʿī jurisprudence. This tension between traditionist and rationalist
approaches to Shāfiʿism can be traced throughout its epochs: from the inclinations of alShāfiʿī’s two most important students and the main transmitters of his juristic teachings, alBuwayṭī (d. 232/847) and al-Muzanī (d. 264/878); to the proliferation of these approaches
through the spread of the taʿlīqas, or dissertations produced by advanced Shāfiʿī students that
were introduced by Ibn Surayj (d. 306/919); to the solidification of the Iraqi and Khurasanian
sub-schools, and, finally, to the decisive reconciliation of the two subschools by al-Nawawī and
al-Rāfiʿī in the seventh/thirteenth century.
The theory of texts also highlighted the existence of an interconnected series of juristic
operations that channel through Shāfiʿī legal and textual history. These operations started with
legal deductions, theory and rulings of the eponym; both in his ‘old’ (qadīm) madhhab, which
was almost entirely abrogated by the ‘new’ madhhab he constructed after settling in Cairo. Even
though his juristic corpus was contained in a massive compendium, two digests by al-Buwayṭī
and al-Muzanī were more effective than his own work in preserving and propagating his legacy,
due to their suitability for educational purposes. Although the following operations have been
applied throughout the ages, the juristic operations that characterize the first three centuries of
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the Shāfiʿī school, from the third/ninth to the sixth/twelfth century, are the following:
transmission (naql) ( accompanied by synthesizing the opinions (jamʿ) of the founders and the
major early mujtahids), editing (ḍabṭ) of texts, filtering of weak opinions (taḥrīr), and of course
commenting and interpreting (sharḥ). This shows clearly in the literary production from those
centuries, especially in the most iconic and influential works from that era; the digests of alMuzanī, al-Muhadhhab of al-Shirāzī’s (d. 476/1084), and al-Ghazālī’s (d. 505/1111) al-Wasīṭ,
and al-Wajīz.
The major educational, social, and judicial needs that influenced Shāfiʿī literary
production between the third/ninth and the sixth/twelfth centuries included the need to explain
the juristic doctrines, the introduction of madrasas later on, and the need to provide shorthand
juristic references for the judges. The major writing genres at the time were digests, along with
the newly introduced genres of taʿlīqas, biographical dictionaries of jurists, and massive
encyclopedias. Also, in the same way that support from the Seljuk and Ayyubid rulers boosted
the presence and influence of the madhhab in social, educational and judicial settings, its
exclusion from heading the fatwa institutions under the Mamluks and the Ottomans, even in
places where it was prominent, has had a weakening effect; especially on the development of
the fiqh of interpersonal exchange (muʿāmalāt).
The following three centuries were characterized by a surge in the spread of the
madhhab and, consequently, the gradual moving away from the founder’s doctrines and
methodology. The most pervasive consolidation of legal positions (tanqīḥ) and rule-formulation
(tarjīḥ) came in the seventh/thirteenth century in the works of al-Nawawī and al-Rāfiʿī and
stabilized the madhhab. This process was akin to a canonization of juristic doctrines. Their
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contributions established the doctrines of the school and decisively reconciled and abrogated its
sub-schools. As the Shāfiʿī corpus amplified, and its doctrinal and authorial references
diversified, new needs emerged. Thus, the mounting necessity for the process of authenticating
(takhrīj or taḥqīq), especially of scriptural evidence, became apparent. Also, in the face of
growing new juristic questions from society, deriving corollary rulings (tafrīʿ) became
inevitable. The emergence of these two processes signified the need for the doctrinal coherence
of the entire school. The accomplishment of al-Nawawī and al-Rāfiʿī did not fall short of that.
Al-Nawawī’s efforts in particular led to two significant outcomes. First, the synthesizing of the
Iraqi and Khurasanian sub-schools that existed up to his own time, with disagreements between
representatives of the two sub-schools cited in educational circles around him.223 Second, the
diverse and unregulated juristic works that preceded the Two Masters became virtually obsolete.
Some scholars, like El Shamsy, believe that later agreement among scholars that the doctrines of
the madhhab are those which the Two Masters agreed on have stifled later juristic innovation.
However, al-Nawawī’s critical and independent juristic erudition led to not only the
consolidation of the madhhab from his time onward; they also brought about numerous
independent ḥadīth evidence-based legal preferences (ikhtiyārāt) that differ from those of the
founder of the school. 224
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The books of al-Nawawī, especially Minhāj al-ṭālibīn, were eventually proven central--if
not centering--to the entire later madhhab. Minhāj is a culmination of other intentional efforts
by al-Nawawī that are in line with his traditionist orientation and those of his source of
inspiration: jurist and ḥadīth master Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ (d. 643/1245). Although the two never met, Ibn
al-Ṣalāḥ was the teacher of al-Nawawī’s main teachers. Al-Nawawī used his chain of
transmission for narrating the books of the madhhab. He also completed and commented on
some of his works. More importantly, al-Nawawī completed Ibn al-Sālāḥ’s project to reconcile
the Iraqi and Khorsanian sub-schools, mainly favoring the Iraqi traditionist approach; an
inclination that is clear in al-Nawawī’s tarjīḥs in Rawḍa and al-Muajmūʿ.225
It is not a coincidence that the most authoritative commentary in the Shāfiʿī school,
Tuḥfat al-muḥtāj of Ibn Hajar (d. 974/1567), is a commentary on its most authoritative digest by
al-Nawawī, i.e. Minhāj. There are three centuries worth of critical engagements with alNawawī’s legacy, especially in Minhāj, including harsh critics like al-Isnawī (d. 722/1372),
which established its unshakable authoritative standing. The literary acumen of Tuḥfa
essentially consists in the quality and scope of of Ibn Ḥajar’s engagement with all the other
commentaries on al-Nawawī’s work. He also performed some innovative verifications. His
trajectory was rather different from that of al-Nawawī, however. While al-Nawawī performed
numerous ijtihāds in the form of ikhtiyārāt, or evidence-based juristic formulations that are
different from the opinions of his madhhab, Ibn Ḥajar was a different kind of jurist. Ibn Ḥajar’s
main juristic operations included defending the doctrines of the madhhab, including those that
al-Nawawī and al-Rāfiʿī arrived at and agreed on, revisiting some old verification and
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examining new issues. However, whenever al-Nawawī differed with the established opinions of
the school, Ibn Ḥajar rebutted his arguments for the sake of defending the doctrines. Ibn Ḥajar’s
other operations included innovative tarjīḥ between the previous rulings, restricting the scope of
previous rulings and distinguishing between similar rulings, among others.
Both al-Nawawī in the seventh/thirteenth century and, to a lesser scope, Ibn Ḥajar in the
tenth/sixteenth century, exercised partial and narrational ijtihāds (ijtihād juzʾī and ijtihād biriwāya); deducing juristic rulings in some legal topics or categories (not universally), and
arriving at independent rulings regarding the authenticity of the narration of legal opinions from
the mujtahids of the madhhab, respectively. This still means, based on their qualifications and
gradual critical solidification of the school’s doctrines, that they performed important types of
ijtihād that fit the stage of development of their precedence-based legal tradition. One of the
main points this research project highlights is the need to study the implications of the departure
of juristic ijtihād from the genres of digest to the genre of expansums post-stabilization, during
the ‘commentarial period’, known as ʿaṣr al-ḥawāshī. That is not to say that this advancement
was uniform in all departments. As Chapter Three showed, innovations in the field of
interpersonal exchange (muʿāmalāt) were weakened by the removal of Shāfiʿism from being the
main madhhab for issuing fatwas in the official fatwa institutions under the Ottomans. As our
study of Tuḥfa demonstrated, there is much more legal thought and innovation in the
commentarial sources than we know about, because of the current dismissal of the intellectual
production from this era. Such a realization will take more than a decolonial commitment to go
beyond orientalist perceptions of this period as a ‘dark age’ of decline, full of either intellectual
gymnastics or stale reproductions. It requires a familiarity with their terminology, discursivity,
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purpose, approach to textual analysis, appreciation for linguistic and logical investigations, and
engagement with the other commentators from their tradition.
Finally, the textual analysis of Minhāj and Tuḥfa has clearly demonstrated the importance
of studying the field of juristic terminologies (muṣṭalaḥāt fiqhiyya) in unveiling the breadth of
the juristic operations in legal texts. The terminological system that al-Nawawī innovated to
signify the source, strength, and degree of disagreement with each juristic opinion that he
verified was essential to his mission. The same was proven for Ibn Ḥajar. In his case, his
glossary was mainly related to his interlocutors from the commentarial tradition. Despite it
being a key to unlock the depth of juristic operations, to the best of my knowledge, this topic
has not yet been studied adequately.
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ī

ā
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ī

ā
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ā

ā
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ī

ṭ
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ī

ā
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ī

ā
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ā

Ḥ
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ā

á

ạ

ṭ
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